Narrative:

I was working sector X combined. A gulfstream was on the [SID] departure out of the terminal area. He was issued the climb to FL410. Sector Y had traffic and suggested he go direct [to the fix]. I issued the clearance. Later on after the hand off was taken by sector Y; the controller said 'you may want to stop him.' I was in the process of switching him when he put an interim altitude of FL390 in the data block. I said; 'oh; I'm sorry; I see he didn't get the altitude.' the other controller said no worries; I got it. In the meantime the gulfstream is out of FL360 still climbing. The gulfstream checked on to [sector] Y's frequency climbing to FL410; and the controller 'rogered' him. The controller on sector Y then gave a briefing. Within about 1 minute of the new controller sitting down; the gulfstream and the B737 start flashing. FL390 was in the data block; but the gulfstream was out of FL391. He was never stopped at the appropriate altitude. The new controller immediately descended him and the B737 responded to an RA. They never got within the 5 miles and 1;000 ft because of the quick action of the new controller and the RA. Basically; it was a communication break down. I assumed the controller understood what I was saying; and he thought I had stopped him. He did not catch it on the initial check on of the gulfstream; which lead to potentially terrible situation. I should have made sure the aircraft was stopped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event when coordination during the ATC position relief briefing was confused reference the climb clearance resulting in the TCAS RA.

Narrative: I was working Sector X combined. A Gulfstream was on the [SID] departure out of the terminal area. He was issued the climb to FL410. Sector Y had traffic and suggested he go direct [to the fix]. I issued the clearance. Later on after the hand off was taken by Sector Y; the Controller said 'you may want to stop him.' I was in the process of switching him when he put an interim altitude of FL390 in the data block. I said; 'Oh; I'm sorry; I see he didn't get the altitude.' The other Controller said no worries; I got it. In the meantime the Gulfstream is out of FL360 still climbing. The Gulfstream checked on to [Sector] Y's frequency climbing to FL410; and the Controller 'rogered' him. The Controller on Sector Y then gave a briefing. Within about 1 minute of the new Controller sitting down; the Gulfstream and the B737 start flashing. FL390 was in the data block; but the Gulfstream was out of FL391. He was never stopped at the appropriate altitude. The new Controller immediately descended him and the B737 responded to an RA. They never got within the 5 miles and 1;000 FT because of the quick action of the new Controller and the RA. Basically; it was a communication break down. I assumed the Controller understood what I was saying; and he thought I had stopped him. He did not catch it on the initial check on of the Gulfstream; which lead to potentially terrible situation. I should have made sure the aircraft was stopped.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.