Narrative:

The C182 pilot called rno tower 13 miles south. (This airman was disorientated on his position as well.) I instructed the aircraft to remain outside rno class charlie airspace and to contact norcal approach on frequency 119.2. The pilot read back the information in a questioning manner and I reiterated the frequency 119.2. Several minutes later I observed an aircraft 7 northwest of rno which initially appeared to be a transitioning aircraft. This aircraft was in fact the C182 and I will continue to refer to him as such. A PA28 was inbound to rno from the northeast on a straight in to runway 16L. There were several other arrivals and departures at this period of time also. I had placed an air carrier in position on 16R pending the exiting of another aircraft. The PA28 had been cleared to land runway 16L. I observed that the C182 was now descending and tracking toward the PA28. I began issuing traffic to the PA28; and reaching out to the then unknown C182. The C182's track appeared to be turning into final and still descending; a NORDO aircraft. I issued a traffic alert to the PA28. The C182 called inbound on final runway 16L. I issued an immediate left turn to the PA28. I had missed the call sign of the C182 and issued a blind transmission to the cessna 1 mile final runway 16L cleared to land. I issued the airliner an immediate takeoff clearance as I could not visually acquire the C182 in the ground clutter (my controller in charge and other controller assisting in the cab had visually acquired the aircraft and were issuing light gun signals as well). The C182 landed runway 16L at which time when asked if he could hear my transmission; he replied that he did; and was issued instructions to exit the runway and contact ground control. Pilot was further confused on taxi instructions and was issued the brasher statement. These two aircraft closest proximity was estimated at less than a 1/2 mile same altitude. Further review of information via liveatc; the C182 attempted to contact approach control (nct) twice and was told to standby. The aircraft on a third attempt reported 7 miles out at which time he was given a squawk code. He did not squawk the correct code. Nct queried his code; and his position; finally identifying the aircraft on the wrong code 3 miles north of rno; told him he was on the wrong code and radar identified him and told him to contact rno tower.nct should have turned this aircraft out of the traffic pattern to the right and issued traffic instead of just dumping on the tower. I was issuing traffic; and traffic alerts followed by an immediate turn; so nct should have been able to see the same traffic I did. Also; a further remain outside class charlie airspace instruction could have helped. Ultimately it appears that if nct sectors had been decombined; the workload would have been less and a better service could have been provided. I don't normally like to say 'they should have done a better job;' but in this case I do feel that this situation could have been mitigated earlier. As for myself; I don't think I could have reacted any different or sooner with an unknown NORDO aircraft. For note; we have VFR aircraft transition this area regularly without ATC communication; so initially there was no reason to suspect an inbound aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A RNO Tower Controller and a C182 pilot each present their version of an uncoordinated entry into the Class C airspace resulting in an airborne conflict.

Narrative: The C182 pilot called RNO TWR 13 miles south. (This airman was disorientated on his position as well.) I instructed the aircraft to remain outside RNO Class Charlie Airspace and to contact NorCal Approach on frequency 119.2. The pilot read back the information in a questioning manner and I reiterated the frequency 119.2. Several minutes later I observed an aircraft 7 northwest of RNO which initially appeared to be a transitioning aircraft. This aircraft was in fact the C182 and I will continue to refer to him as such. A PA28 was inbound to RNO from the northeast on a straight in to RWY 16L. There were several other arrivals and departures at this period of time also. I had placed an air carrier in position on 16R pending the exiting of another aircraft. The PA28 had been cleared to land RWY 16L. I observed that the C182 was now descending and tracking toward the PA28. I began issuing traffic to the PA28; and reaching out to the then unknown C182. The C182's track appeared to be turning into final and still descending; a NORDO aircraft. I issued a traffic alert to the PA28. The C182 called inbound on final RWY 16L. I issued an immediate left turn to the PA28. I had missed the call sign of the C182 and issued a blind transmission to the Cessna 1 mile final RWY 16L cleared to land. I issued the airliner an immediate takeoff clearance as I could not visually acquire the C182 in the ground clutter (my CIC and other controller assisting in the cab had visually acquired the aircraft and were issuing light gun signals as well). The C182 landed RWY 16L at which time when asked if he could hear my transmission; he replied that he did; and was issued instructions to exit the RWY and contact Ground Control. Pilot was further confused on taxi instructions and was issued the Brasher statement. These two aircraft closest proximity was estimated at less than a 1/2 mile same altitude. Further review of information via LiveATC; the C182 attempted to contact Approach Control (NCT) twice and was told to standby. The aircraft on a third attempt reported 7 miles out at which time he was given a squawk code. He did not squawk the correct code. NCT queried his code; and his position; finally identifying the aircraft on the wrong code 3 miles north of RNO; told him he was on the wrong code and radar identified him and told him to contact RNO TWR.NCT should have turned this aircraft out of the traffic pattern to the right and issued traffic instead of just dumping on the Tower. I was issuing traffic; and traffic alerts followed by an immediate turn; so NCT should have been able to see the same traffic I did. Also; a further remain outside class Charlie airspace instruction could have helped. Ultimately it appears that if NCT Sectors had been decombined; the workload would have been less and a better service could have been provided. I don't normally like to say 'they should have done a better job;' but in this case I do feel that this situation could have been mitigated earlier. As for myself; I don't think I could have reacted any different or sooner with an unknown NORDO aircraft. For note; we have VFR aircraft transition this area regularly without ATC communication; so initially there was no reason to suspect an inbound aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.