Narrative:

I was working sector xx with sector xy. I was then assigned to open sector xx from sector xz. Sector xy is at the end of the aisle-a long distance from sector xx. Since there were only a few ZZZ aircraft and not much volume in sector xx; I said I was ready to take sector xy. I soon realized after the cs entry was made that sector xy had a lot of traffic; and the controller was working a push. He was told to give sector xy to sector xx and he did. Shortly after; I had two aircraft I was trying to space on one route. A restricted area was active; and I had a d-side. I put speeds on the arrivals; only climbing the second arrival to FL200 until the speeds worked out. Once the speeds were working; I climbed the B737-700 to FL220. There was a ZZZ arrival in level flight northbound at FL210. On the bigger range; I took a second look and realized it wasn't going to work; therefore I started a left turn to 100 heading on the B737-700; and a left turn on the embraer 175 to a 360 heading. I asked for a report from the B737-700 being level at FL220. Both aircraft responded to TCAS. I believe the embraer 175 descended to FL205; and the B737-700 reported level at FL220 before a loss of separation occurred. The d-side immediately pointed out the the B737-700 to restricted area advisories as I had to use their airspace. The pilot of the B737-700 kept inquiring about what happened; however I still had a high volume/complexity with aircraft that needed clearances and I could not answer him. I was assigned a position to work for my first rotation; and asked to work an unusual combination (xx/xy). I said yes because on the shifts I work (mostly nights and weekends) sectors xx and xy are fairly slow; and that was the impression I got if they were going to be combined. I had no idea sector xy was working a push. The supervisor and the sector xy controller both knew this; and neither one said let's wait to combine until after the push. It would have been nice had the supervisor said it's a little busy in xy; but not in xx; or something to give me a head's up. Routinely; supervisors are making decision to split or combine sectors too late; and often controllers are working busy pushes and tasked with giving briefings during this time. I know it's not a science; but it's like if a controller is busy and the supervisor didn't split it out in time-if something were to happen then the supervisor might get in trouble for not having it split-so out of fear of getting in trouble; they irrationally split sectors in a hurry-which actually can cause something to happen or things to get missed. In this case it was combining sectors-but can't we wait until after the push? Why did it have to happen right then? I said I was ready-but I did not have all the information-the supervisor did; as well as the controller working the traffic knew it was busy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller working combined positions encountered unexpected busy traffic and experienced a loss of separation.

Narrative: I was working Sector XX with Sector XY. I was then assigned to open Sector XX from Sector XZ. Sector XY is at the end of the aisle-a long distance from Sector XX. Since there were only a few ZZZ aircraft and not much volume in Sector XX; I said I was ready to take Sector XY. I soon realized after the CS entry was made that Sector XY had a lot of traffic; and the Controller was working a push. He was told to give Sector XY to Sector XX and he did. Shortly after; I had two aircraft I was trying to space on one route. A restricted area was active; and I had a D-Side. I put speeds on the arrivals; only climbing the second arrival to FL200 until the speeds worked out. Once the speeds were working; I climbed the B737-700 to FL220. There was a ZZZ arrival in level flight northbound at FL210. On the bigger range; I took a second look and realized it wasn't going to work; therefore I started a left turn to 100 heading on the B737-700; and a left turn on the Embraer 175 to a 360 heading. I asked for a report from the B737-700 being level at FL220. Both aircraft responded to TCAS. I believe the Embraer 175 descended to FL205; and the B737-700 reported level at FL220 before a loss of separation occurred. The D-Side immediately pointed out the the B737-700 to Restricted Area advisories as I had to use their airspace. The pilot of the B737-700 kept inquiring about what happened; however I still had a high volume/complexity with aircraft that needed clearances and I could not answer him. I was assigned a position to work for my first rotation; and asked to work an unusual combination (XX/XY). I said yes because on the shifts I work (mostly nights and weekends) Sectors XX and XY are fairly slow; and that was the impression I got if they were going to be combined. I had no idea Sector XY was working a push. The Supervisor and the Sector XY Controller both knew this; and neither one said let's wait to combine until after the push. It would have been nice had the Supervisor said it's a little busy in XY; but not in XX; or something to give me a head's up. Routinely; Supervisors are making decision to split or combine sectors too late; and often controllers are working busy pushes and tasked with giving briefings during this time. I know it's not a science; but it's like if a controller is busy and the supervisor didn't split it out in time-if something were to happen then the supervisor might get in trouble for not having it split-so out of fear of getting in trouble; they irrationally split sectors in a hurry-which actually can cause something to happen or things to get missed. In this case it was combining sectors-but can't we wait until after the push? Why did it have to happen right then? I said I was ready-but I did not have all the information-the supervisor did; as well as the Controller working the traffic knew it was busy.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.