A B737 crew became distracted during a long slow CAT 3 final accompanied by a temporary; warm temper...

Narrative:

1;200 RVR at our destination. Briefed CAT 3 to 16. Fog layer tops at around 500 ft. Clear above. We were vectored to about a 20 mile final and assigned 190 KTS for spacing. We configured and slowed to meet speed request at flaps 1. After glideslope intercept ATC requested 160 KTS to final. As we attempted to slow there was a quartering tailwind. Aircraft wasn't slowing enough so we put the gear down. We slowed to 160 KTS early in the approach. We both thought to turn on the engine anti-ice but due to an inversion; it was 13 or 14C so we turned it back off. At this point we were configured for the initial approach and began the CAT 3 procedures. We made our pertinent calls to both ATC and for our approach. Between the final approach fix and the 500 ft call; I believe I fixated on the temperature for turning on the engine anti-ice which probably happened at about 900-1;000 ft AGL. The airport surface temperature was 1C. After the 500 ft call; the captain realized our speed was still 160 KTS and our flaps weren't properly configured. I can't recall if we were at flaps 10 or 15. I believe F15 because we selected F25 right about when the too low terrain GPWS sounded. We immediately executed a missed approach and I know I went from F25 to F15. After an uneventful missed approach and subsequent CAT 3 approach to 16R; we parked the jet at the gate and completed our checklists. We then conducted a thorough debrief full of embarrassment and disappointment.I feel ultimately that the responsibility was mine as the overall situation monitor to catch the flap position while the captain performed a HUD monitored approach. We were slowed so early on in the approach that we put the gear down and conducted the landing checklist very early. I then fixated on the engine anti-ice which normally could be just turned on and forgotten but the temperature inversion precluded that. From final approach fix in I concentrated on the autoland and HUD specific monitoring and the prolonged low speed lulled me into a feeling of being configured. Neither I nor the captain considered this an acceptable performance.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 crew became distracted during a long slow CAT 3 final accompanied by a temporary; warm temperature inversion on a very cold night so when the EGPWS alerted TOO LOW TERRAIN at 500 FT because only Flaps 25 was selected; they executed a go-around.

Narrative: 1;200 RVR at our destination. Briefed CAT 3 to 16. Fog layer tops at around 500 FT. Clear above. We were vectored to about a 20 mile final and assigned 190 KTS for spacing. We configured and slowed to meet speed request at Flaps 1. After glideslope intercept ATC requested 160 KTS to final. As we attempted to slow there was a quartering tailwind. Aircraft wasn't slowing enough so we put the gear down. We slowed to 160 KTS early in the approach. We both thought to turn on the engine anti-ice but due to an inversion; it was 13 or 14C so we turned it back off. At this point we were configured for the initial approach and began the CAT 3 procedures. We made our pertinent calls to both ATC and for our approach. Between the final approach fix and the 500 FT call; I believe I fixated on the temperature for turning ON the engine anti-ice which probably happened at about 900-1;000 FT AGL. The airport surface temperature was 1C. After the 500 FT call; the Captain realized our speed was still 160 KTS and our flaps weren't properly configured. I can't recall if we were at Flaps 10 or 15. I believe F15 because we selected F25 right about when the TOO LOW TERRAIN GPWS sounded. We immediately executed a missed approach and I know I went from F25 to F15. After an uneventful missed approach and subsequent CAT 3 approach to 16R; we parked the jet at the gate and completed our checklists. We then conducted a thorough debrief full of embarrassment and disappointment.I feel ultimately that the responsibility was mine as the overall situation monitor to catch the flap position while the Captain performed a HUD monitored approach. We were slowed so early on in the approach that we put the gear down and conducted the landing checklist very early. I then fixated on the engine anti-ice which normally could be just turned on and forgotten but the temperature inversion precluded that. From Final Approach Fix in I concentrated on the autoland and HUD specific monitoring and the prolonged low speed lulled me into a feeling of being configured. Neither I nor the Captain considered this an acceptable performance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1145608
Time
Date	201401
Local Time Of Day	0001-0600
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B737-400
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Initial Approach
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Trailing Edge Flap
Person 1
Function	Pilot Not Flying First Officer
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Person 2
Function	Captain Pilot Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

A B737 crew became distracted during a long slow CAT 3 final accompanied by a temporary; warm temperature inversion on a very cold night so when the egpws alerted too low terrain at 500 ft because only flaps 25 was selected; they executed a go-around.