Narrative:

I was working on a discrepancy generated off of an inspection work card. The inspection work card was signed-off. The discrepancy was for the crew oxygen system capillary line broken. I replaced the line 'in accordance with' (in accordance with) the maintenance manual in september 2013. In november 2013; the 'manager on duty' informed me that there was an incorrectly installed capillary line; found during a fleet campaign directive (fcd) that had to be performed while the aircraft was at another maintenance facility being painted. When I was installing the new capillary line; the old line was temporarily installed with a few threads engaged and the end that attaches to the bottle was taped to the broken end of the line. The manager on duty has all of the names of people involved with this incident. I can only state what I did. I believe I had the line correctly installed. But the documentation trail showed to me; shows differently. [Recommend that] during emergency equipment installation; [that] at a minimum; a confirmation check should be performed with an engineering notice (east/north); or a placard; showing the correct installation of the O2 oxygen system connections at the O2 bottle. The work performed was done after a 24-hour leak check had been performed and signed-off. The line I installed was loosely threaded on and the broken end taped to bottle. Hangar c-check. It was found at an aircraft paint shop after the emb-145 had left ZZZ during a fleet campaign directive (fcd) to inspect the oxygen system. Because I was not at the paint shop facility when problem was found; I do believe corrective action was taken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed by the Manager on Duty that a Crew Oxygen bottle capillary line was found incorrectly installed on an EMB-145 aircraft. The discrepancy was noted during a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) inspection when the aircraft was at a Paint Shop facility.

Narrative: I was working on a discrepancy generated off of an Inspection Work Card. The Inspection Work Card was signed-off. The discrepancy was for the Crew Oxygen System capillary line broken. I replaced the line 'In Accordance With' (IAW) the Maintenance Manual in September 2013. In November 2013; the 'Manager on Duty' informed me that there was an incorrectly installed capillary line; found during a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) that had to be performed while the aircraft was at another maintenance facility being painted. When I was installing the new capillary line; the old line was temporarily installed with a few threads engaged and the end that attaches to the bottle was taped to the broken end of the line. The Manager on Duty has all of the names of people involved with this incident. I can only state what I did. I believe I had the line correctly installed. But the documentation trail showed to me; shows differently. [Recommend that] during emergency equipment installation; [that] at a minimum; a Confirmation Check should be performed with an Engineering Notice (E/N); or a Placard; showing the correct installation of the O2 Oxygen System connections at the O2 bottle. The work performed was done after a 24-hour Leak Check had been performed and signed-off. The line I installed was loosely threaded on and the broken end taped to bottle. Hangar C-Check. It was found at an aircraft Paint Shop after the EMB-145 had left ZZZ during a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) to inspect the Oxygen System. Because I was not at the Paint Shop facility when problem was found; I do believe corrective action was taken.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.