Narrative:

The incident occurred on preflight inspection of flight xx (air carrier) from rsw to tpa. During my walk around inspection of the aircraft I was informed by a mechanic that they were removing my aircraft's crew O2 bottle and switching it with another air carrier aircraft's O2 bottle which had been reported 50 psi low. The switch was being performed to meet the other aircraft's departure time, which occurred before our flight. After the switch was completed our aircraft registered 900 psi on the crew O2 pressure gauge (1200 psi is minimum pressure). I reported this discrepancy to captain XXXX. We consulted the MEL and found no item concerning crew O2. During this time we were also informed that no spare O2 bottles or O2 servicing was available in fort meyers. The first officer and I gave our opinion that we should not depart until we could have the O2 serviced or replaced. The captain made the decision to proceed with the flight noting my objection as well as the first officer's. He stated the reasons for his decision: the flight was to be operated below 10000', the flight was to be operated in VMC and was scheduled for only 30+ mins and in his opinion 900 psi of crew O2 would have been sufficient to sustain us in the event of smoke or fire in the aircraft. Although I agreed with his arguments I maintained my position. We proceed west/O further incident to tpa were the bottle was changed. It was the captain's decision not to record any of this in the aircraft log book and we were informed that the other crew involved had not made any log book entries.. Although our flight proceeded west/O the required amount of O2 (which is why I raised objections), I do feel we proceeded safely as well as in a timely manner. Supplemental information from acn 107843: the captain stated that 'he was going,' he would take full responsibility, and he was 'ordering us to go.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REPORTER FLT WAS UNABLE TO GET ACFT CREW OXYGEN SYSTEM SERVICED AND DEPARTED WITHOUT THE QUANTITY REQUIRED BY THE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT OCCURRED ON PREFLT INSPECTION OF FLT XX (ACR) FROM RSW TO TPA. DURING MY WALK AROUND INSPECTION OF THE ACFT I WAS INFORMED BY A MECH THAT THEY WERE REMOVING MY ACFT'S CREW O2 BOTTLE AND SWITCHING IT WITH ANOTHER ACR ACFT'S O2 BOTTLE WHICH HAD BEEN RPTED 50 PSI LOW. THE SWITCH WAS BEING PERFORMED TO MEET THE OTHER ACFT'S DEP TIME, WHICH OCCURRED BEFORE OUR FLT. AFTER THE SWITCH WAS COMPLETED OUR ACFT REGISTERED 900 PSI ON THE CREW O2 PRESSURE GAUGE (1200 PSI IS MINIMUM PRESSURE). I RPTED THIS DISCREPANCY TO CAPT XXXX. WE CONSULTED THE MEL AND FOUND NO ITEM CONCERNING CREW O2. DURING THIS TIME WE WERE ALSO INFORMED THAT NO SPARE O2 BOTTLES OR O2 SERVICING WAS AVAILABLE IN FORT MEYERS. THE F/O AND I GAVE OUR OPINION THAT WE SHOULD NOT DEPART UNTIL WE COULD HAVE THE O2 SERVICED OR REPLACED. THE CAPT MADE THE DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE FLT NOTING MY OBJECTION AS WELL AS THE F/O'S. HE STATED THE REASONS FOR HIS DECISION: THE FLT WAS TO BE OPERATED BELOW 10000', THE FLT WAS TO BE OPERATED IN VMC AND WAS SCHEDULED FOR ONLY 30+ MINS AND IN HIS OPINION 900 PSI OF CREW O2 WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN US IN THE EVENT OF SMOKE OR FIRE IN THE ACFT. ALTHOUGH I AGREED WITH HIS ARGUMENTS I MAINTAINED MY POS. WE PROCEED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT TO TPA WERE THE BOTTLE WAS CHANGED. IT WAS THE CAPT'S DECISION NOT TO RECORD ANY OF THIS IN THE ACFT LOG BOOK AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE OTHER CREW INVOLVED HAD NOT MADE ANY LOG BOOK ENTRIES.. ALTHOUGH OUR FLT PROCEEDED W/O THE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF O2 (WHICH IS WHY I RAISED OBJECTIONS), I DO FEEL WE PROCEEDED SAFELY AS WELL AS IN A TIMELY MANNER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 107843: THE CAPT STATED THAT 'HE WAS GOING,' HE WOULD TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY, AND HE WAS 'ORDERING US TO GO.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.