Narrative:

Prior to departing; I had added 2;000 pounds of fuel because of bad weather on departure and a forecast low landing weight in rno. We had a runway change which cut into our fuel load some; but once airborne; everything proceeded normally. Enroute to rno; we pulled up the ATIS and found that it was raining with low ceilings (2;300 broken.) forecast had been for >3;000/5. We contacted dispatch for an updated forecast and were again told > 3;000/5 for our arrival time. ATIS was calling 2;300 broken. Runway 34L (the primary instrument runway) was closed. Runway 34R had only RNAV approaches available; however; none of the RNAV approaches to this runway were in the airbus database! We tried to coordinate with approach control to shoot an RNAV to the left runway and circle to land (sidestep) to the right; taking a 360 turn to set all this up; but this was ultimately disapproved; the tower controller told us the approach controller would lose radar contact with us in the clouds and that we would never break out. The visual approach to 34R required 5;000/5. At this point we were becoming critically low on fuel and opted to divert immediately to smf. We declared min fuel and landed with 8.0 pounds of fuel.there needs to be much better coordination between dispatch and maintenance as to what approaches are loaded into the FMS database on these airplanes. Dispatch knew that the left (instrument) runway was going to be closed for an extended period of time; ergo; they should have done their research to make sure that the airplane they were sending to rno was capable of landing there. When I contacted the dispatcher after landing in smf; he had no idea that the RNAV approaches to 34R were not in our database. A further conversation with dispatch revealed that maintenance claimed the RNAV approaches had been loaded to runway 34L but later admitted that this had not been done. This bears additional investigation; this was a serious - and potentially fatal - error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew reports diverting from RNO due to Runway 34L being closed and RNAV approaches to 34R not being part of their database. An RNAV approach to Runway 34L with sidestep to Runway 34R was denied by ATC due to weather.

Narrative: Prior to departing; I had added 2;000 LBS of fuel because of bad weather on departure and a forecast low landing weight in RNO. We had a runway change which cut into our fuel load some; but once airborne; everything proceeded normally. Enroute to RNO; we pulled up the ATIS and found that it was raining with low ceilings (2;300 broken.) Forecast had been for >3;000/5. We contacted Dispatch for an updated forecast and were again told > 3;000/5 for our arrival time. ATIS was calling 2;300 broken. Runway 34L (the primary instrument runway) was closed. Runway 34R had only RNAV approaches available; however; none of the RNAV approaches to this runway were in the Airbus database! We tried to coordinate with Approach Control to shoot an RNAV to the L runway and circle to land (sidestep) to the right; taking a 360 turn to set all this up; but this was ultimately disapproved; the Tower Controller told us the Approach Controller would lose radar contact with us in the clouds and that we would never break out. The visual approach to 34R required 5;000/5. At this point we were becoming critically low on fuel and opted to divert immediately to SMF. We declared min fuel and landed with 8.0 LBS of fuel.There needs to be much better coordination between Dispatch and Maintenance as to what approaches are loaded into the FMS database on these airplanes. Dispatch knew that the left (instrument) runway was going to be closed for an extended period of time; ergo; they should have done their research to make sure that the airplane they were sending to RNO was capable of landing there. When I contacted the Dispatcher after landing in SMF; he had no idea that the RNAV approaches to 34R were not in our database. A further conversation with Dispatch revealed that Maintenance claimed the RNAV approaches had been loaded to Runway 34L but later admitted that this had not been done. This bears additional investigation; this was a serious - and potentially fatal - error.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.