Narrative:

Failure to locate O22, the destination airport was primary problem, although I may have been within 10 mi at one time. Contributing factors: 1) navcom 200. Use of VOR precludes use of communication receiver at same time. 2) communication limited to 180 channels. Apc/departure ZOA 126.85 not usable. (124.2, 120.2 ZOA could have been used, but since I had not been using ARTCC center for flight following I didn't think of looking it up in my flight guide. 3) 7 mi visibility and unfamiliar terrain raised the stress level. 4) this was my second x-country in this airplane with only liquid compass (no gyro) and the limited navcom. I'm used to 50 mi visibility on the east side of the mountains. My pilotage is usually good, so failure to spot O22 took me by surprise. Contributing to the stress level is the airplane that requires more attention to fly right. The liquid compass is another load in an airplane that is short coupled and, while not unstable, bobbles in light turbulence. Corrective action: since I seemed to have trouble raising FSS on the usual frequencys, and fuel was in the reserve area, I went 121.5. I was able to read FSS, but castle AFB was stronger and took over. With no transponder, they were able to pick me up on primary radar and steer me to the nearest airport, mariposa. Asked if I was declaring an emergency. I replied, 'yes sir.' the landing at mariposa was 3 1/2 hours after takeoff. The engine had used 18.5 gals out of a 25 gal tank. Perhaps 4 gals usable remaining. Since this airplane comes over the fence at 90, and on final at 100 carrying power, the declaration of an emergency was justified. The terrain is not hospitable. After refueling and taking a break for a sandwich, I followed route 49 to columbia with no problem. The flight from columbia to inyo-kern, the next afternoon, took 2 hours. Pilotage with VOR backup was used. In retrospect: I should have contacted FSS on the el nido VOR about 30 mins earlier than I did for navigation assistance. 1) a vertical card compass is to replace the liquid compass (magnetic). 2) a 720 channel communication is to be installed so that center frequencys can be monitored and communicated with. 3) a mode C transponder and perhaps a LORAN will follow. Many thanks to castle AFB RAPCON for their timely help. The decision to use V459 and V332 from porterville VOR to columbia vicinity rather than follow hinky 99 is primarily because of the perception of 'unfriendly skies' caused by FAA's '0 tolerance' policy. Also, without a transponder, overflying the arsa's at fresno and castle AFB, was deemed risky though legal. High performance aircraft (jets) climb and descend to these airports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DECLARED EMERGENCY WHEN UNABLE TO LOCATE DESTINATION ARPT AND FUEL WAS GETTING CLOSE TO RESERVE STATUS.

Narrative: FAILURE TO LOCATE O22, THE DEST ARPT WAS PRIMARY PROB, ALTHOUGH I MAY HAVE BEEN WITHIN 10 MI AT ONE TIME. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) NAVCOM 200. USE OF VOR PRECLUDES USE OF COM RECEIVER AT SAME TIME. 2) COM LIMITED TO 180 CHANNELS. APC/DEP ZOA 126.85 NOT USABLE. (124.2, 120.2 ZOA COULD HAVE BEEN USED, BUT SINCE I HAD NOT BEEN USING ARTCC CTR FOR FLT FOLLOWING I DIDN'T THINK OF LOOKING IT UP IN MY FLT GUIDE. 3) 7 MI VISIBILITY AND UNFAMILIAR TERRAIN RAISED THE STRESS LEVEL. 4) THIS WAS MY SECOND X-COUNTRY IN THIS AIRPLANE WITH ONLY LIQUID COMPASS (NO GYRO) AND THE LIMITED NAVCOM. I'M USED TO 50 MI VISIBILITY ON THE E SIDE OF THE MOUNTAINS. MY PILOTAGE IS USUALLY GOOD, SO FAILURE TO SPOT O22 TOOK ME BY SURPRISE. CONTRIBUTING TO THE STRESS LEVEL IS THE AIRPLANE THAT REQUIRES MORE ATTN TO FLY RIGHT. THE LIQUID COMPASS IS ANOTHER LOAD IN AN AIRPLANE THAT IS SHORT COUPLED AND, WHILE NOT UNSTABLE, BOBBLES IN LIGHT TURB. CORRECTIVE ACTION: SINCE I SEEMED TO HAVE TROUBLE RAISING FSS ON THE USUAL FREQS, AND FUEL WAS IN THE RESERVE AREA, I WENT 121.5. I WAS ABLE TO READ FSS, BUT CASTLE AFB WAS STRONGER AND TOOK OVER. WITH NO XPONDER, THEY WERE ABLE TO PICK ME UP ON PRIMARY RADAR AND STEER ME TO THE NEAREST ARPT, MARIPOSA. ASKED IF I WAS DECLARING AN EMER. I REPLIED, 'YES SIR.' THE LNDG AT MARIPOSA WAS 3 1/2 HRS AFTER TKOF. THE ENG HAD USED 18.5 GALS OUT OF A 25 GAL TANK. PERHAPS 4 GALS USABLE REMAINING. SINCE THIS AIRPLANE COMES OVER THE FENCE AT 90, AND ON FINAL AT 100 CARRYING PWR, THE DECLARATION OF AN EMER WAS JUSTIFIED. THE TERRAIN IS NOT HOSPITABLE. AFTER REFUELING AND TAKING A BREAK FOR A SANDWICH, I FOLLOWED ROUTE 49 TO COLUMBIA WITH NO PROB. THE FLT FROM COLUMBIA TO INYO-KERN, THE NEXT AFTERNOON, TOOK 2 HRS. PILOTAGE WITH VOR BACKUP WAS USED. IN RETROSPECT: I SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED FSS ON THE EL NIDO VOR ABOUT 30 MINS EARLIER THAN I DID FOR NAV ASSISTANCE. 1) A VERT CARD COMPASS IS TO REPLACE THE LIQUID COMPASS (MAGNETIC). 2) A 720 CHANNEL COM IS TO BE INSTALLED SO THAT CTR FREQS CAN BE MONITORED AND COMMUNICATED WITH. 3) A MODE C XPONDER AND PERHAPS A LORAN WILL FOLLOW. MANY THANKS TO CASTLE AFB RAPCON FOR THEIR TIMELY HELP. THE DECISION TO USE V459 AND V332 FROM PORTERVILLE VOR TO COLUMBIA VICINITY RATHER THAN FOLLOW HINKY 99 IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION OF 'UNFRIENDLY SKIES' CAUSED BY FAA'S '0 TOLERANCE' POLICY. ALSO, WITHOUT A XPONDER, OVERFLYING THE ARSA'S AT FRESNO AND CASTLE AFB, WAS DEEMED RISKY THOUGH LEGAL. HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT (JETS) CLB AND DSND TO THESE ARPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.