Narrative:

I came back from a break to sit on the d-side which is a high inbound sector that feeds atl from the northeast. There was a massive line of weather stretching from the gulf of mexico to the indianapolis airspace. It was moving fairly slow and we had been watching it for a couple days so it was not a surprise when it got over atl. The sector was working more than usual inbounds because as the weather line moved from west to east over ZTL; tmu started moving all the northwest inbounds to the northeast to beat the weather. On top of the extra inbounds; we also had the special procedures in effect which is one of the busiest times of the year. The flm asked the OM for some holdover overtime for the weather and the additional expected traffic coming earlier that day and he was denied. Later the atl airport was shut off and we went to hold. The OM walked down to the area; the flm again told him that people were going home and we were going to be short. The OM's response was; 'I think you can handle it.' the low side's pattern filled quickly; then the high side a minute after that. As the d-side; I made the decision to shut off the arrivals from the northeast because we were full. The r-side was going home and a d-side came back from break so we made the decision for me to get the r-side out; for him to track because everybody was in the holding pattern; it was a lull in traffic; and I had the flick so we could make a better transition when it was time for him to go home. Atl opened back up about 20 minutes later but by this time there was weather to the east; west; and middle of the sector so we had to the change the turns of the holding pattern from right to left which put the holding pattern encroaching on the neighboring sector. Point-outs were made and we proceeded to try and get out of the holding pattern. The low side had 10 miles in trail with little to no room to vector because the aircraft were holding in the only hole in the sky. Slowly the low side began to take airplanes from me but with the extra over flights climbing out; the process was going to take a while. Later two cpcs (my tracker and another senior controller) were scheduled to sign out but with no one on break to relieve them they both stayed behind me to help out as much as they could for about 15 minutes until they were told to leave. Someone then made the decision to send our flm to our ultra-high and let that controller track for me; and get another supervisor from another area to watch our area. By this time we were about out of the holding so we called the sector north of us; which was holding atl inbounds as well; to start clearing the aircraft in. As I got the aircraft they were all slowed to 250 knots; and vectored has much as possible (which wasn't much because of the weather everywhere) so that we could get out of holding fast because there was another wave of atl inbounds coming in. I waited as long as I could; but with no room to vector and 10 miles in trail; I had to put the aircraft back into holding with the weather moving closer to the holding fix and aircraft holding fuel times running out. Because we went back into hold; my tracker was removed to go back and relieve the sector that the flm was working because he was getting too busy. The OM then called a supervisor from another area that at one time was checked out in our area to come track for me. The inbound fix into atl was covered with weather so we had to acquire (with coordination) the airspace south of the sector so we could vector the aircraft into atl. After two plus hours; I was able to give up the sector to my tracker. I later learned that the areas ultra-high sector that feeds [the sector I was working] the inbounds into atl was holding without a d-side and had multiple reroutes due to weather. That three; maybe more; controllers were on sector for more than two hours. It was all very unsafe. This situation is inexcusable. First; this was one of the busiest times of the year and second; the massive weather that moved in very slow with multiple thunderstorms and weather warnings for a couple of days are very predictable. The OM knew of both of these and even with the facility under weather warnings; decided not to allow overtime. As the weather got closer and we actually went into hold the flm again asked for hold over overtime and he was denied. This was a horrific breach of safety. For a couple hours overtime we could have had a certified controller tracking and working a needed d-side. I may have been able to a short break to recharge from 2 plus hours; not even being offered a break; of holding aircraft; issuing reroutes; and dealing with weather. I understand we get paid very well and one of the reasons is because of weather season and being able to direct aircraft safely and efficiently. With the knowledge of one of the busiest IFR events in the world going on and a weather front that is known and moving very slowly to compromise safety for a couple hours overtime because an OM and the chief of the facility are trying to save money is ridiculous. As controllers; it's not in our nature to not try and make it work; but when our OM and chief do not give us support to do our jobs in a situation that is very forcible can be very demoralizing. How can they look us in the face a preach safety; safety; and when the situation comes that something can be done to increase safety exponentially; nothing is done? How can anybody take them seriously? Although we did not have a deal or worse; a midair; safety was compromised and that could have been prevented. With extra people; holding would not been avoided but safety could have been improved and a lot of money could have been saved for aircraft having to divert to alternate airports. Someone needs to look into why overtime was not granted; why our area is shorthanded every day; and if the chief is making the decision; how is he doing so with not even being aware of the situation we were in? Another factor could have tmu. Why were three sectors before atl holding aircraft when a known weather font coming through? Why wasn't there a ground stop; bigger miles in trail; or aircraft moved to a different fix when weather covered the the northeast fix and the southeast fix opened?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZTL Controller voiced concern regarding management's decision not permit overtime when know increased traffic volumes and weather impacts were forecasted.

Narrative: I came back from a break to sit on the D-Side which is a high inbound sector that feeds ATL from the Northeast. There was a massive line of weather stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Indianapolis airspace. It was moving fairly slow and we had been watching it for a couple days so it was not a surprise when it got over ATL. The sector was working more than usual inbounds because as the weather line moved from west to east over ZTL; TMU started moving all the Northwest inbounds to the Northeast to beat the weather. On top of the extra inbounds; we also had the Special Procedures in effect which is one of the busiest times of the year. The FLM asked the OM for some holdover overtime for the weather and the additional expected traffic coming earlier that day and he was denied. Later the ATL airport was shut off and we went to hold. The OM walked down to the area; the FLM again told him that people were going home and we were going to be short. The OM's response was; 'I think you can handle it.' The low side's pattern filled quickly; then the high side a minute after that. As the D-Side; I made the decision to shut off the arrivals from the Northeast because we were full. The R-Side was going home and a D-Side came back from break so we made the decision for me to get the R-Side out; for him to track because everybody was in the holding pattern; it was a lull in traffic; and I had the flick so we could make a better transition when it was time for him to go home. ATL opened back up about 20 minutes later but by this time there was weather to the east; west; and middle of the sector so we had to the change the turns of the holding pattern from right to left which put the holding pattern encroaching on the neighboring sector. Point-outs were made and we proceeded to try and get out of the holding pattern. The low side had 10 miles in trail with little to no room to vector because the aircraft were holding in the only hole in the sky. Slowly the low side began to take airplanes from me but with the extra over flights climbing out; the process was going to take a while. Later two CPCs (my tracker and another senior controller) were scheduled to sign out but with no one on break to relieve them they both stayed behind me to help out as much as they could for about 15 minutes until they were told to leave. Someone then made the decision to send our FLM to our Ultra-High and let that Controller track for me; and get another Supervisor from another area to watch our area. By this time we were about out of the holding so we called the sector north of us; which was holding ATL inbounds as well; to start clearing the aircraft in. As I got the aircraft they were all slowed to 250 knots; and vectored has much as possible (which wasn't much because of the weather everywhere) so that we could get out of holding fast because there was another wave of ATL inbounds coming in. I waited as long as I could; but with no room to vector and 10 miles in trail; I had to put the aircraft back into holding with the weather moving closer to the holding fix and aircraft holding fuel times running out. Because we went back into hold; my tracker was removed to go back and relieve the sector that the FLM was working because he was getting too busy. The OM then called a Supervisor from another area that at one time was checked out in our area to come track for me. The inbound fix into ATL was covered with weather so we had to acquire (with coordination) the airspace south of the sector so we could vector the aircraft into ATL. After two plus hours; I was able to give up the sector to my tracker. I later learned that the areas ultra-high sector that feeds [the sector I was working] the inbounds into ATL was holding without a D-Side and had multiple reroutes due to weather. That three; maybe more; controllers were on sector for more than two hours. It was all very unsafe. This situation is inexcusable. First; this was one of the busiest times of the year and second; the massive weather that moved in very slow with multiple thunderstorms and weather warnings for a couple of days are very predictable. The OM knew of both of these and even with the facility under weather warnings; decided not to allow overtime. As the weather got closer and we actually went into hold the FLM again asked for hold over overtime and he was denied. This was a horrific breach of safety. For a couple hours overtime we could have had a certified controller tracking and working a needed D-Side. I may have been able to a short break to recharge from 2 plus hours; not even being offered a break; of holding aircraft; issuing reroutes; and dealing with weather. I understand we get paid very well and one of the reasons is because of weather season and being able to direct aircraft safely and efficiently. With the knowledge of one of the busiest IFR events in the world going on and a weather front that is known and moving very slowly to compromise safety for a couple hours overtime because an OM and the Chief of the Facility are trying to save money is ridiculous. As controllers; it's not in our nature to not try and make it work; but when our OM and Chief do not give us support to do our jobs in a situation that is very forcible can be very demoralizing. How can they look us in the face a preach safety; safety; and when the situation comes that something can be done to increase safety exponentially; nothing is done? How can anybody take them seriously? Although we did not have a deal or worse; a midair; safety was compromised and that could have been prevented. With extra people; holding would not been avoided but safety could have been improved and a lot of money could have been saved for aircraft having to divert to alternate airports. Someone needs to look into why overtime was not granted; why our area is shorthanded every day; and if the Chief is making the decision; how is he doing so with not even being aware of the situation we were in? Another factor could have TMU. Why were three sectors before ATL holding aircraft when a known weather font coming through? Why wasn't there a ground stop; bigger miles in trail; or aircraft moved to a different fix when weather covered the the Northeast fix and the Southeast fix opened?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.