Narrative:

This report is really two related events in one; an injury to me (the captain) and a fumes related injury to my flight attendant. The flight was unremarkable. There was no communication with the cabin; other than to ask the flight attendant to remain seated due to our proximity to thunderstorm activity. The approach was normal in every respect. Upon arrival at the gate; and just after the gpu was plugged in; I noticed a distinctive odor in the air. It wasn't the sort of odor that immediately caused grave concern; but it was enough that I noticed something may be amiss. A quick look at the first officer's face confirmed my suspicion as he was sniffing the air as well. The cockpit door was opened at the completion of the parking checks; and the first thing the flight attendant said 'is something burning? I started smelling it when we were descending'. I immediately shut off the APU bleed at that point; not wanting to worsen whatever problem was occurring. The cabin door was open; the air was clearing rapidly and all seemed well. I recalled that the aircraft had a recent history of fumes; and at any rate; I wasn't going to allow a possibly bad airplane to be passed to another crew; fumes; I know; are a serious thing. Upon speaking with dispatch; the first questions from my dispatcher revolved around ferrying the airplane. I was not keen on the idea at all; but I simply stated that I thought that we were putting the cart before the horse and that perhaps we should discuss this with maintenance control first. In speaking with maintenance control; they asked me to run the airplane. I had no objections to this; but in hindsight; this may have been a less than optimal choice. We ran the aircraft once we received proper ramp signals from the company staff. We tried the #2 and #1 bleeds independently; both with the recirc fan off and on. We were able to reproduce the odor; especially when the pack was run at full cold. The fumes seemed to be the worst from the APU bleed. We worked this issue for maybe 10 minutes. Then my first officer said to me that his throat was beginning to hurt a bit and I realized that we had gone too far in helping maintenance control to diagnose the issue. This is where my choice was less than optimal: in helping maintenance control; I actually ran the risk of exposing my crew to additional harmful fumes. If I had that choice over again; I would not have done this. The final indignity of the evening was suffered by me as we brought the process to a close. Maintenance control asked me to walk to the back of the airplane to see if I could hear the acm turning. I did so. A few minutes prior; the airport crash fire rescue equipment folks had showed up to see what all of the fuss was about. They have very bright lights on those trucks; and those lights were right in my eyes as I walked back to the forward park of the airplane. I could not see much; and by not much I mean I could not see the tip of one of the blades of the #1 prop which was directly in my path. I walked straight into it; which earned me 4 stitches in my head as a reminder of my less than stellar decision making in this event. As the transportation company was taking me to the hospital with my crew in tow; ostensibly so that they could go to the hotel; my flight attendant became ill. We feared that she may have incurred a fumes related injury; so we insisted that she obtain a medical check out as well. As the captain; I was very concerned that our attempts to help maintenance control may have resulted in an injury to my flight attendant.the fumes are of unknown origin. As for my head; the props are actually very difficult to see under certain conditions. I was able to complete the logbook prior to leaving for the hospital. I made sure my crew was cared for and safe prior to receiving care for my own wound.there are three takeaways here for me as a captain: first: I have now had an object lesson in how insidious fumes can be. I wasn't even sure we had an issue; and in the process of figuring that out I exposed myself and my crew to potential harm. Had this been in flight; my reactions would have been radically different; I am trained for that. Being at the gate; my 'safety sa' was reduced. I just didn't do the head work to realize that diagnosing a problem for maintenance would be hazardous. In the future; I will not do this. Maintenance control needs to coordinate the investigation of fumes on their own. Second: the cabin needs to inform the flight deck at the first sign of smoke or fumes. My reaction to this event probably would have been different had that occurred. I definitely would have wanted to know about that! Third: don't be in a rush walking around the airplane; especially talking on a cell phone with maintenance control and with your head down walking toward really bright lights. It may cost you a fair amount of skin.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC-8-100 developed a burning odor at the gate with ground power plugged in but the Captain; working with Maintenance Control; could not find the source while troubleshooting and causing the Flight Attendant to become ill. When emergency vehicles arrived investigate the engine run; the Captain walked into a stationary propeller causing an injury.

Narrative: This report is really two related events in one; an injury to me (the Captain) and a fumes related injury to my Flight Attendant. The flight was unremarkable. There was no communication with the cabin; other than to ask the Flight Attendant to remain seated due to our proximity to thunderstorm activity. The approach was normal in every respect. Upon arrival at the gate; and just after the GPU was plugged in; I noticed a distinctive odor in the air. It wasn't the sort of odor that immediately caused grave concern; but it was enough that I noticed something may be amiss. A quick look at the First Officer's face confirmed my suspicion as he was sniffing the air as well. The cockpit door was opened at the completion of the parking checks; and the first thing the Flight Attendant said 'Is something burning? I started smelling it when we were descending'. I immediately shut off the APU bleed at that point; not wanting to worsen whatever problem was occurring. The cabin door was open; the air was clearing rapidly and all seemed well. I recalled that the aircraft had a recent history of fumes; and at any rate; I wasn't going to allow a possibly bad airplane to be passed to another crew; fumes; I know; are a serious thing. Upon speaking with Dispatch; the first questions from my Dispatcher revolved around ferrying the airplane. I was not keen on the idea at all; but I simply stated that I thought that we were putting the cart before the horse and that perhaps we should discuss this with Maintenance Control first. In speaking with Maintenance Control; they asked me to run the airplane. I had no objections to this; but in hindsight; this may have been a less than optimal choice. We ran the aircraft once we received proper ramp signals from the Company staff. We tried the #2 and #1 bleeds independently; both with the recirc fan off and on. We were able to reproduce the odor; especially when the pack was run at full cold. The fumes seemed to be the worst from the APU bleed. We worked this issue for maybe 10 minutes. Then my First Officer said to me that his throat was beginning to hurt a bit and I realized that we had gone too far in helping Maintenance Control to diagnose the issue. This is where my choice was less than optimal: In helping Maintenance Control; I actually ran the risk of exposing my crew to additional harmful fumes. If I had that choice over again; I would not have done this. The final indignity of the evening was suffered by me as we brought the process to a close. Maintenance Control asked me to walk to the back of the airplane to see if I could hear the ACM turning. I did so. A few minutes prior; the airport CFR folks had showed up to see what all of the fuss was about. They have very bright lights on those trucks; and those lights were right in my eyes as I walked back to the forward park of the airplane. I could not see much; and by not much I mean I could not see the tip of one of the blades of the #1 prop which was directly in my path. I walked straight into it; which earned me 4 stitches in my head as a reminder of my less than stellar decision making in this event. As the transportation company was taking me to the hospital with my crew in tow; ostensibly so that they could go to the hotel; my Flight Attendant became ill. We feared that she may have incurred a fumes related injury; so we insisted that she obtain a medical check out as well. As the Captain; I was very concerned that our attempts to help Maintenance Control may have resulted in an injury to my Flight Attendant.The fumes are of unknown origin. As for my head; the props are actually very difficult to see under certain conditions. I was able to complete the logbook prior to leaving for the hospital. I made sure my crew was cared for and safe prior to receiving care for my own wound.There are three takeaways here for me as a Captain: First: I have now had an object lesson in how insidious fumes can be. I wasn't even sure we had an issue; and in the process of figuring that out I exposed myself and my crew to potential harm. Had this been in flight; my reactions would have been radically different; I am trained for that. Being at the gate; my 'safety SA' was reduced. I just didn't do the head work to realize that diagnosing a problem for Maintenance would be hazardous. In the future; I will not do this. Maintenance Control needs to coordinate the investigation of fumes on their own. Second: The cabin needs to inform the flight deck at the first sign of smoke or fumes. My reaction to this event probably would have been different had that occurred. I definitely would have wanted to know about that! Third: Don't be in a rush walking around the airplane; especially talking on a cell phone with Maintenance Control and with your head down walking toward really bright lights. It may cost you a fair amount of skin.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.