Narrative:

After landing at kinston, nc the PIC (myself) got off aircraft, performed post-flight (turnaround flight) walk-around inspection and proceeded to the company operations area to obtain flight release papers and updated WX for flight back to bwi. During the period that I was in operations a ground crew member extended the nose gear locking link. (The mdt uses conventional removable locking pins for the main gear, but the nose gear is ground locked for towing, pushback, etc. By an integral locking link actuated by a small pull and turn handle on the forward lower left fuselage.) company procedures authorize the main gear to be pinned and the nose gear link to be engaged only for towing, pushback, overnight parking, and certain maintenance procedures. After engaging the nose lock link, the ground crew member went to base operations and left another person to dispatch the aircraft from the line area. This person was not aware of the lock line being engaged. After takeoff, when gear up selection was made, the nose gear failed to retract and the main gear doors remained open. Suspecting a proximity switch electronic unit (pseu) failure, or a solenoid sequence valve problem, I extended the gear via the alternate gear extension system and made a normal landing at kinston, nc. Ground crew disengaged the lock link and we made a normal takeoff and flight to bwi. The cause of this incident was, simply, an unauthorized action on the part of the ground crew caused by a lack of training. The mdt was introduced to the station (kinston) only the month before and station personnel were not familiar with ground handling procedures. Compounding the problem was the ground crew's failure to tell the flight crew that the lock link had been engaged after the captain had performed his walkaround inspection, and the fact that the person who engaged the lock link did not tell the ground crewman who actually monitored the engine starts and directed the aircraft from the line area. Also, no warning flag was attached to the extended lock link handle even though the flag was available in its designated stowage area on the aircraft. 1) failure to follow standard ground handling procedures caused by a lack of training (the ground crewman actually believed that the lock line was supposed to be engaged on a turnaround flight). 2) failure to communicate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NOSE WHEEL LOCKING LINK ENGAGED BY COMPANY GND PERSONNEL CONTRARY TO COMPANY PROCS, NOT DETECTED BY THE FLT CREW, CAUSING ACFT TO RETURN FOR LNDG.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG AT KINSTON, NC THE PIC (MYSELF) GOT OFF ACFT, PERFORMED POST-FLT (TURNAROUND FLT) WALK-AROUND INSPECTION AND PROCEEDED TO THE COMPANY OPERATIONS AREA TO OBTAIN FLT RELEASE PAPERS AND UPDATED WX FOR FLT BACK TO BWI. DURING THE PERIOD THAT I WAS IN OPERATIONS A GND CREW MEMBER EXTENDED THE NOSE GEAR LOCKING LINK. (THE MDT USES CONVENTIONAL REMOVABLE LOCKING PINS FOR THE MAIN GEAR, BUT THE NOSE GEAR IS GND LOCKED FOR TOWING, PUSHBACK, ETC. BY AN INTEGRAL LOCKING LINK ACTUATED BY A SMALL PULL AND TURN HANDLE ON THE FORWARD LOWER LEFT FUSELAGE.) COMPANY PROCS AUTHORIZE THE MAIN GEAR TO BE PINNED AND THE NOSE GEAR LINK TO BE ENGAGED ONLY FOR TOWING, PUSHBACK, OVERNIGHT PARKING, AND CERTAIN MAINT PROCS. AFTER ENGAGING THE NOSE LOCK LINK, THE GND CREW MEMBER WENT TO BASE OPERATIONS AND LEFT ANOTHER PERSON TO DISPATCH THE ACFT FROM THE LINE AREA. THIS PERSON WAS NOT AWARE OF THE LOCK LINE BEING ENGAGED. AFTER TKOF, WHEN GEAR UP SELECTION WAS MADE, THE NOSE GEAR FAILED TO RETRACT AND THE MAIN GEAR DOORS REMAINED OPEN. SUSPECTING A PROX SWITCH ELECTRONIC UNIT (PSEU) FAILURE, OR A SOLENOID SEQUENCE VALVE PROBLEM, I EXTENDED THE GEAR VIA THE ALTERNATE GEAR EXTENSION SYSTEM AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG AT KINSTON, NC. GND CREW DISENGAGED THE LOCK LINK AND WE MADE A NORMAL TKOF AND FLT TO BWI. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS, SIMPLY, AN UNAUTHORIZED ACTION ON THE PART OF THE GND CREW CAUSED BY A LACK OF TRAINING. THE MDT WAS INTRODUCED TO THE STATION (KINSTON) ONLY THE MONTH BEFORE AND STATION PERSONNEL WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH GND HANDLING PROCS. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM WAS THE GND CREW'S FAILURE TO TELL THE FLT CREW THAT THE LOCK LINK HAD BEEN ENGAGED AFTER THE CAPT HAD PERFORMED HIS WALKAROUND INSPECTION, AND THE FACT THAT THE PERSON WHO ENGAGED THE LOCK LINK DID NOT TELL THE GND CREWMAN WHO ACTUALLY MONITORED THE ENGINE STARTS AND DIRECTED THE ACFT FROM THE LINE AREA. ALSO, NO WARNING FLAG WAS ATTACHED TO THE EXTENDED LOCK LINK HANDLE EVEN THOUGH THE FLAG WAS AVAILABLE IN ITS DESIGNATED STOWAGE AREA ON THE ACFT. 1) FAILURE TO FOLLOW STANDARD GND HANDLING PROCS CAUSED BY A LACK OF TRAINING (THE GND CREWMAN ACTUALLY BELIEVED THAT THE LOCK LINE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ENGAGED ON A TURNAROUND FLT). 2) FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.