Narrative:

During APU fuel shutoff actuator replacement required for critical design configuration control (cdccl); steps were missed. During installation; all steps for torque; seal; bond checks and operational checks were followed. I was working four hours overtime on dayshift and was given the installation of the actuator. Line technicians removed valve and placed removed parts in the flight deck for aircraft movement. Two different actuators and hardware were ordered; along with paperwork to be filled out; for the robbed (cannibalized) bad actuator. The computers kept locking up in work center X; so I went to work center Y and had the same problems with both the computers and printers locked up. Inspection requirements and [fuel] shut-off actuator was not indicated [as needing inspection]; one line said cdccl was; [required/applicable]. I was unable to print general maintenance manual (gmm) to save the information. Eventually I had to go to the service center and was able to get a computer to research illustrated parts catalog (ipc) and verify correct part number of actuator. I did not need the 'robbed' actuator and was not sure why it was even given to us to use. The hardware that was ordered was incorrect; so I had to order the correct hardware. I had to move to another work center to finally get the paperwork to print the aircraft maintenance manual (amm); this was two hours after the start of the shift. I finally got to the aircraft and started to install the [APU fuel shutoff] actuator and I was under pressure from the lead mechanic because the aircraft had an afternoon departure. Had amm 28-25-02 [with me] to install actuator and amm 28-00-00-912 for cdccl 'do not deviate' requirements. But gmm for inspection of cdccl step would not print. Inspection requirement was missed. [Recommend] amm 28-25-02 should be more specific on the inspection requirement on such a critical installation. Shift turnover was inadequate. Also; I felt I was put under undue pressure from the lead who was not familiar with the task being worked and the need [demand] for the aircraft for an afternoon departure; put extra time constraints on the job. Additionally; the lack of functioning computers and printers in all work areas only exasperated the frustration of trying to accomplish this job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes how inoperative workplace computers and printers; inadequate shift turnover; Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) references; incorrect parts ordered; Lead Mechanic pressures; and the B767's departure schedule; contributed to a missed Inspection of an APU Fuel Shut-off Actuator replacement. The missed Inspection was required under the Critical Design Configuration Control (CDCCL) procedures.

Narrative: During APU Fuel Shutoff Actuator replacement required for Critical Design Configuration Control (CDCCL); steps were missed. During installation; all steps for torque; seal; bond checks and operational checks were followed. I was working four hours overtime on dayshift and was given the installation of the actuator. Line technicians removed valve and placed removed parts in the Flight Deck for aircraft movement. Two different actuators and hardware were ordered; along with paperwork to be filled out; for the Robbed (Cannibalized) bad actuator. The computers kept locking up in Work Center X; so I went to Work Center Y and had the same problems with both the computers and printers locked up. Inspection requirements and [Fuel] Shut-off actuator was not indicated [as needing Inspection]; one line said CDCCL was; [required/applicable]. I was unable to print General Maintenance Manual (GMM) to save the information. Eventually I had to go to the Service Center and was able to get a computer to research Illustrated parts Catalog (IPC) and verify correct part number of actuator. I did not need the 'Robbed' actuator and was not sure why it was even given to us to use. The hardware that was ordered was incorrect; so I had to order the correct hardware. I had to move to another Work Center to finally get the paperwork to print the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM); this was two hours after the start of the shift. I finally got to the aircraft and started to install the [APU Fuel Shutoff] Actuator and I was under pressure from the Lead Mechanic because the aircraft had an afternoon departure. Had AMM 28-25-02 [with me] to install actuator and AMM 28-00-00-912 for CDCCL 'do not deviate' requirements. But GMM for inspection of CDCCL step would not print. Inspection requirement was missed. [Recommend] AMM 28-25-02 should be more specific on the Inspection requirement on such a critical installation. Shift turnover was inadequate. Also; I felt I was put under undue pressure from the Lead who was not familiar with the task being worked and the need [demand] for the aircraft for an afternoon departure; put extra time constraints on the job. Additionally; the lack of functioning computers and printers in all work areas only exasperated the frustration of trying to accomplish this job.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.