Narrative:

Departing runway 35L at dfw, we had to deviate from an ATC clearance calling for a 335 degree heading after takeoff as issued by the tower. This action was necessary because as we climbed to 300' and began the turn the air carrier Y large transport that had departed runway 36R came into my view and appeared to be on a collision course with us. I took control of the aircraft and stopped the turn, informed the copilot of the situation and handed the aircraft back to the copilot. I learned later that the air carrier Y jet had accepted a takeoff clearance with a visibility on us, but that information was not relayed to us. Additionally, they were also issued a turn to 005 degrees. According to the tower chief it is a normal procedure to cross traffic in this manner, but it is obvious to me that relinquishing sep responsibility to 1 aircraft at the same time having 2 aircraft performing a crossing maneuver at low altitude, dirty and most vulnerable to changes in performance is a prerequisite to disaster. The tower chief admitted to me that we would have passed 1/4 mi in front of air carrier Y, which is not the way I saw it anyway, but let's say he is correct. If we had had an engine failure or other malfunction that inhibited climb performance and speed, this surely would have caused a serious problem! Perhaps if the tower had waited longer to release air carrier Y this never would have happened. Still it leaves little, if any, room in the operation to have aircraft performing turns at low altitude during high workload times. The takeoff phase has enough going on with out looking for trouble. Contributing to this problem was the tower's inability to relay to me what was going on because of a frequency change at the time and poor timing on their part as far as takeoff clearance releases of the second aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 109171: problem arose, I believe, as dfw tower attempted to clear a surge launch period. We were cleared for takeoff, 'climb runway heading, maintain 5000.' at liftoff tower advised, 'turn left 335 degrees, contact departure...' at about 700' AGL switched radios. The response and tone from departure control inferred concern. They basically wanted to know if we'd turned to 335 degrees. We hadn't. From the flight engineer seat, I could not see the air carrier Y aircraft. If our captain had been flying, I don't believe he would have been able to observe air carrier Y.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX ACR-LGT ACR-LGT BOTH ON TKOF FROM PARALLEL RWYS WITH CROSSING VECTOR HEADINGS ASSIGNED.

Narrative: DEPARTING RWY 35L AT DFW, WE HAD TO DEVIATE FROM AN ATC CLRNC CALLING FOR A 335 DEG HDG AFTER TKOF AS ISSUED BY THE TWR. THIS ACTION WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE AS WE CLBED TO 300' AND BEGAN THE TURN THE ACR Y LGT THAT HAD DEPARTED RWY 36R CAME INTO MY VIEW AND APPEARED TO BE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH US. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND STOPPED THE TURN, INFORMED THE COPLT OF THE SITUATION AND HANDED THE ACFT BACK TO THE COPLT. I LEARNED LATER THAT THE ACR Y JET HAD ACCEPTED A TKOF CLRNC WITH A VIS ON US, BUT THAT INFO WAS NOT RELAYED TO US. ADDITIONALLY, THEY WERE ALSO ISSUED A TURN TO 005 DEGS. ACCORDING TO THE TWR CHIEF IT IS A NORMAL PROC TO CROSS TFC IN THIS MANNER, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT RELINQUISHING SEP RESPONSIBILITY TO 1 ACFT AT THE SAME TIME HAVING 2 ACFT PERFORMING A XING MANEUVER AT LOW ALT, DIRTY AND MOST VULNERABLE TO CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE IS A PREREQUISITE TO DISASTER. THE TWR CHIEF ADMITTED TO ME THAT WE WOULD HAVE PASSED 1/4 MI IN FRONT OF ACR Y, WHICH IS NOT THE WAY I SAW IT ANYWAY, BUT LET'S SAY HE IS CORRECT. IF WE HAD HAD AN ENG FAILURE OR OTHER MALFUNCTION THAT INHIBITED CLB PERFORMANCE AND SPD, THIS SURELY WOULD HAVE CAUSED A SERIOUS PROB! PERHAPS IF THE TWR HAD WAITED LONGER TO RELEASE ACR Y THIS NEVER WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. STILL IT LEAVES LITTLE, IF ANY, ROOM IN THE OP TO HAVE ACFT PERFORMING TURNS AT LOW ALT DURING HIGH WORKLOAD TIMES. THE TKOF PHASE HAS ENOUGH GOING ON WITH OUT LOOKING FOR TROUBLE. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS PROB WAS THE TWR'S INABILITY TO RELAY TO ME WHAT WAS GOING ON BECAUSE OF A FREQ CHANGE AT THE TIME AND POOR TIMING ON THEIR PART AS FAR AS TKOF CLRNC RELEASES OF THE SECOND ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 109171: PROB AROSE, I BELIEVE, AS DFW TWR ATTEMPTED TO CLR A SURGE LAUNCH PERIOD. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, 'CLB RWY HDG, MAINTAIN 5000.' AT LIFTOFF TWR ADVISED, 'TURN LEFT 335 DEGS, CONTACT DEP...' AT ABOUT 700' AGL SWITCHED RADIOS. THE RESPONSE AND TONE FROM DEP CTL INFERRED CONCERN. THEY BASICALLY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE'D TURNED TO 335 DEGS. WE HADN'T. FROM THE FE SEAT, I COULD NOT SEE THE ACR Y ACFT. IF OUR CAPT HAD BEEN FLYING, I DON'T BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE ACR Y.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.