|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : ugn|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||general aviation : corporate|
|Make Model Name||Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||landing other|
|Route In Use||approach : straight in|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
pilot : atp
pilot : flight engineer
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 30|
flight time total : 7075
flight time type : 2525
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 87|
flight time total : 11903
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
Corp flight operation with light transport scheduled to depart sna with 6 passenger at CST for ugn. Prior to departing snh it was decided to land at cmi to refuel due to poor WX at destination (ugn). Snh was 5000' runway which limited our fuel to below legal IFR minimums for snh-ugn leg. The captain obtained a WX briefing via phone from snh with jackson, tn, FSS. Ugn was reporting west 3 X 1/2 r-f, wind strong from the northeast, temperature and dew point not reported. The wind favored landing on runway 5 (ugn), but no straight in approach is available. Circling from the ILS 23 would be required. The ugn WX was below circling minimums. The captain phoned the ugn tower prior to departing snh and cmi to check WX and runway conditions. The later report was braking poor to nil with clear runway 30' on either side of centerline. Runway was sanded and treated with urea. The captain decided to fly the leg cmi-ugn for more favorable visibility contact with runway should circling approach be flown with left hand pattern. Inbound to ugn, the ugn WX was issued by chi approach control as 5 9 overcast, 2 r-f 0312 M/M. The ceiling was below ceilings needed for circling, CAT-D, however visibility was at minimums required to fly approach. We set up for a circling approach minimums (altitude bugs, altitude alerter). The captain planned to see if a circle could be done, if not continue for straight in landing. While being vectored downwind a base leg vector was given. While in the turn as we leveled the wings, approach issued an intercept heading, told us we were 2 mi from the OM, and cleared us for the approach. I asked to verify radar contact. Radar contact was verified. We were to call the tower at the OM. I had turned off #1 communication on my side so I could work approach on #2. I pushed in the button to hear our landing clearance wind 0312 and a report that an small transport had landed prior to us and reported braking nil. I completed the checklist. At circling minimums the captain. Reset altitude bugs and altitude alerter with straight in minimums he extended the flaps to 40 degrees. (I was still going through the checklist.) I asked, 'are you sure you want to land with nil braking?' he replied that it was ok, 'that was him.' after T/D the air brake was applied along with reverse thrust. It took 2 attempts to get both reverse green lights on. As the aircraft slowed it began to drift to the left side of the runway. The aircraft entered the grass area along side the runway, crossed a taxiway and came to a stop. The entire landing was smooth with no abrupt or jarring movement of the aircraft. The captain shut down the engines and all electrical power. The passenger were all calm and there were no injuries. There were no visible signs of damage to the aircraft at that time. During the preflight briefing between crew members before the first departure of the day, the captain reviewed company operations manual for landing with braking reports of nil. He misinterp that we could land with nil braking. Company policy forbids landing with nil braking reports. I should have more closely scrutinized the policy with the captain. I should have gone by my instincts which said, 'do no land...divert.' when I challenged the captain on final approach I should have been more insistent that we go around and discuss the situation. We got rushed and changing from circling to straight in last minute made for a less than stabilized approach. I was not in favor of the landing and should have told him so. We also should not have landed with the excessive tailwind component. Our in-flight estimate of 030 degrees at 12 KTS was 10 krs or less tailwind, but we were wrong. Tailwind component of 11 KTS (actual) exceeded aircraft limitation. My private pilot instrument advised me yrs ago, 'when in doubt, don't!' I should have relied on his age-old advice.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RWY EXCURSION, LOSS OF ACFT CONTROL, POOR WX, NIL BRAKING ACTION, LANDED WITH TAILWIND EXCEEDING ALLOWABLE.
Narrative: CORP FLT OPERATION WITH LTT SCHEDULED TO DEPART SNA WITH 6 PAX AT CST FOR UGN. PRIOR TO DEPARTING SNH IT WAS DECIDED TO LAND AT CMI TO REFUEL DUE TO POOR WX AT DEST (UGN). SNH WAS 5000' RWY WHICH LIMITED OUR FUEL TO BELOW LEGAL IFR MINIMUMS FOR SNH-UGN LEG. THE CAPT OBTAINED A WX BRIEFING VIA PHONE FROM SNH WITH JACKSON, TN, FSS. UGN WAS RPTING W 3 X 1/2 R-F, WIND STRONG FROM THE NE, TEMP AND DEW POINT NOT RPTED. THE WIND FAVORED LNDG ON RWY 5 (UGN), BUT NO STRAIGHT IN APCH IS AVAILABLE. CIRCLING FROM THE ILS 23 WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE UGN WX WAS BELOW CIRCLING MINIMUMS. THE CAPT PHONED THE UGN TWR PRIOR TO DEPARTING SNH AND CMI TO CHK WX AND RWY CONDITIONS. THE LATER RPT WAS BRAKING POOR TO NIL WITH CLR RWY 30' ON EITHER SIDE OF CENTERLINE. RWY WAS SANDED AND TREATED WITH UREA. THE CAPT DECIDED TO FLY THE LEG CMI-UGN FOR MORE FAVORABLE VIS CONTACT WITH RWY SHOULD CIRCLING APCH BE FLOWN WITH LEFT HAND PATTERN. INBND TO UGN, THE UGN WX WAS ISSUED BY CHI APCH CTL AS 5 9 OVCST, 2 R-F 0312 M/M. THE CEILING WAS BELOW CEILINGS NEEDED FOR CIRCLING, CAT-D, HOWEVER VISIBILITY WAS AT MINIMUMS REQUIRED TO FLY APCH. WE SET UP FOR A CIRCLING APCH MINIMUMS (ALT BUGS, ALT ALERTER). THE CAPT PLANNED TO SEE IF A CIRCLE COULD BE DONE, IF NOT CONTINUE FOR STRAIGHT IN LNDG. WHILE BEING VECTORED DOWNWIND A BASE LEG VECTOR WAS GIVEN. WHILE IN THE TURN AS WE LEVELED THE WINGS, APCH ISSUED AN INTERCEPT HDG, TOLD US WE WERE 2 MI FROM THE OM, AND CLRED US FOR THE APCH. I ASKED TO VERIFY RADAR CONTACT. RADAR CONTACT WAS VERIFIED. WE WERE TO CALL THE TWR AT THE OM. I HAD TURNED OFF #1 COM ON MY SIDE SO I COULD WORK APCH ON #2. I PUSHED IN THE BUTTON TO HEAR OUR LNDG CLRNC WIND 0312 AND A RPT THAT AN SMT HAD LANDED PRIOR TO US AND RPTED BRAKING NIL. I COMPLETED THE CHKLIST. AT CIRCLING MINIMUMS THE CAPT. RESET ALT BUGS AND ALT ALERTER WITH STRAIGHT IN MINIMUMS HE EXTENDED THE FLAPS TO 40 DEGS. (I WAS STILL GOING THROUGH THE CHKLIST.) I ASKED, 'ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT TO LAND WITH NIL BRAKING?' HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS OK, 'THAT WAS HIM.' AFTER T/D THE AIR BRAKE WAS APPLIED ALONG WITH REVERSE THRUST. IT TOOK 2 ATTEMPTS TO GET BOTH REVERSE GREEN LIGHTS ON. AS THE ACFT SLOWED IT BEGAN TO DRIFT TO THE LEFT SIDE OF THE RWY. THE ACFT ENTERED THE GRASS AREA ALONG SIDE THE RWY, CROSSED A TXWY AND CAME TO A STOP. THE ENTIRE LNDG WAS SMOOTH WITH NO ABRUPT OR JARRING MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT. THE CAPT SHUT DOWN THE ENGS AND ALL ELECTRICAL PWR. THE PAX WERE ALL CALM AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THERE WERE NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF DAMAGE TO THE ACFT AT THAT TIME. DURING THE PREFLT BRIEFING BTWN CREW MEMBERS BEFORE THE FIRST DEP OF THE DAY, THE CAPT REVIEWED COMPANY OPS MANUAL FOR LNDG WITH BRAKING RPTS OF NIL. HE MISINTERP THAT WE COULD LAND WITH NIL BRAKING. COMPANY POLICY FORBIDS LNDG WITH NIL BRAKING RPTS. I SHOULD HAVE MORE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED THE POLICY WITH THE CAPT. I SHOULD HAVE GONE BY MY INSTINCTS WHICH SAID, 'DO NO LAND...DIVERT.' WHEN I CHALLENGED THE CAPT ON FINAL APCH I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE INSISTENT THAT WE GO AROUND AND DISCUSS THE SITUATION. WE GOT RUSHED AND CHANGING FROM CIRCLING TO STRAIGHT IN LAST MINUTE MADE FOR A LESS THAN STABILIZED APCH. I WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF THE LNDG AND SHOULD HAVE TOLD HIM SO. WE ALSO SHOULD NOT HAVE LANDED WITH THE EXCESSIVE TAILWIND COMPONENT. OUR INFLT ESTIMATE OF 030 DEGS AT 12 KTS WAS 10 KRS OR LESS TAILWIND, BUT WE WERE WRONG. TAILWIND COMPONENT OF 11 KTS (ACTUAL) EXCEEDED ACFT LIMITATION. MY PVT PLT INSTR ADVISED ME YRS AGO, 'WHEN IN DOUBT, DON'T!' I SHOULD HAVE RELIED ON HIS AGE-OLD ADVICE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.