Narrative:

Small aircraft X departed asn on a heading of 180 degrees. Shortly after departure it was determined that the flight plan had timed out and dropped from the system, discovered when an attempt to force the data block into ARTS was unsuccessful due to no stored flight plan. I immediately contacted the rome sector to notify them that the aircraft was active and determine that they could re-enter the flight plan to allow small aircraft X to continue on his route of flight. The rome sector controller agreed to re-enter the flight plan and did, even though an en route strip was generated and was never passed to the satellite radar position. Additionally, no track was sent to our ARTS system. At xx:xx Z, coordination was effected with rome sector for an aircraft departing gadsden. This was the last landline communication we were able to establish with rome sector. As small aircraft X proceeded, the radar controller and I were expecting to establish radar contact on the original beacon code since the new code was not available. No target of any kind was observed and when small aircraft X reported leaving 7000', I began taking action to coordinate non radar procedures with rome sector. I called rome sector 5 times, in 3 mins, and received no response from them on any call. After the fifth call, small aircraft X reported 34 mi out and we assumed the report was distance from talladega and that the aircraft had left birmingham airspace. Since the aircraft was apparently in rome airspace and I could not contact them, I felt that they should at least be talking to the aircraft since they would not talk to me. At this time, I instructed the satellite radar controller to switch the aircraft to rome sector frequency rather than try to turn the aircraft around and risk the possibility of complicating the situation. During the investigation of this incident, it was suggested that I should have expressed more urgency on the landline by 'pitching a fit.' I do not consider that to be a proper example for me to set for my peers or subordinates since so much emphasis is place on proper landline communications. I also did not feel it was necessary if everyone involved were attentive to and doing their job as they should. The data from ZTL provided for me to review also revealed a lack of action on their part to take timely sep action. It was evident that the rome sector should have been alert to the fact that small aircraft X was active since I had told them the aircraft was airborne and they had in fact generated an en route strip showing the aircraft active. According to the data provided, the 2 aircraft involved were 8-10 mi apart when small aircraft X contacted rome sector but timely action was not taken to properly separate the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA ENTERED ADJACENT AIRSPACE WITHOUT A HANDOFF, RESULTING IN LOSS OF SEPARATION WITH ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: SMA X DEPARTED ASN ON A HDG OF 180 DEGS. SHORTLY AFTER DEP IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE FLT PLAN HAD TIMED OUT AND DROPPED FROM THE SYS, DISCOVERED WHEN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE DATA BLOCK INTO ARTS WAS UNSUCCESSFUL DUE TO NO STORED FLT PLAN. I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE ROME SECTOR TO NOTIFY THEM THAT THE ACFT WAS ACTIVE AND DETERMINE THAT THEY COULD RE-ENTER THE FLT PLAN TO ALLOW SMA X TO CONTINUE ON HIS ROUTE OF FLT. THE ROME SECTOR CTLR AGREED TO RE-ENTER THE FLT PLAN AND DID, EVEN THOUGH AN ENRTE STRIP WAS GENERATED AND WAS NEVER PASSED TO THE SATELLITE RADAR POS. ADDITIONALLY, NO TRACK WAS SENT TO OUR ARTS SYS. AT XX:XX Z, COORD WAS EFFECTED WITH ROME SECTOR FOR AN ACFT DEPARTING GADSDEN. THIS WAS THE LAST LANDLINE COM WE WERE ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH ROME SECTOR. AS SMA X PROCEEDED, THE RADAR CTLR AND I WERE EXPECTING TO ESTABLISH RADAR CONTACT ON THE ORIGINAL BEACON CODE SINCE THE NEW CODE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. NO TARGET OF ANY KIND WAS OBSERVED AND WHEN SMA X RPTED LEAVING 7000', I BEGAN TAKING ACTION TO COORDINATE NON RADAR PROCS WITH ROME SECTOR. I CALLED ROME SECTOR 5 TIMES, IN 3 MINS, AND RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THEM ON ANY CALL. AFTER THE FIFTH CALL, SMA X RPTED 34 MI OUT AND WE ASSUMED THE RPT WAS DISTANCE FROM TALLADEGA AND THAT THE ACFT HAD LEFT BIRMINGHAM AIRSPACE. SINCE THE ACFT WAS APPARENTLY IN ROME AIRSPACE AND I COULD NOT CONTACT THEM, I FELT THAT THEY SHOULD AT LEAST BE TALKING TO THE ACFT SINCE THEY WOULD NOT TALK TO ME. AT THIS TIME, I INSTRUCTED THE SATELLITE RADAR CTLR TO SWITCH THE ACFT TO ROME SECTOR FREQ RATHER THAN TRY TO TURN THE ACFT AROUND AND RISK THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLICATING THE SITUATION. DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULD HAVE EXPRESSED MORE URGENCY ON THE LANDLINE BY 'PITCHING A FIT.' I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT TO BE A PROPER EXAMPLE FOR ME TO SET FOR MY PEERS OR SUBORDINATES SINCE SO MUCH EMPHASIS IS PLACE ON PROPER LANDLINE COMS. I ALSO DID NOT FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY IF EVERYONE INVOLVED WERE ATTENTIVE TO AND DOING THEIR JOB AS THEY SHOULD. THE DATA FROM ZTL PROVIDED FOR ME TO REVIEW ALSO REVEALED A LACK OF ACTION ON THEIR PART TO TAKE TIMELY SEP ACTION. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE ROME SECTOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALERT TO THE FACT THAT SMA X WAS ACTIVE SINCE I HAD TOLD THEM THE ACFT WAS AIRBORNE AND THEY HAD IN FACT GENERATED AN ENRTE STRIP SHOWING THE ACFT ACTIVE. ACCORDING TO THE DATA PROVIDED, THE 2 ACFT INVOLVED WERE 8-10 MI APART WHEN SMA X CONTACTED ROME SECTOR BUT TIMELY ACTION WAS NOT TAKEN TO PROPERLY SEPARATE THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.