Narrative:

I was on the second leg of a two leg day. This was my first time flying with this captain. We switched planes before the second leg. I would like to note that this aircraft had arrived two days earlier and this was its first flight of the day. This was a conventional.we had a normal pushback and taxi to runway. The captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. We were cleared for takeoff and I immediately noticed I had no airspeed on my side. I took a quick glance to the captain side and saw his airspeed indicator was moving. I immediately said 'I have no airspeed I have no airspeed' (twice). We were no faster then 65-70 knots. Expecting the captain to reject the takeoff I said a third time; 'I have no airspeed.' by this time we were approximately 80 knots. The captain said nothing and continued the takeoff. Just after takeoff at approximately 400-500 feet (inhibited prior to that) we received a master caution light along with the EICAS message (IAS disagree). The definition (captain and first officer's airspeed indications disagree). We continued to climb to our initial altitude of 5;000 feet and clean up the aircraft. Tower handed us off to departure. It was about this time that my airspeed came alive but didn't match his. Just prior to me contacting departure control I turned to the captain and said 'do you want me to tell them we are coming back?' he replied; 'no.' I said; 'I'm not comfortable taking this plane. I want to go back.' he said; 'let's just continue we can always stop someplace else along the way.'this was now the second time I was ignored. We contacted departure and continued to climb while we were trouble shooting the situation. It was determined that his airspeed and the standby were the same and mine was wrong. Mine was reading 30 knots faster. Now passing 10;000 feet plus and continuing to climb I said again; 'I'm uncomfortable with this. I want to return to the departure airport. We are out over the ocean at night with storms all around us this is where bad things happen.' he said; 'calm down and run the checklist' and continued to climb. I said 'I am calm; I just don't understand why we are still climbing.' I asked him for his QRH. Captain has 757 and first officer has 767. (Seriously a pain and needs to be changed.) he said you have the plane. Not a problem for me; but you can see why this was an issue. I was asked to fly a plane with bad indications while he pulled out his QRH. I first ran the procedure for IAS disagree. It basically says go to the airspeed unreliable checklist. This is a memory item on our fleet. The captain was already hand flying the plane and both flight directors had gone off prior by themselves and came back on. Determining that my side was the problem and his flight director was matching on his side I was comfortable with it being on. I completed the QRH procedure and my side was still wrong. At some points it was within 7 knots but was still wrong and did go to a higher spread again. During this time the EICAS message would go on and off with the caution light the entire time to landing. At approximately 15;000 feet I said a third time; 'I am uncomfortable I want to go back.' at FL190 he said; 'tell them we want to come back and declare an emergency.' we were over FL200 before we started down. I complied and we were put on an arrival and were given a turn direct an arrival fix. The captain asked me to contact dispatch. I switched briefly to com two and told ramp we were returning and asked him to pass it along and I would contact him on the ground for a gate. The controller did ask if direct the arrival fix was ok or if we wanted direct to the airport. We said it was fine. ATC asked if we wanted arff and captain said; 'no'. He later changed his mind. On the decent the captain asked me to get the dispatch frequency. I was busy and didn't get to it and honestly didn't think it was important enough to take me away from monitoring the aircraft. At 8;000 feet he asked me again so I got it for him. The captain said to monitor radio #1. He went off to talk to dispatch but was still flying the plane and never gave me control. At this point we were able to see the airport. We configured and made a normal landing and taxied to the gate. After we parked at the gate and all checklist were completed I asked the captain why he didn't stop on the runway when I told him three times I had no airspeed. His reply was; 'I didn't hear you.' I found this entire event to be completely unacceptable and my input meant nothing. It was at this time that I packed my bag and walked off the aircraft. I contacted dispatch and advised them of the situation and I would be happy to fly to the filed destination with a different captain or I would need to be replaced. The dispatcher was completely professional with me and asked me to call the duty chief. I called and explained my situation. He supported my decision and we hung up. I then spoke with my director of flight. He understood my decision and we agreed to talk the next day. I would like to note that the aircraft was taken out of service and the maintenance records indicate the first officer's pitot tube was clogged.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 First Officer pitot tube was clogged which prevented accurate airspeed during takeoff and climb; but the Captain refused to reject the takeoff or return until well into the climb. After returning; the First Officer removed himself from the flight.

Narrative: I was on the second leg of a two leg day. This was my first time flying with this Captain. We switched planes before the second leg. I would like to note that this aircraft had arrived two days earlier and this was its first flight of the day. This was a conventional.We had a normal pushback and taxi to Runway. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring. We were cleared for takeoff and I immediately noticed I had no airspeed on my side. I took a quick glance to the Captain side and saw his airspeed indicator was moving. I immediately said 'I have no airspeed I have no airspeed' (twice). We were no faster then 65-70 knots. Expecting the Captain to reject the takeoff I said a third time; 'I have no airspeed.' By this time we were approximately 80 knots. The Captain said nothing and continued the takeoff. Just after takeoff at approximately 400-500 feet (inhibited prior to that) we received a Master Caution light along with the EICAS message (IAS DISAGREE). The definition (Captain and First Officer's airspeed indications disagree). We continued to climb to our initial altitude of 5;000 feet and clean up the aircraft. Tower handed us off to Departure. It was about this time that my airspeed came alive but didn't match his. Just prior to me contacting Departure Control I turned to the Captain and said 'Do you want me to tell them we are coming back?' He replied; 'no.' I said; 'I'm not comfortable taking this plane. I want to go back.' He said; 'Let's just continue we can always stop someplace else along the way.'This was now the second time I was ignored. We contacted Departure and continued to climb while we were trouble shooting the situation. It was determined that his airspeed and the standby were the same and mine was wrong. Mine was reading 30 knots faster. Now passing 10;000 feet plus and continuing to climb I said again; 'I'm uncomfortable with this. I want to return to the departure airport. We are out over the ocean at night with storms all around us this is where bad things happen.' He said; 'Calm down and run the checklist' and continued to climb. I said 'I am calm; I just don't understand why we are still climbing.' I asked him for his QRH. Captain has 757 and First Officer has 767. (Seriously a pain and needs to be changed.) He said you have the plane. Not a problem for me; but you can see why this was an issue. I was asked to fly a plane with bad indications while he pulled out his QRH. I first ran the procedure for IAS DISAGREE. It basically says go to the AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE checklist. This is a MEMORY ITEM on our fleet. The Captain was already hand flying the plane and both flight directors had gone off prior by themselves and came back on. Determining that my side was the problem and his flight director was matching on his side I was comfortable with it being on. I completed the QRH procedure and my side was still wrong. At some points it was within 7 knots but was still wrong and did go to a higher spread again. During this time the EICAS message would go on and off with the Caution light the entire time to landing. At approximately 15;000 feet I said a third time; 'I am uncomfortable I want to go back.' At FL190 he said; 'Tell them we want to come back and declare an emergency.' We were over FL200 before we started down. I complied and we were put on an arrival and were given a turn direct an arrival fix. The Captain asked me to contact Dispatch. I switched briefly to Com two and told Ramp we were returning and asked him to pass it along and I would contact him on the ground for a gate. The Controller did ask if direct the arrival fix was OK or if we wanted direct to the airport. We said it was fine. ATC asked if we wanted ARFF and Captain said; 'NO'. He later changed his mind. On the decent the Captain asked me to get the dispatch frequency. I was busy and didn't get to it and honestly didn't think it was important enough to take me away from monitoring the aircraft. At 8;000 feet he asked me again so I got it for him. The Captain said to monitor radio #1. He went off to talk to Dispatch but was still flying the plane and never gave me control. At this point we were able to see the airport. We configured and made a normal landing and taxied to the gate. After we parked at the gate and all checklist were completed I asked the Captain why he didn't stop on the runway when I told him three times I had no airspeed. His reply was; 'I didn't hear you.' I found this entire event to be completely unacceptable and my input meant nothing. It was at this time that I packed my bag and walked off the aircraft. I contacted Dispatch and advised them of the situation and I would be happy to fly to the filed destination with a different Captain or I would need to be replaced. The Dispatcher was completely professional with me and asked me to call the Duty Chief. I called and explained my situation. He supported my decision and we hung up. I then spoke with my Director of Flight. He understood my decision and we agreed to talk the next day. I would like to note that the aircraft was taken out of service and the maintenance records indicate the First Officer's pitot tube was clogged.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.