Narrative:

During climb after takeoff we experienced a major engine malfunction and associated engine fire. It was decided to split duties; with the captain flying the airplane and communicating with ATC; and the first officer running checklists to prepare for an immediate return. During this time there were a lot of distractions with ATC and the cabin calling to work out the details of the return. As the event progressed; we learned that we might not be able to extinguish the engine fire. After both fire bottles were used; the engine fire warning remained. At this point the prime objective became to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. To make matters worse; after donning O2 masks; communication was disrupted between the captain and the first officer; resulting in much difficulty in running checklists. Due to the time constraints; we were not able to resolve the communication problem. After landing it was discovered the captain's headset cord had become tangled with the O2 mask hose and also the captain's seat arm rest and the airframe of the airplane. I used my captain's authority to deviate to meet the needs to get the flight on the ground. In light of the emphasis of the danger of fire and/or smoke; I felt that the best course of action was to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. It is possible we missed standard calls at some points; and although [we] completed all the correct checklists; [we] did so in a hurried manner. On final; we had allowed extra energy. It's possible we exceeded flap extension speeds by a small margin. Also; it became apparent that our extra energy nearing the runway could cause us to go much longer than desired. I decided to extend the flaps to 35 instead of leave them at the normal 15 for a single engine landing. We discussed the fact that we would not be attempting a go around with a fire still indicated and that the flaps 35 setting would be the better of the two possible courses. In our debrief we discussed we had probably broken the sterile cockpit rule on taxi out. We had briefly discussed the location of [the] gate in the terminal. Also; we discussed the fact the standby instrument display was flickering. The display was readable; but we had a brief discussion of whether it was a distraction or not. It was decided with weather not an issue; we would continue with the flickering display.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 flight crew reported engine fire after takeoff; and after discharging bottles the fire light remained on. Crew felt pressure to get aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible; and some SOP deviations may have occurred.

Narrative: During climb after takeoff we experienced a major engine malfunction and associated engine fire. It was decided to split duties; with the Captain flying the airplane and communicating with ATC; and the First Officer running checklists to prepare for an immediate return. During this time there were a lot of distractions with ATC and the cabin calling to work out the details of the return. As the event progressed; we learned that we might not be able to extinguish the engine fire. After both fire bottles were used; the engine fire warning remained. At this point the prime objective became to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. To make matters worse; after donning O2 masks; communication was disrupted between the Captain and the First Officer; resulting in much difficulty in running checklists. Due to the time constraints; we were not able to resolve the communication problem. After landing it was discovered the Captain's headset cord had become tangled with the O2 mask hose and also the Captain's seat arm rest and the airframe of the airplane. I used my captain's authority to deviate to meet the needs to get the flight on the ground. In light of the emphasis of the danger of fire and/or smoke; I felt that the best course of action was to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. It is possible we missed standard calls at some points; and although [we] completed all the correct checklists; [we] did so in a hurried manner. On final; we had allowed extra energy. It's possible we exceeded flap extension speeds by a small margin. Also; it became apparent that our extra energy nearing the runway could cause us to go much longer than desired. I decided to extend the flaps to 35 instead of leave them at the normal 15 for a single engine landing. We discussed the fact that we would not be attempting a go around with a fire still indicated and that the Flaps 35 setting would be the better of the two possible courses. In our debrief we discussed we had probably broken the sterile cockpit rule on taxi out. We had briefly discussed the location of [the] gate in the terminal. Also; we discussed the fact the Standby Instrument display was flickering. The display was readable; but we had a brief discussion of whether it was a distraction or not. It was decided with weather not an issue; we would continue with the flickering display.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.