Narrative:

During our approach to land; when I requested flaps 35; at approximately 1;800 MSL; the 'flaps fail' cas message illuminated. We both acknowledged the fault. Rather than pausing and pulling out the checklist; the pilot not flying pushed the flap reset button. When that didn't fix the error; he matched the flap selector to the flap position of 15 then pushed the flap reset button once again. The fail message extinguished and the flaps were selected to 35; and they moved into the proper position. The landing was uneventful; normal; however company SOP with regard to checklist usage wasn't complied with. This was the third time we had received this failure selecting flaps to 35 out of the previous 4 legs we failed to communicate a proper reaction based upon previous occurrences and familiarity of the abnormal checklist. In the few seconds; 3-5 seconds; where the failure occurred; in a high workload environment; a better course of action would to have been to execute a missed approach; call for the proper checklist; and execute the procedure for a flaps fail cas message. In the checklist the procedure calls for the following:1. Flap position indicator: check position 2. Flap handle: verify in a detent 3. Airspeed: appropriate speed for configuration 4. Flap reset button: push if the flaps remain in the failed condition; the checklist moves us to the 'flaps not in the landing position (35)' checklist. Nowhere in the flaps failed checklist does it tell us to take the flap selector to match the condition of the failure and push the flap reset button. If we had followed the specified procedure; it would have forced us to land in a non-normal condition; flaps 15. Contributing factors: first; our communication regarding call for the abnormal checklist was lacking. Second; we went on 'muscle-memory' to resolve the abnormal problem rather than execute a go-around and pull the appropriate checklist. Third; other factors include VMC environment; our position relative to the airport (close-in) final approach; revenue passengers onboard; and a feeling that this is an easy resolution with the flap fail button versus executing a go-around and inconveniencing the passengers. Last; possible checklist oversight; in that if the procedure were it followed as written; we would have been forced to land in a degraded configuration; flaps 15; to a 5;000 ft long runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE-680 flight crew reported they deviated from the published procedure in dealing with a flap failure.

Narrative: During our approach to land; when I requested flaps 35; at approximately 1;800 MSL; the 'flaps fail' CAS message illuminated. We both acknowledged the fault. Rather than pausing and pulling out the checklist; the pilot not flying pushed the flap reset button. When that didn't fix the error; he matched the flap selector to the flap position of 15 then pushed the flap reset button once again. The fail message extinguished and the flaps were selected to 35; and they moved into the proper position. The landing was uneventful; normal; however company SOP with regard to checklist usage wasn't complied with. This was the third time we had received this failure selecting flaps to 35 out of the previous 4 legs we failed to communicate a proper reaction based upon previous occurrences and familiarity of the abnormal checklist. In the few seconds; 3-5 seconds; where the failure occurred; in a high workload environment; a better course of action would to have been to execute a missed approach; call for the proper checklist; and execute the procedure for a flaps fail CAS message. In the checklist the procedure calls for the following:1. Flap position indicator: Check position 2. Flap handle: Verify in a detent 3. Airspeed: Appropriate speed for configuration 4. Flap reset button: Push If the flaps remain in the failed condition; the checklist moves us to the 'flaps not in the landing position (35)' checklist. Nowhere in the Flaps Failed Checklist does it tell us to take the flap selector to match the condition of the failure and push the flap reset button. If we had followed the specified procedure; it would have forced us to land in a non-normal condition; flaps 15. Contributing factors: First; our communication regarding call for the abnormal checklist was lacking. Second; we went on 'muscle-memory' to resolve the abnormal problem rather than execute a go-around and pull the appropriate checklist. Third; other factors include VMC environment; our position relative to the airport (close-in) final approach; revenue passengers onboard; and a feeling that this is an easy resolution with the flap fail button versus executing a go-around and inconveniencing the passengers. Last; possible checklist oversight; in that if the procedure were it followed as written; we would have been forced to land in a degraded configuration; flaps 15; to a 5;000 FT long runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.