Narrative:

While taxiing to runway 13L, ground control handed us off to the tower controller who then in turn told us to taxi into position and hold runway 13L. The area was cleared for landing aircraft as we taxied into position (noting none). While holding in position on runway 13L, approximately 1 min had gone by when suddenly a large jet transport flew overhead and landed on runway 13L. Apparently the tower was unaware of the incident, because approximately 15 seconds later we reported to the tower what had just happened. I believe the jet which flew overhead did not know we were there until he was right over top. A few mins later and we were cleared to takeoff. The tower controller obviously made a human error by clearing us into position on runway 13L. But I feel the main contributing factor which compounded this incident was the possibility of a blind spot or area on runway 13L where the tower controller is unable to see aircraft holding in position. May I suggest some additional safe guards for preventing this from recurring; once the pilot is in position and holding, then again, the pilot should state so. In our situation there seemed to be enough time to exit the runway had the controller alerted us to do so. Last, a stop bar light system between the taxiway and runway might indicate an obvious conflict between the controller's verbal clearance and the visibility indication of a stop bar light.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB ACFT CLEARED ONTO RWY AND HOLD. APPROX 1 MINUTE LATER LGT ACFT LANDED OVER TOP OF HOLDING ACFT.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 13L, GND CTL HANDED US OFF TO THE TWR CTLR WHO THEN IN TURN TOLD US TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 13L. THE AREA WAS CLRED FOR LNDG ACFT AS WE TAXIED INTO POS (NOTING NONE). WHILE HOLDING IN POS ON RWY 13L, APPROX 1 MIN HAD GONE BY WHEN SUDDENLY A LARGE JET TRANSPORT FLEW OVERHEAD AND LANDED ON RWY 13L. APPARENTLY THE TWR WAS UNAWARE OF THE INCIDENT, BECAUSE APPROX 15 SECS LATER WE RPTED TO THE TWR WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. I BELIEVE THE JET WHICH FLEW OVERHEAD DID NOT KNOW WE WERE THERE UNTIL HE WAS RIGHT OVER TOP. A FEW MINS LATER AND WE WERE CLRED TO TKOF. THE TWR CTLR OBVIOUSLY MADE A HUMAN ERROR BY CLRING US INTO POS ON RWY 13L. BUT I FEEL THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WHICH COMPOUNDED THIS INCIDENT WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF A BLIND SPOT OR AREA ON RWY 13L WHERE THE TWR CTLR IS UNABLE TO SEE ACFT HOLDING IN POS. MAY I SUGGEST SOME ADDITIONAL SAFE GUARDS FOR PREVENTING THIS FROM RECURRING; ONCE THE PLT IS IN POS AND HOLDING, THEN AGAIN, THE PLT SHOULD STATE SO. IN OUR SITUATION THERE SEEMED TO BE ENOUGH TIME TO EXIT THE RWY HAD THE CTLR ALERTED US TO DO SO. LAST, A STOP BAR LIGHT SYS BTWN THE TXWY AND RWY MIGHT INDICATE AN OBVIOUS CONFLICT BTWN THE CTLR'S VERBAL CLRNC AND THE VIS INDICATION OF A STOP BAR LIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.