|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : yow|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Navigation In Use||Other|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
pilot : instrument
pilot : flight engineer
pilot : commercial
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 90|
flight time total : 6500
flight time type : 1000
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||non adherence other|
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
This incident arose due to differences between us and canadian clearance procedures. For the last 4 yrs or so of my flying with a major airline utilizing canned flight plans and due to major congestion at many airports, I developed the acceptable (and often requested) procedure of receiving a clearance and only reading back flight number and transponder code. At the canadian airport in question, I received the clearance and read back my flight number and transponder code. Clearance delivery (clearance delivery) informed me that under canadian rules I had to read back the entire clearance, which I did. Part of the clearance was providing the departure runway (which at most us airports is given only on the ATIS) 'runway 25'. I had written this at '25' and in my haste to read back the clearance, I misread as '2500'.' again I needed to be corrected. In a rushed push back (our flight was now 30 min late) during which the captain did not call for the required checklist (before start) and I had to ask if he would like me to read it, the captain also communicated with ramp personnel and allowed pushback to begin without conferring with me or inquiring whether pushback clearance was required (this was the captain's first time into a canadian airport). In lieu of these circumstances and the fact that this airport has little traffic (it has been my experience that uncongested airports do not require pushback clearance) I did not call for pushback clearance and continued the before start checklist. After pushback, still monitoring clearance delivery, I heard our call sign (actually, I just had not had time to switch my radio to ground for taxi, it was coincidence that I was still on clearance delivery) I answered and clearance delivery asked why we pushed back without clearance. He said he had told me previously to contact him prior to pushback. I said that I had not heard that request. He informed me again of 'correct procedures' at this airport and that the reason for the request was because of the location of an active taxiway at the far end of the ramp (where we pushed back). It is my belief that I did not hear the 'call me prior to pushback' because of my frustration at not being more aware of reading entire clearance and then reading it back incorrectly. En route, I checked our information on this airport in my charts and found nothing to aid me in reviewing canadian requirements. After 5 yrs with a major airline, flying under us rules and utilizing the efficient expedited procedures we have developed here, have become normal and routine. It is frustrating to be caught with your pants down not realizing when standard becomes nonstandard. I am a professional, and this seemingly nonprofessional event concerns me. Because of this being my first time copying a canadian clearance since I began the 'short form' of clearance readback, almost never flying into a canadian airport, my errors associated with this particular clearance (i.e., not 'hearing' the request to call clearance delivery prior to pushback, misreading '25') and the lack of pushback communication and confirmation between the captain and myself, my usual precaution of calling for pushback clearance (usually a call to ground control) at an unfamiliar airport was disregarded. It is my suggestion that for those of us who seldom cross the border, a page of information in our charts pertaining to items like the aforementioned would not only save a pilot from sounding unprofessional unknowingly, but would highlight the differences in procedures for the enhancement of safety.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FAILURE TO FOLLOW CANADIAN ARPT PROCS. PUSHBACK WITHOUT CLRNC POSSIBLY ONTO ACTIVE TXWY.
Narrative: THIS INCIDENT AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND CANADIAN CLRNC PROCS. FOR THE LAST 4 YRS OR SO OF MY FLYING WITH A MAJOR AIRLINE UTILIZING CANNED FLT PLANS AND DUE TO MAJOR CONGESTION AT MANY ARPTS, I DEVELOPED THE ACCEPTABLE (AND OFTEN REQUESTED) PROC OF RECEIVING A CLRNC AND ONLY READING BACK FLT NUMBER AND XPONDER CODE. AT THE CANADIAN ARPT IN QUESTION, I RECEIVED THE CLRNC AND READ BACK MY FLT NUMBER AND XPONDER CODE. CLRNC DELIVERY (CD) INFORMED ME THAT UNDER CANADIAN RULES I HAD TO READ BACK THE ENTIRE CLRNC, WHICH I DID. PART OF THE CLRNC WAS PROVIDING THE DEP RWY (WHICH AT MOST U.S. ARPTS IS GIVEN ONLY ON THE ATIS) 'RWY 25'. I HAD WRITTEN THIS AT '25' AND IN MY HASTE TO READ BACK THE CLRNC, I MISREAD AS '2500'.' AGAIN I NEEDED TO BE CORRECTED. IN A RUSHED PUSH BACK (OUR FLT WAS NOW 30 MIN LATE) DURING WHICH THE CAPT DID NOT CALL FOR THE REQUIRED CHECKLIST (BEFORE START) AND I HAD TO ASK IF HE WOULD LIKE ME TO READ IT, THE CAPT ALSO COMMUNICATED WITH RAMP PERSONNEL AND ALLOWED PUSHBACK TO BEGIN WITHOUT CONFERRING WITH ME OR INQUIRING WHETHER PUSHBACK CLRNC WAS REQUIRED (THIS WAS THE CAPT'S FIRST TIME INTO A CANADIAN ARPT). IN LIEU OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE FACT THAT THIS ARPT HAS LITTLE TFC (IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT UNCONGESTED ARPTS DO NOT REQUIRE PUSHBACK CLRNC) I DID NOT CALL FOR PUSHBACK CLRNC AND CONTINUED THE BEFORE START CHECKLIST. AFTER PUSHBACK, STILL MONITORING CLRNC DELIVERY, I HEARD OUR CALL SIGN (ACTUALLY, I JUST HAD NOT HAD TIME TO SWITCH MY RADIO TO GND FOR TAXI, IT WAS COINCIDENCE THAT I WAS STILL ON CLRNC DELIVERY) I ANSWERED AND CLRNC DELIVERY ASKED WHY WE PUSHED BACK WITHOUT CLRNC. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY TO CONTACT HIM PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT HEARD THAT REQUEST. HE INFORMED ME AGAIN OF 'CORRECT PROCS' AT THIS ARPT AND THAT THE REASON FOR THE REQUEST WAS BECAUSE OF THE LOCATION OF AN ACTIVE TXWY AT THE FAR END OF THE RAMP (WHERE WE PUSHED BACK). IT IS MY BELIEF THAT I DID NOT HEAR THE 'CALL ME PRIOR TO PUSHBACK' BECAUSE OF MY FRUSTRATION AT NOT BEING MORE AWARE OF READING ENTIRE CLRNC AND THEN READING IT BACK INCORRECTLY. ENRTE, I CHECKED OUR INFO ON THIS ARPT IN MY CHARTS AND FOUND NOTHING TO AID ME IN REVIEWING CANADIAN REQUIREMENTS. AFTER 5 YRS WITH A MAJOR AIRLINE, FLYING UNDER U.S. RULES AND UTILIZING THE EFFICIENT EXPEDITED PROCS WE HAVE DEVELOPED HERE, HAVE BECOME NORMAL AND ROUTINE. IT IS FRUSTRATING TO BE CAUGHT WITH YOUR PANTS DOWN NOT REALIZING WHEN STANDARD BECOMES NONSTANDARD. I AM A PROFESSIONAL, AND THIS SEEMINGLY NONPROFESSIONAL EVENT CONCERNS ME. BECAUSE OF THIS BEING MY FIRST TIME COPYING A CANADIAN CLRNC SINCE I BEGAN THE 'SHORT FORM' OF CLRNC READBACK, ALMOST NEVER FLYING INTO A CANADIAN ARPT, MY ERRORS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PARTICULAR CLRNC (I.E., NOT 'HEARING' THE REQUEST TO CALL CLRNC DELIVERY PRIOR TO PUSHBACK, MISREADING '25') AND THE LACK OF PUSHBACK COM AND CONFIRMATION BETWEEN THE CAPT AND MYSELF, MY USUAL PRECAUTION OF CALLING FOR PUSHBACK CLRNC (USUALLY A CALL TO GND CTL) AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT WAS DISREGARDED. IT IS MY SUGGESTION THAT FOR THOSE OF US WHO SELDOM CROSS THE BORDER, A PAGE OF INFO IN OUR CHARTS PERTAINING TO ITEMS LIKE THE AFOREMENTIONED WOULD NOT ONLY SAVE A PLT FROM SOUNDING UNPROFESSIONAL UNKNOWINGLY, BUT WOULD HIGHLIGHT THE DIFFERENCES IN PROCS FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF SAFETY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.