Narrative:

Arriving in operations for the flight; we found out the auxiliary power unit was unavailable due to EICAS message oil cluster. Coordination with the ramp crew; providing both external air and external electrical power; was less than ideal. Someone removed both external electrical sources without directions from us and only one electrical source was eventually restored because the other had run out of fuel. That put the aircraft in the dark for awhile and then the aircraft had to spool up its various components before we could gain access to checklists; ensure navigation; performance; and communications data was restored; and the aircraft was prepared to start number 1 engine at the gate via the checklist. Clearance was received from below on the intercom that they were ready for engine start. We had completed the aircraft electronic checklist down to the crossbleed section to be completed after pushback. When the number 1 engine started; all appeared normal right until just after it stabilized at idle. At that time; there was a loud noise and then the entire aircraft began to shake severely - like another large aircraft turning out and sweeping our aircraft; or a mishandled tug; or a first gust from a frontal passage. All the engine instruments were normal and no warning systems were activated. As a precautionary measure; we fuel chopped the number 1 engine and the gyrations stopped. We deduced the engine had ingested something pretty substantial; but it isn't something pilots are trained for per se. After completing the appropriate checklists; and communicating with the cabin crew and passengers; we stepped outside to survey the damage. Due to the lack of an APU; conditioned air was being provided from the jetway. At some point; the large rubberized and metal hose had been ingested long enough to foul the engine with parts distributed throughout the fan section. Since all engine instruments had been normal; we didn't know how much damage had occurred. Many of the changes to the tools used in flight operations have been introduced with little or no training - computer system; wsi weather system; ipad integration - leaving the flight crews to their own devices. Aircraft procedural changes occur automatically; self-downloading into the pilot's ipads with only some summary statement provided in the same manner. Pilot testing results are remediated and training materials are often not updated to current flight manual standards; due in large part to cascading changes involved with the merger of two airlines. I suspect that most divisions operate under the same atmosphere - including maintenance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew reports ingesting a ground air conditioning hose in the number one engine while starting at the gate.

Narrative: Arriving in operations for the flight; we found out the Auxiliary Power Unit was unavailable due to EICAS message OIL CLUSTER. Coordination with the ramp crew; providing both external air and external electrical power; was less than ideal. Someone removed both external electrical sources without directions from us and only one electrical source was eventually restored because the other had run out of fuel. That put the aircraft in the dark for awhile and then the aircraft had to spool up its various components before we could gain access to checklists; ensure navigation; performance; and communications data was restored; and the aircraft was prepared to start Number 1 engine at the gate via the checklist. Clearance was received from below on the intercom that they were ready for engine start. We had completed the aircraft electronic checklist down to the Crossbleed section to be completed after pushback. When the Number 1 engine started; all appeared normal right until just after it stabilized at idle. At that time; there was a loud noise and then the entire aircraft began to shake severely - like another large aircraft turning out and sweeping our aircraft; or a mishandled tug; or a first gust from a frontal passage. All the engine instruments were normal and no warning systems were activated. As a precautionary measure; we fuel chopped the Number 1 engine and the gyrations stopped. We deduced the engine had ingested something pretty substantial; but it isn't something pilots are trained for per se. After completing the appropriate checklists; and communicating with the cabin crew and passengers; we stepped outside to survey the damage. Due to the lack of an APU; conditioned air was being provided from the jetway. At some point; the large rubberized and metal hose had been ingested long enough to foul the engine with parts distributed throughout the fan section. Since all engine instruments had been normal; we didn't know how much damage had occurred. Many of the changes to the tools used in Flight Operations have been introduced with little or no training - computer system; WSI weather system; iPad integration - leaving the flight crews to their own devices. Aircraft procedural changes occur automatically; self-downloading into the pilot's iPads with only some summary statement provided in the same manner. Pilot testing results are remediated and training materials are often not updated to current flight manual standards; due in large part to cascading changes involved with the merger of two airlines. I suspect that most divisions operate under the same atmosphere - including maintenance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.