Narrative:

An small aircraft 1 recently equipped with new transponder with mode C was on an outbnd flight (first flight since installing transponder and mode C) from spokane to the seattle area earlier that day. Pilot asked departure control for altitude readout from encoder before leaving the spokane arsa. Encoder reading was 250' higher than actual altimeter indication. Altimeter had been set to felts field field elevation just a few mins before. On return leg of flight, stayed north of lower tier of the arsa and below the floor of the second tier. (Outer tier floor of arsa in this area is 3700'.) monitored, but did not contact approach (a safety measure to be aware of other traffic, making possible transitions into a controled traffic area). Had transponder with mode C squawking 1200 for VFR turned on and operating. Had received the altimeter setting just before entering the spokane area by monitoring approach control communications with other aircraft. Further monitoring indicated that there was an aircraft approaching from the north and about 5-6 mi and heading south for spokane international. Approach communications with the aircraft indicated that I was in the area (aircraft heading easterly, squawking 1200 and indicating 3800'). The altimeter was indicating 3450', so I descended to 3350' to compensate for the encoder discrepancy noted in the outbnd flight. Crossing traffic small aircraft 2 was at approximately 4000' and came into view after crossing a small ridge to the north. The small aircraft 2 was advised of our traffic 'at the same altitude' (controller). When small aircraft 2 spotted small aircraft 1 and advised controller of 'traffic in sight,' the controller asked the #2 pilot to relay the color of the crossing traffic (the small aircraft 1) to him when he was close enough. The controller then relayed to the #2 pilot that the crossing traffic was violating the arsa. He then told the #2 pilot that he (the controller) was not kidding about getting the color of the crossing traffic (the #1). The pilot then asked him (the controller) if he wanted the north#. The controller then answered in a zealous tone a resounding, 'yes.' the #2 pilot asked permission to deviate to obtain the north#. The #2 was observed descending to our altitude and west/O our contact, passed within 20' of our right wing tip at very high speed. #2 did not get north#. 'I do not see any #'south, but it is an small aircraft.' at the speed he was flying and the close proximity to us, it is no wonder he did not read the #'south. The #2 then turned toward spokane international, and #1 continued to felts field. This incident was a compound problem of the incorrectly indicating encoder and an unsafe maneuver by the #2 pilot at the request of the approach controller. Even if the #1 had been in the arsa airspace, a far more serious safety hazard resulted from the aggressiveness and zealousness of the controller and #2 pilot. The pilot of the #2 passed within 20' of the #1 west/O direct knowledge of permission from the #1 (far part 91). The new '0 tolerance' attitude of the FAA is creating a far greater safety hazard than some of the incidents. It is obvious that in this instance, that approach control was more eager to get the goods on a (potential) violator than in actual safety. I would like to know that I have a friend in the control tower, not an antagonist that if it pleases him, he can endanger my life for his satisfaction! If I can be a safer pilot, I want the controller to help me be a safer pilot. We both have our responsibilities for providing a safe arwy system for everyone to use, he as a controller, and me as a pilot. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter states he did not contact approach because at first he was not sure they were talking about him as the traffic. When he saw the aircraft leave his altitude and fly toward him he was sure he would just pass behind. When the aircraft came so close and he could hear the roar of the engine passing, he was extremely startled and shaken. Reporter's passenger who was a 10000 hour pilot was equally disturbed at #2 pilot's aggressive behavior. Pilots who have had difficulty in the arsa have usually been asked by tower to contact approach after landing and been given a phone #. When this did not happen, reporter let matter drop at suggestion of his experienced passenger, due to FAA current 0 tolerance attitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSSIBLE ARSA PENETRATION RESULTING IN A DELIBERATE DIVING, CLOSE APCH OF ONE ACFT TO GET 'N' NUMBERS OF ANOTHER, WITH ENCOURAGEMENT OF CTLR. SECOND PLT NOT AWARE OF INTENTIONS, VERY STARTLED.

Narrative: AN SMA 1 RECENTLY EQUIPPED WITH NEW XPONDER WITH MODE C WAS ON AN OUTBND FLT (FIRST FLT SINCE INSTALLING XPONDER AND MODE C) FROM SPOKANE TO THE SEATTLE AREA EARLIER THAT DAY. PLT ASKED DEP CTL FOR ALT READOUT FROM ENCODER BEFORE LEAVING THE SPOKANE ARSA. ENCODER READING WAS 250' HIGHER THAN ACTUAL ALTIMETER INDICATION. ALTIMETER HAD BEEN SET TO FELTS FIELD FIELD ELEVATION JUST A FEW MINS BEFORE. ON RETURN LEG OF FLT, STAYED N OF LOWER TIER OF THE ARSA AND BELOW THE FLOOR OF THE SECOND TIER. (OUTER TIER FLOOR OF ARSA IN THIS AREA IS 3700'.) MONITORED, BUT DID NOT CONTACT APCH (A SAFETY MEASURE TO BE AWARE OF OTHER TFC, MAKING POSSIBLE TRANSITIONS INTO A CTLED TFC AREA). HAD XPONDER WITH MODE C SQUAWKING 1200 FOR VFR TURNED ON AND OPERATING. HAD RECEIVED THE ALTIMETER SETTING JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE SPOKANE AREA BY MONITORING APCH CTL COMS WITH OTHER ACFT. FURTHER MONITORING INDICATED THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT APCHING FROM THE N AND ABOUT 5-6 MI AND HDG S FOR SPOKANE INTL. APCH COMS WITH THE ACFT INDICATED THAT I WAS IN THE AREA (ACFT HDG EASTERLY, SQUAWKING 1200 AND INDICATING 3800'). THE ALTIMETER WAS INDICATING 3450', SO I DSNDED TO 3350' TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ENCODER DISCREPANCY NOTED IN THE OUTBND FLT. XING TFC SMA 2 WAS AT APPROX 4000' AND CAME INTO VIEW AFTER XING A SMALL RIDGE TO THE N. THE SMA 2 WAS ADVISED OF OUR TFC 'AT THE SAME ALT' (CTLR). WHEN SMA 2 SPOTTED SMA 1 AND ADVISED CTLR OF 'TFC IN SIGHT,' THE CTLR ASKED THE #2 PLT TO RELAY THE COLOR OF THE XING TFC (THE SMA 1) TO HIM WHEN HE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH. THE CTLR THEN RELAYED TO THE #2 PLT THAT THE XING TFC WAS VIOLATING THE ARSA. HE THEN TOLD THE #2 PLT THAT HE (THE CTLR) WAS NOT KIDDING ABOUT GETTING THE COLOR OF THE XING TFC (THE #1). THE PLT THEN ASKED HIM (THE CTLR) IF HE WANTED THE N#. THE CTLR THEN ANSWERED IN A ZEALOUS TONE A RESOUNDING, 'YES.' THE #2 PLT ASKED PERMISSION TO DEVIATE TO OBTAIN THE N#. THE #2 WAS OBSERVED DSNDING TO OUR ALT AND W/O OUR CONTACT, PASSED WITHIN 20' OF OUR RIGHT WING TIP AT VERY HIGH SPD. #2 DID NOT GET N#. 'I DO NOT SEE ANY #'S, BUT IT IS AN SMA.' AT THE SPD HE WAS FLYING AND THE CLOSE PROX TO US, IT IS NO WONDER HE DID NOT READ THE #'S. THE #2 THEN TURNED TOWARD SPOKANE INTL, AND #1 CONTINUED TO FELTS FIELD. THIS INCIDENT WAS A COMPOUND PROB OF THE INCORRECTLY INDICATING ENCODER AND AN UNSAFE MANEUVER BY THE #2 PLT AT THE REQUEST OF THE APCH CTLR. EVEN IF THE #1 HAD BEEN IN THE ARSA AIRSPACE, A FAR MORE SERIOUS SAFETY HAZARD RESULTED FROM THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND ZEALOUSNESS OF THE CTLR AND #2 PLT. THE PLT OF THE #2 PASSED WITHIN 20' OF THE #1 W/O DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF PERMISSION FROM THE #1 (FAR PART 91). THE NEW '0 TOLERANCE' ATTITUDE OF THE FAA IS CREATING A FAR GREATER SAFETY HAZARD THAN SOME OF THE INCIDENTS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN THIS INSTANCE, THAT APCH CTL WAS MORE EAGER TO GET THE GOODS ON A (POTENTIAL) VIOLATOR THAN IN ACTUAL SAFETY. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT I HAVE A FRIEND IN THE CTL TWR, NOT AN ANTAGONIST THAT IF IT PLEASES HIM, HE CAN ENDANGER MY LIFE FOR HIS SATISFACTION! IF I CAN BE A SAFER PLT, I WANT THE CTLR TO HELP ME BE A SAFER PLT. WE BOTH HAVE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROVIDING A SAFE ARWY SYS FOR EVERYONE TO USE, HE AS A CTLR, AND ME AS A PLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATES HE DID NOT CONTACT APCH BECAUSE AT FIRST HE WAS NOT SURE THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT HIM AS THE TFC. WHEN HE SAW THE ACFT LEAVE HIS ALT AND FLY TOWARD HIM HE WAS SURE HE WOULD JUST PASS BEHIND. WHEN THE ACFT CAME SO CLOSE AND HE COULD HEAR THE ROAR OF THE ENG PASSING, HE WAS EXTREMELY STARTLED AND SHAKEN. RPTR'S PAX WHO WAS A 10000 HR PLT WAS EQUALLY DISTURBED AT #2 PLT'S AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR. PLTS WHO HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY IN THE ARSA HAVE USUALLY BEEN ASKED BY TWR TO CONTACT APCH AFTER LNDG AND BEEN GIVEN A PHONE #. WHEN THIS DID NOT HAPPEN, RPTR LET MATTER DROP AT SUGGESTION OF HIS EXPERIENCED PAX, DUE TO FAA CURRENT 0 TOLERANCE ATTITUDE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.