Narrative:

On approach our yaw damper failed. The captain elected to attempt to reset the yaw damper; but his attempts were unsuccessful. After being distracted by the yaw damper malfunction; we continued to configure for the approach. However; we were unable to stabilize the aircraft by 1;000 AGL as required by company policy; therefore; I called for a go-around. The captain concurred; and we executed a missed approach.during the approach; I had noticed abnormal indications on the masi. Specifically; the low speed red checkerboard and low speed yellow tape indications were displaying at much higher airspeeds than normal. I mentioned this to the captain; but he disregarded it and immediately began to prepare for another approach. On the second approach; the same abnormally high masi indications occurred. Since we were not able to achieve a stabilized approach; I called for another go-around. The captain again concurred and we executed a second missed approach. I suggested that we get delaying vectors in order to run the yaw damper failure abnormal checklist since I suspected that abnormal masi indications may in some way be related to the failure of the yaw damper. The captain concurred and we ran the yaw dampener failure abnormal checklist. Because this did not correct the abnormally high low speed indications on the masi; we contacted company maintenance via the radio in an attempt to gain help in sorting out the problem. Maintenance was unable to offer advice. However; moments later; I noticed that the flaps had failed to retract fully. This led me to make the correct diagnosis of a flap failure. We completed the no-flaps abnormal checklist and diverted.I should have been more assertive by insisting that we get delaying vectors in order to diagnose the abnormally high low speed indications on the masi after the first missed approach. I unwisely let the captain rush me into immediately beginning to prepare for a second approach rather than insisting that we get delaying vectors to slowly and methodically diagnose the problem. I believe that we both initially (and hastily) dismissed the abnormal indications as a temporary software glitch. The abnormal masi indications also distracted our attention from the flap position indicator.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When their yaw damper failed on approach the flight crew of a B737-700 was distracted and; unable to establish a stabilized approach to the short runway at their destination; performed a missed approach. A second approach suffered the same inability to stabilize at which time the First Officer noted abnormally high 'low speed' stall indications on the MASI [Mach Air Speed Indicator] and realized the flaps had not extended as commanded. They diverted successfully to an airport with longer runways.

Narrative: On approach our yaw damper failed. The Captain elected to attempt to reset the yaw damper; but his attempts were unsuccessful. After being distracted by the yaw damper malfunction; we continued to configure for the approach. However; we were unable to stabilize the aircraft by 1;000 AGL as required by company policy; therefore; I called for a go-around. The Captain concurred; and we executed a missed approach.During the approach; I had noticed abnormal indications on the MASI. Specifically; the low speed red checkerboard and low speed yellow tape indications were displaying at much higher airspeeds than normal. I mentioned this to the Captain; but he disregarded it and immediately began to prepare for another approach. On the second approach; the same abnormally high MASI indications occurred. Since we were not able to achieve a stabilized approach; I called for another go-around. The Captain again concurred and we executed a second missed approach. I suggested that we get delaying vectors in order to run the Yaw Damper Failure Abnormal Checklist since I suspected that abnormal MASI indications may in some way be related to the failure of the yaw damper. The Captain concurred and we ran the Yaw Dampener Failure Abnormal Checklist. Because this did not correct the abnormally high low speed indications on the MASI; we contacted Company Maintenance via the radio in an attempt to gain help in sorting out the problem. Maintenance was unable to offer advice. However; moments later; I noticed that the flaps had failed to retract fully. This led me to make the correct diagnosis of a flap failure. We completed the no-Flaps Abnormal Checklist and diverted.I should have been more assertive by insisting that we get delaying vectors in order to diagnose the abnormally high low speed indications on the MASI after the first missed approach. I unwisely let the Captain rush me into immediately beginning to prepare for a second approach rather than insisting that we get delaying vectors to slowly and methodically diagnose the problem. I believe that we both initially (and hastily) dismissed the abnormal indications as a temporary software glitch. The abnormal MASI indications also distracted our attention from the flap position indicator.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.