Narrative:

My approach and landing were normal. As I was braking, the tower asked if I would clear the runway as soon as possible. In the same transmission, he asked if I could execute a 180 degree turn and '...back taxi...' to the intersection I had passed. With no reason not to, I agreed. I slowed sufficiently, veered right to have all the runway width possible for the u-turn, then started around to the left. Halfway around I saw a long-wing aircraft at what I estimated to be 50' altitude, over the #'south, about 800-1000' south of me. The controller then instructed an aircraft with an '8' in its # to go around. He issued this instruction 3 times, each time using the '8' #, with no response from the landing aircraft. The landing aircraft had started to flare when the controller issued a go around instruction to an aircraft with a '5' in its #, and the landing aircraft immediately executed that go around. Meanwhile, I had taxied as close to the west runway edge lights as possible in anticipation of taxiing into the dirt to avoid a collision. The low wing aircraft doing the go around passed me at an altitude I estimated to be 25'; approximately 20' separated our wing tips, horizontal. The tower controller instructed me to taxi off the runway and contact ground control 121.7 when clear. I complied. Taxi back to parking, shutdown and post-flight were normal. The incident scared the $#@!&* out of me. I phoned the tower to speak with a supervisor about the incident approximately 20 mins after landing. The shift supervisor, answered the phone; when I started to relate the incident, he replied that he had seen an aircraft taxi the wrong way on 34L,but that he '...wasn't aware a controller told him to do that...'. This wasn't simply a defensive controller; this was a supervisor starting to shift responsibility for the incident to me. I terminated the discussion immediately, and asked for his name, which he gave me. I also asked for the controller's initials. I then made a verbal request that all tapes be held, and informed him that I would make the appropriate requests in writing to the vny FSDO the next morning. I visited the vny FSDO and spoke with a safety counselor who listened to mydescription of the incident, and advised that I call the tower and ask to come listen to the tapes with a supervisor. Specifically, the counselor advised me against filing this safety report--'...there's no need to stir up that kind of trouble, you'll be able to talk this over with the controllers and solve the problem.' I obtained this blank and left. Tower had dubbed a portion of the tape onto a cassette, which they played for me in the training room. The incident was basically as I had remembered it and as I have described it here. After listening to the appropriate portions, I asked what could be done to avoid this kind of situation: was back-taxiing at night an acceptable procedure at a busy airport? What could I have done? What should I have done? His only response to any of my questions was that I could always say, 'unable.' at no time did he even acknowledge that a dangerous incident had occurred. He could not tell me whether back-taxiing was considered a safe procedure. He could not suggest anything I might have done differently except to say, 'unable.' he could not assure me that he would not have come after me (my phrase) had I replied unable and thus forced him to make the other aircraft go around because I refused to follow his instructions. He could not tell me what he himself would do differently if the same situation were to arise again that evening, whether he was the controller on duty or the PIC in the aircraft involved. I had the feeling that I was punching a marshmallow; no matter how I phrased the question, or characterized the incident, or expressed my desire to learn from this, he evaded a conversation. As far as I know, back-taxiing at night at vny is standard procedure. I did not, nor do I now, wish to cause trouble for the controller. He was trying to clear the runway as quickly as he could in view of the aircraft on short final, and at the same time allow me to exit the runway farther south, closer to what he knew to be my tie down location. His error in judging the sep between my aircraft and the low wing on final, compounded by his mixing up the aircraft numbers, created a dangerous situation unintentionally. As I told the FSDO safety officer, I don't want his hide, I want him to attend a public relations retraining course and clean up his act. And incidentally, I sure would appreciate hearing that back-taxiing at night on vny runways will not be requested or approved in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMA INSTRUCTED TO BACK-TAXI OBSERVED SMA ACFT ON FINAL MAKE A GO AROUND MISSING ACFT ON RWY 20'.

Narrative: MY APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL. AS I WAS BRAKING, THE TWR ASKED IF I WOULD CLR THE RWY ASAP. IN THE SAME XMISSION, HE ASKED IF I COULD EXECUTE A 180 DEG TURN AND '...BACK TAXI...' TO THE INTXN I HAD PASSED. WITH NO REASON NOT TO, I AGREED. I SLOWED SUFFICIENTLY, VEERED RIGHT TO HAVE ALL THE RWY WIDTH POSSIBLE FOR THE U-TURN, THEN STARTED AROUND TO THE LEFT. HALFWAY AROUND I SAW A LONG-WING ACFT AT WHAT I ESTIMATED TO BE 50' ALT, OVER THE #'S, ABOUT 800-1000' S OF ME. THE CTLR THEN INSTRUCTED AN ACFT WITH AN '8' IN ITS # TO GO AROUND. HE ISSUED THIS INSTRUCTION 3 TIMES, EACH TIME USING THE '8' #, WITH NO RESPONSE FROM THE LNDG ACFT. THE LNDG ACFT HAD STARTED TO FLARE WHEN THE CTLR ISSUED A GO AROUND INSTRUCTION TO AN ACFT WITH A '5' IN ITS #, AND THE LNDG ACFT IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED THAT GAR. MEANWHILE, I HAD TAXIED AS CLOSE TO THE W RWY EDGE LIGHTS AS POSSIBLE IN ANTICIPATION OF TAXIING INTO THE DIRT TO AVOID A COLLISION. THE LOW WING ACFT DOING THE GO AROUND PASSED ME AT AN ALT I ESTIMATED TO BE 25'; APPROX 20' SEPARATED OUR WING TIPS, HORIZ. THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED ME TO TAXI OFF THE RWY AND CONTACT GND CTL 121.7 WHEN CLR. I COMPLIED. TAXI BACK TO PARKING, SHUTDOWN AND POST-FLT WERE NORMAL. THE INCIDENT SCARED THE $#@!&* OUT OF ME. I PHONED THE TWR TO SPEAK WITH A SUPVR ABOUT THE INCIDENT APPROX 20 MINS AFTER LNDG. THE SHIFT SUPVR, ANSWERED THE PHONE; WHEN I STARTED TO RELATE THE INCIDENT, HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD SEEN AN ACFT TAXI THE WRONG WAY ON 34L,BUT THAT HE '...WASN'T AWARE A CTLR TOLD HIM TO DO THAT...'. THIS WASN'T SIMPLY A DEFENSIVE CTLR; THIS WAS A SUPVR STARTING TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT TO ME. I TERMINATED THE DISCUSSION IMMEDIATELY, AND ASKED FOR HIS NAME, WHICH HE GAVE ME. I ALSO ASKED FOR THE CTLR'S INITIALS. I THEN MADE A VERBAL REQUEST THAT ALL TAPES BE HELD, AND INFORMED HIM THAT I WOULD MAKE THE APPROPRIATE REQUESTS IN WRITING TO THE VNY FSDO THE NEXT MORNING. I VISITED THE VNY FSDO AND SPOKE WITH A SAFETY COUNSELOR WHO LISTENED TO MYDESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT, AND ADVISED THAT I CALL THE TWR AND ASK TO COME LISTEN TO THE TAPES WITH A SUPVR. SPECIFICALLY, THE COUNSELOR ADVISED ME AGAINST FILING THIS SAFETY RPT--'...THERE'S NO NEED TO STIR UP THAT KIND OF TROUBLE, YOU'LL BE ABLE TO TALK THIS OVER WITH THE CTLRS AND SOLVE THE PROB.' I OBTAINED THIS BLANK AND LEFT. TWR HAD DUBBED A PORTION OF THE TAPE ONTO A CASSETTE, WHICH THEY PLAYED FOR ME IN THE TRNING ROOM. THE INCIDENT WAS BASICALLY AS I HAD REMEMBERED IT AND AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IT HERE. AFTER LISTENING TO THE APPROPRIATE PORTIONS, I ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO AVOID THIS KIND OF SITUATION: WAS BACK-TAXIING AT NIGHT AN ACCEPTABLE PROC AT A BUSY ARPT? WHAT COULD I HAVE DONE? WHAT SHOULD I HAVE DONE? HIS ONLY RESPONSE TO ANY OF MY QUESTIONS WAS THAT I COULD ALWAYS SAY, 'UNABLE.' AT NO TIME DID HE EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A DANGEROUS INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED. HE COULD NOT TELL ME WHETHER BACK-TAXIING WAS CONSIDERED A SAFE PROC. HE COULD NOT SUGGEST ANYTHING I MIGHT HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY EXCEPT TO SAY, 'UNABLE.' HE COULD NOT ASSURE ME THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE COME AFTER ME (MY PHRASE) HAD I REPLIED UNABLE AND THUS FORCED HIM TO MAKE THE OTHER ACFT GO AROUND BECAUSE I REFUSED TO FOLLOW HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE COULD NOT TELL ME WHAT HE HIMSELF WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY IF THE SAME SITUATION WERE TO ARISE AGAIN THAT EVENING, WHETHER HE WAS THE CTLR ON DUTY OR THE PIC IN THE ACFT INVOLVED. I HAD THE FEELING THAT I WAS PUNCHING A MARSHMALLOW; NO MATTER HOW I PHRASED THE QUESTION, OR CHARACTERIZED THE INCIDENT, OR EXPRESSED MY DESIRE TO LEARN FROM THIS, HE EVADED A CONVERSATION. AS FAR AS I KNOW, BACK-TAXIING AT NIGHT AT VNY IS STANDARD PROC. I DID NOT, NOR DO I NOW, WISH TO CAUSE TROUBLE FOR THE CTLR. HE WAS TRYING TO CLR THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS HE COULD IN VIEW OF THE ACFT ON SHORT FINAL, AND AT THE SAME TIME ALLOW ME TO EXIT THE RWY FARTHER S, CLOSER TO WHAT HE KNEW TO BE MY TIE DOWN LOCATION. HIS ERROR IN JUDGING THE SEP BTWN MY ACFT AND THE LOW WING ON FINAL, COMPOUNDED BY HIS MIXING UP THE ACFT NUMBERS, CREATED A DANGEROUS SITUATION UNINTENTIONALLY. AS I TOLD THE FSDO SAFETY OFFICER, I DON'T WANT HIS HIDE, I WANT HIM TO ATTEND A PUBLIC RELATIONS RETRAINING COURSE AND CLEAN UP HIS ACT. AND INCIDENTALLY, I SURE WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING THAT BACK-TAXIING AT NIGHT ON VNY RWYS WILL NOT BE REQUESTED OR APPROVED IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.