Narrative:

Upon taxi out of ord, our WX radar indicated thunderstorm cells beginning about 5 mi southwest of the field. When in position for takeoff on runway 27L, tower cleared us for takeoff, with instructions to turn to 250 degree heading. Before beginning our roll, we reported we would not be able to remain on that heading for long, due to WX. Tower responded that we would not have to. After takeoff tower sent us to departure frequency 127.4. This is not the normal wbound frequency, most likely the first major mistake, and I believe, a large contributing factor. When we checked on with departure, we stated we would soon have to turn to a heading of 270 degree for WX. He responded by directing us to change to frequency 125.4, this being the proper frequency for our direction. Upon checking in, we now stated we were in a turn to 270 degree heading for WX avoidance. He refused our turn, and upon arriving at a 270 degree heading, we began a turn back to 250 degree heading. He reported we were in conflict with the preceding takeoff traffic that was slower than we were. By turning to the 250 degree heading, we did enter the edge of contouring storm cell as we entered cloud bases. After separation was again established, man on departure requested that the next time we turn, we tell someone ahead of time. I responded that we certainly did, and that the tapes will verify it. I have a couple of afterthoughts, for discussion: in this case, we were fairly light, and was in our turn to 250 degree about at junction of runway 27L and 14R. This gave us a southwest track before leaving airport boundary. How much separation would we have had, if we had been heavy, and started our initial turn at the end of 27L or even 1/2 mi west of that? Another question: how much separation would we have had, if we had had an engine failure, and climbed to 1500' along runway centerline extension, to maintain terrain clearance, as our SOP's dictate? From my viewpoint, this was an obvious case of attempting to get too many aircraft off the ground before ord closed due to WX, as it did shortly thereafter. At our stop (msp) we waited over 1 hour as ord had stopped all arrs. Supplemental information from acn 114683: it appears to me that we had a classic problem of communication during a time of high workload. WX was approaching the field along our departure path. Traffic was heavy at ord and I am sure that the tower was trying to launch aircraft as quickly as possible before WX would shut off departures. All of these little 'goofs' combined to create this incident. I am surprised that 2 aircraft of such differing speed and climb capabilities would be cleared on westerly headings towards WX, so soon behind a slower aircraft. I feel that ATC should realize that mixing aircraft of such different performance characteristics requires extra spacing in the vicinity of WX returns. I feel that the captain was quite earnest in his concern for a safe climb path for our aircraft and had indicated such to the tower and departure controllers during this busy initial climb. I can only assume that departure control was quite busy also with this erroneous initial handoff which resulted in a late handoff to the appropriate controller. These high workloads made communication difficult and the nonstandard radio phraseology impeded this communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR IN UNAUTH HEADING DEVIATION FOR WX ON DEP. DEP VECTOR GIVEN.

Narrative: UPON TAXI OUT OF ORD, OUR WX RADAR INDICATED TSTM CELLS BEGINNING ABOUT 5 MI SW OF THE FIELD. WHEN IN POSITION FOR TKOF ON RWY 27L, TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN TO 250 DEG HDG. BEFORE BEGINNING OUR ROLL, WE REPORTED WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REMAIN ON THAT HDG FOR LONG, DUE TO WX. TWR RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO. AFTER TKOF TWR SENT US TO DEP FREQ 127.4. THIS IS NOT THE NORMAL WBOUND FREQ, MOST LIKELY THE FIRST MAJOR MISTAKE, AND I BELIEVE, A LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. WHEN WE CHECKED ON WITH DEP, WE STATED WE WOULD SOON HAVE TO TURN TO A HDG OF 270 DEG FOR WX. HE RESPONDED BY DIRECTING US TO CHANGE TO FREQ 125.4, THIS BEING THE PROPER FREQ FOR OUR DIRECTION. UPON CHECKING IN, WE NOW STATED WE WERE IN A TURN TO 270 DEG HDG FOR WX AVOIDANCE. HE REFUSED OUR TURN, AND UPON ARRIVING AT A 270 DEG HDG, WE BEGAN A TURN BACK TO 250 DEG HDG. HE REPORTED WE WERE IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRECEDING TKOF TFC THAT WAS SLOWER THAN WE WERE. BY TURNING TO THE 250 DEG HDG, WE DID ENTER THE EDGE OF CONTOURING STORM CELL AS WE ENTERED CLOUD BASES. AFTER SEPARATION WAS AGAIN ESTABLISHED, MAN ON DEP REQUESTED THAT THE NEXT TIME WE TURN, WE TELL SOMEONE AHEAD OF TIME. I RESPONDED THAT WE CERTAINLY DID, AND THAT THE TAPES WILL VERIFY IT. I HAVE A COUPLE OF AFTERTHOUGHTS, FOR DISCUSSION: IN THIS CASE, WE WERE FAIRLY LIGHT, AND WAS IN OUR TURN TO 250 DEG ABOUT AT JUNCTION OF RWY 27L AND 14R. THIS GAVE US A SW TRACK BEFORE LEAVING ARPT BOUNDARY. HOW MUCH SEPARATION WOULD WE HAVE HAD, IF WE HAD BEEN HEAVY, AND STARTED OUR INITIAL TURN AT THE END OF 27L OR EVEN 1/2 MI W OF THAT? ANOTHER QUESTION: HOW MUCH SEPARATION WOULD WE HAVE HAD, IF WE HAD HAD AN ENGINE FAILURE, AND CLIMBED TO 1500' ALONG RWY CENTERLINE EXTENSION, TO MAINTAIN TERRAIN CLRNC, AS OUR SOP'S DICTATE? FROM MY VIEWPOINT, THIS WAS AN OBVIOUS CASE OF ATTEMPTING TO GET TOO MANY ACFT OFF THE GND BEFORE ORD CLOSED DUE TO WX, AS IT DID SHORTLY THEREAFTER. AT OUR STOP (MSP) WE WAITED OVER 1 HR AS ORD HAD STOPPED ALL ARRS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 114683: IT APPEARS TO ME THAT WE HAD A CLASSIC PROBLEM OF COM DURING A TIME OF HIGH WORKLOAD. WX WAS APCHING THE FIELD ALONG OUR DEP PATH. TFC WAS HEAVY AT ORD AND I AM SURE THAT THE TWR WAS TRYING TO LAUNCH ACFT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE WX WOULD SHUT OFF DEPS. ALL OF THESE LITTLE 'GOOFS' COMBINED TO CREATE THIS INCIDENT. I AM SURPRISED THAT 2 ACFT OF SUCH DIFFERING SPEED AND CLIMB CAPABILITIES WOULD BE CLRED ON WESTERLY HDGS TOWARDS WX, SO SOON BEHIND A SLOWER ACFT. I FEEL THAT ATC SHOULD REALIZE THAT MIXING ACFT OF SUCH DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS REQUIRES EXTRA SPACING IN THE VICINITY OF WX RETURNS. I FEEL THAT THE CAPT WAS QUITE EARNEST IN HIS CONCERN FOR A SAFE CLIMB PATH FOR OUR ACFT AND HAD INDICATED SUCH TO THE TWR AND DEP CTLRS DURING THIS BUSY INITIAL CLIMB. I CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT DEP CTL WAS QUITE BUSY ALSO WITH THIS ERRONEOUS INITIAL HANDOFF WHICH RESULTED IN A LATE HANDOFF TO THE APPROPRIATE CTLR. THESE HIGH WORKLOADS MADE COM DIFFICULT AND THE NONSTANDARD RADIO PHRASEOLOGY IMPEDED THIS COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.