Narrative:

Atop sectors 87/89 combined. Multiple aircraft were giving estimates that were not in conformance; and were verified by the controller. Upon further investigation; including reports from aircraft about the winds; I learned that the winds were over 200 KTS off at altitude in the system. This corrupts the aircraft's profiles and results in separation being lost. Due to this huge error in the system; I believe two airplanes may have lost separation. The problem is that when I advised flm of the situation; he/she took no action. Instead he/she advised me that they would be fixed on the next update; several hours away. This is unacceptable. I figured out that by manually entering the winds; they would be changed on the hour update or so it seemed. After changing winds in the system; the system then alerted me to another pair of aircraft that were together; as the one aircraft's profile was incorrect due to the gross error in winds in the system. My change in the wind data resulted in the display of the conflict and subsequent resolution. This is a serious safety issue when we depend on the winds to be accurate to ensure aircraft profiles are up to date. This combined with estimates from pilots are the only assurances we have of separation. If an error is discovered with the winds; they must be fixed! I believe that the controller and flm workforce is not trained to fix the winds or even understand them. I recommend further training on the system for all controllers and flm's in regard to wind data.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZNY Controller described a probable loss of separation event when accurate wind data was not entered into the system creating the potential for separation errors; the reporter suggesting increased training in this area.

Narrative: ATOP Sectors 87/89 combined. Multiple aircraft were giving estimates that were not in conformance; and were verified by the Controller. Upon further investigation; including reports from aircraft about the winds; I learned that the winds were over 200 KTS off at altitude in the system. This corrupts the aircraft's profiles and results in separation being lost. Due to this huge error in the system; I believe two airplanes may have lost separation. The problem is that when I advised FLM of the situation; he/she took no action. Instead he/she advised me that they would be fixed on the next update; several hours away. This is unacceptable. I figured out that by manually entering the winds; they would be changed on the hour update or so it seemed. After changing winds in the system; the system then alerted me to another pair of aircraft that were together; as the one aircraft's profile was incorrect due to the gross error in winds in the system. My change in the wind data resulted in the display of the conflict and subsequent resolution. This is a serious safety issue when we depend on the winds to be accurate to ensure aircraft profiles are up to date. This combined with estimates from pilots are the only assurances we have of separation. If an error is discovered with the winds; they must be fixed! I believe that the controller and FLM workforce is not trained to fix the winds or even understand them. I recommend further training on the system for all controllers and FLM's in regard to wind data.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.