Narrative:

Full power takeoff from full length with high speed rejected takeoff. Throughout the engine start and taxi out all engine indications and engine sounds were normal. The flight was cleared to lineup and wait well before reaching the end of the runway and cleared for takeoff as we crossed the hold short line. We took the takeoff 'on the roll' while still maximizing available takeoff distance. First officer was flying pilot; I was monitoring pilot. The fp advanced the throttles and the engines spooled normally and together. The fp called for autothrottle at which time I selected thrust on the MCP. The engines continued to accelerate normally and equally up to target thrust. The fp removed his hand from the throttles. I assumed control of the throttles. I verified the engines had reached commanded thrust and called out the N1 reading. At full thrust the aircraft accelerated briskly and I made the 100 KIAS call about 10 knots late. I was looking at the engine instruments again; verifying the engine instruments for normal readings. At approximately 120 to 130 KIAS I heard 2 loud bangs in rapid succession and felt a sharp lurch to the left. The fp immediately corrected the aircraft back toward centerline. At the same time; I announced reject. I immediately closed the throttles deployed the thrust reversers verified the speed brakes had deployed and the rejected takeoff autobrakes were engaged. The airplane decelerated rapidly maintaining centerline. As we decelerated I commanded the international relief officer to make a remain seated PA. As soon as the international relief officer finished the PA we could clearly hear the flight attendant's shouting their commands to remain seated to the cabin. At the same time the first officer notified the tower we were aborting and the equipment was rolled. We came to a stop on the runway centerline with approximately 2;500 feet of runway remaining. I verified with the tower that we had no fire and the equipment was on its way; at this point all engine indications were still normal. We completed the rejected takeoff checklist. At this point all 3 pilots agreed it felt like we had hit something either on the runway or a bird. I made a new remain seated PA and reassured the passengers that although something had happened we had stopped the aircraft; there was no immediate danger and that we would be returning to the gate after the fire personnel had confirmed that the tires were good and the aircraft was safe to taxi. When the equipment arrived they indicated by hand signal that there was no fire and the left side looked ok. They attempted to establish intercom communication as did we but their handset was not working. We verified the btms which was at 5-6 and rising. We advised the tower that we could clear the runway and they advised that they had seen a flash and smoke from the left engine just prior to our rejecting the takeoff. Once the equipment cleared the runway I made an additional PA that we were returning to a gate and for all passengers to remain seated. I verified with the cabin that everyone was seated and we requested to return to a gate. We were cleared to follow the follow me vehicle. We completed an after landing procedure; retracting the flaps since we had verified tire and wheel integrity. We taxied in and shut down; all engine indications were still normal. We completed the parking checklist; with the exception that after verifying the nose gear was chocked; we released the parking brake; to assist in brake cooling. Btms readings peaked at 7 on all wheels. I wrote up a maintenance discrepancy describing the engine event. Subsequent borescope inspection by maintenance revealed that the engine had ingested sufficient FOD to damage several compressor blades most likely resulting in a compressor stall. The engine was damaged sufficiently to require removal from the aircraft before further flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew describes a rejected takeoff when the left engine experiences compressor stalls at high speed. Maintenance inspection reveals damage to compressor blades requiring an engine change.

Narrative: Full power takeoff from full length with high speed rejected takeoff. Throughout the engine start and taxi out all engine indications and engine sounds were normal. The flight was cleared to lineup and wait well before reaching the end of the runway and cleared for takeoff as we crossed the hold short line. We took the takeoff 'on the roll' while still maximizing available takeoff distance. First Officer was flying pilot; I was monitoring pilot. The FP advanced the throttles and the engines spooled normally and together. The FP called for AUTOTHROTTLE at which time I selected Thrust on the MCP. The engines continued to accelerate normally and equally up to target thrust. The FP removed his hand from the throttles. I assumed control of the throttles. I verified the engines had reached commanded thrust and called out the N1 reading. At full thrust the aircraft accelerated briskly and I made the 100 KIAS call about 10 knots late. I was looking at the engine instruments again; verifying the engine instruments for normal readings. At approximately 120 to 130 KIAS I heard 2 loud bangs in rapid succession and felt a sharp lurch to the left. The FP immediately corrected the aircraft back toward centerline. At the same time; I announced REJECT. I immediately closed the throttles deployed the thrust reversers verified the speed brakes had deployed and the RTO autobrakes were engaged. The airplane decelerated rapidly maintaining centerline. As we decelerated I commanded the IRO to make a REMAIN SEATED PA. As soon as the IRO finished the PA we could clearly hear the FA's shouting their commands to remain seated to the cabin. At the same time the FO notified the Tower we were aborting and the equipment was rolled. We came to a stop on the runway centerline with approximately 2;500 feet of runway remaining. I verified with the Tower that we had no fire and the equipment was on its way; at this point all engine indications were still normal. We completed the REJECTED TAKEOFF CHECKLIST. At this point all 3 pilots agreed it felt like we had hit something either on the runway or a bird. I made a new remain seated PA and reassured the passengers that although something had happened we had stopped the aircraft; there was no immediate danger and that we would be returning to the gate after the fire personnel had confirmed that the tires were good and the aircraft was safe to taxi. When the equipment arrived they indicated by hand signal that there was no fire and the left side looked OK. They attempted to establish intercom communication as did we but their handset was not working. We verified the BTMS which was at 5-6 and rising. We advised the Tower that we could clear the runway and they advised that they had seen a flash and smoke from the left engine just prior to our rejecting the takeoff. Once the equipment cleared the runway I made an additional PA that we were returning to a gate and for all passengers to remain seated. I verified with the cabin that everyone was seated and we requested to return to a gate. We were cleared to follow the FOLLOW ME vehicle. We completed an After Landing procedure; retracting the flaps since we had verified tire and wheel integrity. We taxied in and shut down; all engine indications were still normal. We completed the PARKING CHECKLIST; with the exception that after verifying the nose gear was chocked; we released the parking brake; to assist in brake cooling. BTMS readings peaked at 7 on all wheels. I wrote up a maintenance discrepancy describing the engine event. Subsequent borescope inspection by maintenance revealed that the engine had ingested sufficient FOD to damage several compressor blades most likely resulting in a compressor stall. The engine was damaged sufficiently to require removal from the aircraft before further flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.