Following an analysis of ice control and pneumatic manifold anomalies the flight crew of an md-11 re...

Narrative:

On departure we received a level one alert (ice det single) followed quickly by another level one alert (air system 1 off). The first officer flew the jet while I worked radios and checklists. After reading the level one info; I didn't feel we had a manifold failure - just an anti ice issue and attempted to repressurize the system by introducing air from system 2. I then received a level 3 (manifold fail) warning. We complied with the appropriate emergency checklists and returned to [our departure airport]. The warning only lasted a few seconds as I cut off the air when the warning came on. Maintenance believes the manifold came apart during takeoff. The first officer believes he heard a noise on takeoff roll. The level one warnings were inhibited until 400 ft. My action of trying to get the number 1 system back didn't cause the manifold failure; it only brought it to our attention.I think the reading of the level one alert could be more directive. It states not to repressurize the system if the manifold has failed. I didn't believe we had a manifold fail. It should simply state 'don't repressurize'.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Following an analysis of ice control and pneumatic manifold anomalies the flight crew of an MD-11 returned to their departure airport for maintenance.

Narrative: On departure we received a level one alert (Ice Det Single) followed quickly by another level one alert (Air System 1 off). The First Officer flew the jet while I worked radios and checklists. After reading the level one info; I didn't feel we had a manifold failure - just an anti ice issue and attempted to repressurize the system by introducing air from system 2. I then received a level 3 (manifold fail) warning. We complied with the appropriate emergency checklists and returned to [our departure airport]. The warning only lasted a few seconds as I cut off the air when the warning came on. Maintenance believes the manifold came apart during takeoff. The First Officer believes he heard a noise on takeoff roll. The level one warnings were inhibited until 400 FT. My action of trying to get the number 1 system back didn't cause the manifold failure; it only brought it to our attention.I think the reading of the level one alert could be more directive. It states not to repressurize the system if the manifold has failed. I didn't believe we had a manifold fail. It should simply state 'don't repressurize'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1078024
Time
Date	201304
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Takeoff
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Pneumatic System
Person 1
Function	Captain Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Following an analysis of ice control and pneumatic manifold anomalies the flight crew of an md-11 returned to their departure airport for maintenance.