Narrative:

Initial climb through FL180 normal and uneventful. While climbing through FL220 we received an ECAM message doors (aft) cargo. Noted cabin altitude approximately 3850 with V/south 0 to 100 FPM. I stated; 'I have control and ATC; ECAM actions go to the communication (there are no ECAM actions)' then noted the first officer already had the communication open and complete to line item: in flight: no crew action required as long as cabin pressure is normal. >If abn cabin attendant V/south: maximum fl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100/MEA I observed at this time the cabin climb rate had increased from 0 FPM to 350 FPM then to 500 FPM. I reduced the climb rate; and conferred with the first officer that the jump from 0 FPM to 350 FPM to 500 FPM cabin climb at FL230 within this short period of time may be abnormal (in conjunction with the cargo door open annunciation). After careful analysis of our systems displays; ECAM warnings; location; altitude; climb rate; and flight plan I asked: 'do you agree it's possible; although not probable; we may actually have a cargo door not secure?' to which he replied to the affirmative. We both understood it might just be a loose cannon plug and indication issue. We considered diverging from the checklist to level off while continuing on course to see if the cabin stabilized but the cabin continued to climb. We considered the possibility the pressurization might temporarily stabilize and then fail completely at maximum differential pressure while en-route at FL370 if in the rare event the cargo door was not secure. We determined that with all the available information we had at that moment in time; including abnormal ECAM warnings; systems displays of cabin climb; and immanent fir crossing to long overwater legs; the most prudent course of action was air return. I transferred communications to him asking him to request descent to 10;000 ft; declare an emergency; prepare to execute an emergency descent; and ask for a vector to return. We immediately executed the emergency descent procedure; including the (new) statement 'attention; take the first available seat and prepare to put on your oxygen mask.' we completed all checklists; briefed the flight attendants (tests); briefed the passengers; all while the first officer conducted landing distance calculations; and completed overweight landing procedures for the longest runway. At the gate we were met by contract mechanic. He looked at our ECAM with doors (aft) cargo open still enunciated; said 'your cargo door's open'; then he went out and aft. We communicated the message to contract maintenance to not open the door until company maintenance arrived. It became apparent the door would need to be opened as the customer baggage needed to coordinate for ground transport. Due to the cargo door being opened to accommodate customer bags it was impossible to ascertain if a bag had fallen on or been shut in the cargo door causing a breach in the door seal. It does not appear the contract maintenance actions were documented completely. It does appear company maintenance inspected; cleared and documented the open item in the logbook without any necessary repairs to canon plugs or jammed latching mechanisms.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew experiences an ECAM for AFT CARGO DOOR climbing through FL220. The crew determines that the pressurization may be abnormal and elects to don oxygen masks and perform an emergency descent. Flight diverts to the nearest suitable airport for an overweight landing.

Narrative: Initial climb through FL180 normal and uneventful. While climbing through FL220 we received an ECAM message DOORS (AFT) CARGO. Noted cabin altitude approximately 3850 with V/S 0 to 100 FPM. I stated; 'I have control and ATC; ECAM actions go to the COM (there are no ECAM Actions)' then noted the First Officer already had the COM open and complete to line item: In flight: No crew action required as long as cabin pressure is normal. >If ABN CAB V/S: MAX FL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100/MEA I observed at this time the cabin climb rate had increased from 0 FPM to 350 FPM then to 500 FPM. I reduced the climb rate; and conferred with the First Officer that the jump from 0 FPM to 350 FPM to 500 FPM cabin climb at FL230 within this short period of time may be abnormal (in conjunction with the cargo door open annunciation). After careful analysis of our systems displays; ECAM Warnings; location; altitude; climb rate; and flight plan I asked: 'Do you agree it's possible; although not probable; we may actually have a cargo door not secure?' To which he replied to the affirmative. We both understood it might just be a loose cannon plug and indication issue. We considered diverging from the checklist to level off while continuing on course to see if the cabin stabilized but the cabin continued to climb. We considered the possibility the pressurization might temporarily stabilize and then fail completely at maximum differential pressure while en-route at FL370 if in the rare event the cargo door was not secure. We determined that with all the available information we had at that moment in time; including abnormal ECAM warnings; Systems Displays of Cabin Climb; and immanent FIR crossing to long overwater legs; the most prudent course of action was air return. I transferred communications to him asking him to request descent to 10;000 FT; declare an emergency; prepare to execute an emergency descent; and ask for a vector to return. We immediately executed the emergency descent procedure; including the (new) statement 'Attention; take the first available seat and prepare to put on your oxygen mask.' We completed all checklists; briefed the flight attendants (TESTS); briefed the passengers; all while the First Officer conducted Landing Distance calculations; and completed Overweight Landing procedures for the longest runway. At the gate we were met by Contract Mechanic. He looked at our ECAM with DOORS (AFT) CARGO open still enunciated; said 'Your cargo door's open'; then he went out and aft. We communicated the message to Contract Maintenance to not open the door until Company Maintenance arrived. It became apparent the door would need to be opened as the customer baggage needed to coordinate for ground transport. Due to the cargo door being opened to accommodate customer bags it was impossible to ascertain if a bag had fallen on or been shut in the cargo door causing a breach in the door seal. It does not appear the Contract Maintenance actions were documented completely. It does appear Company Maintenance inspected; cleared and documented the open item in the logbook without any necessary repairs to canon plugs or jammed latching mechanisms.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.