Narrative:

Two operation's vehicles [were] out doing runway checks during a critically busy time of the shift (cargo push and first departure push). Only one person [was] working two positions (local control 4/ground control 4) due to three sick outs; furlough; and one person being late. To compound the situation; the person working the position was a front line manager with very little working experience with the new RNAV procedures. One city operations vehicle (operations X) had just completed a runway check to one of the two active runways on the west side and another operations vehicle came out to complete a runway check on the parallel runway 34L; unusual two operations vehicles to do the same side of the airport at about the same time. In trying to coordinate departures with local control 2; who had all the airspace and the majority of departures; and trying to interpret the new heading listed on the cheat sheet; the local control 4 controller forgot about the operations vehicle on the runway when the local control 2 controller gave the release for a B737. When the B737 was approximately 900 ft from the runway and the operations vehicle was 14;500 ft down the 16;000 ft runway; the B737 was cleared for take off; to expedite their departure in between cargo departures. The operations vehicle (operations Y) heard the take off clearance and exited the runway and reported off on the tower frequency prior to the B737 being no less than 900 ft from the runway. Make sure that everyone; including the front line managers; is familiar with the new RNAV procedures. It's almost a done deal; however; get rid of the furlough. Have city operations not do runway checks during peak periods of traffic. [We should have] only one operation's vehicle at a time conducting runway checks on either the west or east side of the airport. Come up with new procedures to specify there is a vehicle on the runway and have these procedures rotated so that we don't become complacent and used to the old bells and whistles.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Supervisor described a runway loss of separation event when internal communications and unfamiliarity with new procedures led to the failure to insure a City Operations vehicle was clear of the runway.

Narrative: Two Operation's vehicles [were] out doing runway checks during a critically busy time of the shift (cargo push and first departure push). Only one person [was] working two positions (Local Control 4/Ground Control 4) due to three sick outs; furlough; and one person being late. To compound the situation; the person working the position was a Front Line Manager with very little working experience with the new RNAV procedures. One city operations vehicle (OPS X) had just completed a runway check to one of the two active runways on the west side and another operations vehicle came out to complete a runway check on the parallel Runway 34L; unusual two operations vehicles to do the same side of the airport at about the same time. In trying to coordinate departures with Local Control 2; who had all the airspace and the majority of departures; and trying to interpret the new heading listed on the cheat sheet; the Local Control 4 Controller forgot about the operations vehicle on the runway when the Local Control 2 Controller gave the release for a B737. When the B737 was approximately 900 FT from the runway and the operations vehicle was 14;500 FT down the 16;000 FT runway; the B737 was cleared for take off; to expedite their departure in between cargo departures. The Operations vehicle (OPS Y) heard the take off clearance and exited the runway and reported off on the Tower frequency prior to the B737 being no less than 900 FT from the runway. Make sure that everyone; including the front line managers; is familiar with the new RNAV procedures. It's almost a done deal; however; get rid of the furlough. Have city operations not do runway checks during peak periods of traffic. [We should have] only one Operation's vehicle at a time conducting runway checks on either the west or east side of the airport. Come up with new procedures to specify there is a vehicle on the runway and have these procedures rotated so that we don't become complacent and used to the old bells and whistles.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.