Narrative:

I was observing a traffic situation at another sector. I received a call asking about the situation at the sector. I went to check on the situation; and saw the aircraft were already less than 5 miles and less than 1;000 ft. The controller stated 'less than 5 miles; but sct approach did it.' I asked what was being done to pry them apart. It was not until after I asked this question that the controller keyed up and told the front aircraft to maintain FL190. At that time the aircraft were only 3.5 miles apart. The controller should have seen the overtake sooner and taken action to separate the aircraft. I felt that he was letting it happen to 'make a point' that socal approach was 'jamming him.' his response to the situation when I asked him about it was also inappropriate. He should have stopped the air carrier X's climb 'immediately' and turned the trailing aircraft 40-50 degrees left to pry them apart. His choice of action was inadequate and carried no sense of urgency at all. This problem could have been avoided by stopping the climb of air carrier X much sooner. I believe the underlying cause of this loss of separation was the controllers' poor attitude; coupled with no sense of accountability since he could just report the situation later. There is a secondary causal factor as well. Our procedures allow the approach control (who owns at and below 15;000 ft in that area) to climb all departures into our airspace and up to FL230 once the handoff is accepted. This practice needs to be immediately stopped. The approach should only climb to the top of their airspace. Had this been the case; the front aircraft would have climbed above the back aircraft and the overtake would not have mattered until the center controller climbed him further.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Enroute Controller observed a loss of separation involving two departure aircraft climbing into the enroute environment.

Narrative: I was observing a traffic situation at another sector. I received a call asking about the situation at the sector. I went to check on the situation; and saw the aircraft were already less than 5 miles and less than 1;000 FT. The Controller stated 'Less than 5 miles; but SCT Approach did it.' I asked what was being done to pry them apart. It was not until after I asked this question that the Controller keyed up and told the front aircraft to maintain FL190. At that time the aircraft were only 3.5 miles apart. The Controller should have seen the overtake sooner and taken action to separate the aircraft. I felt that he was letting it happen to 'make a point' that Socal Approach was 'jamming him.' His response to the situation when I asked him about it was also inappropriate. He should have stopped the Air Carrier X's climb 'immediately' and turned the trailing aircraft 40-50 degrees left to pry them apart. His choice of action was inadequate and carried no sense of urgency at all. This problem could have been avoided by stopping the climb of Air Carrier X much sooner. I believe the underlying cause of this loss of separation was the Controllers' poor attitude; coupled with no sense of accountability since he could just report the situation later. There is a secondary causal factor as well. Our procedures allow the Approach Control (who owns at and below 15;000 FT in that area) to climb all departures into our airspace and up to FL230 once the handoff is accepted. This practice needs to be immediately stopped. The Approach should only climb to the top of their airspace. Had this been the case; the front aircraft would have climbed above the back aircraft and the overtake would not have mattered until the Center Controller climbed him further.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.