Narrative:

Our trouble started when we called for the clearance. The controller was difficult to understand and seemed unsure about the exact detail of our clearance when queried. We had to have the clearance read 3 times before we satisfied ourselves that we understood it. 2 other factors were already at work. We had flown 12 hours in the previous 24 and had 12 hours of technical rest with a maximum of about 7 hours of sleep. In addition to this, we were faced with a departure deadline which was especially important at that time since we were flying on a trial basis for mac and were hoping to get the contract extended. Finally, there was no VHF frequency for clearance at ramstein so we had to get our clearance from the tower controller. (How much of a factor this may have been I could not say.) our clearance took us from dirk VOR (kir) to ruwer intersection, which is 37 DME west of kir on the 273 degree right. We were on an assigned heading after takeoff and handed off to frankfurt center. We had difficulty understanding the controller. The captain understood him to assign us a heading. I had thought he said, 'until able direct kirn,' and then as cleared, but at the time we were each unaware of the confusion between us as to this point. We were quite close to the VOR and I was involved in other cockpit duties (after takeoff checklist, communication with frankfurt). I did not see us pass kir heading northwest. We were not 6 mi past kirn heading northwesterly when frankfurt called us. They apparently had to turn an inbound widebody transport though no 'evasive' action was required. For the rest of the trip I devoted much more of my time to navigation and xchking the PF--delaying checklists when necessary. And I was much more careful about reading back and clarifying clrncs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NAVIGATION ERROR WHILE FLT CREW DISTRACTED WITH COCKPIT TASKS. ACR FAILED TO INTERCEPT AIRWAY ON DEP AS PER CLRNC. ARTCC RADAR CTLR CAUGHT DEVIATION AND VECTORED ANOTHER ACFT TO PROVIDE STANDARD SEPARATION. NO CONFLICT.

Narrative: OUR TROUBLE STARTED WHEN WE CALLED FOR THE CLRNC. THE CTLR WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND AND SEEMED UNSURE ABOUT THE EXACT DETAIL OF OUR CLRNC WHEN QUERIED. WE HAD TO HAVE THE CLRNC READ 3 TIMES BEFORE WE SATISFIED OURSELVES THAT WE UNDERSTOOD IT. 2 OTHER FACTORS WERE ALREADY AT WORK. WE HAD FLOWN 12 HRS IN THE PREVIOUS 24 AND HAD 12 HRS OF TECHNICAL REST WITH A MAX OF ABOUT 7 HRS OF SLEEP. IN ADDITION TO THIS, WE WERE FACED WITH A DEP DEADLINE WHICH WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AT THAT TIME SINCE WE WERE FLYING ON A TRIAL BASIS FOR MAC AND WERE HOPING TO GET THE CONTRACT EXTENDED. FINALLY, THERE WAS NO VHF FREQ FOR CLRNC AT RAMSTEIN SO WE HAD TO GET OUR CLRNC FROM THE TWR CTLR. (HOW MUCH OF A FACTOR THIS MAY HAVE BEEN I COULD NOT SAY.) OUR CLRNC TOOK US FROM DIRK VOR (KIR) TO RUWER INTXN, WHICH IS 37 DME W OF KIR ON THE 273 DEG R. WE WERE ON AN ASSIGNED HDG AFTER TKOF AND HANDED OFF TO FRANKFURT CENTER. WE HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING THE CTLR. THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD HIM TO ASSIGN US A HDG. I HAD THOUGHT HE SAID, 'UNTIL ABLE DIRECT KIRN,' AND THEN AS CLRED, BUT AT THE TIME WE WERE EACH UNAWARE OF THE CONFUSION BTWN US AS TO THIS POINT. WE WERE QUITE CLOSE TO THE VOR AND I WAS INVOLVED IN OTHER COCKPIT DUTIES (AFTER TKOF CHKLIST, COM WITH FRANKFURT). I DID NOT SEE US PASS KIR HDG NW. WE WERE NOT 6 MI PAST KIRN HDG NORTHWESTERLY WHEN FRANKFURT CALLED US. THEY APPARENTLY HAD TO TURN AN INBND WDB THOUGH NO 'EVASIVE' ACTION WAS REQUIRED. FOR THE REST OF THE TRIP I DEVOTED MUCH MORE OF MY TIME TO NAV AND XCHKING THE PF--DELAYING CHKLISTS WHEN NECESSARY. AND I WAS MUCH MORE CAREFUL ABOUT READING BACK AND CLARIFYING CLRNCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.