Narrative:

I was tasked to do a daily check on an airbus 319. The temperature was 15 degrees above 0 and was snowing. This was the first time I was doing the daily by myself. I have been involved briefly 2 other times and that was to help in parts of the check; i.e. Inflate the tires or walk around the aircraft. On [the previous day] I saw a technician service the crew O2 while the bottle was still inside the aircraft while I serviced the tires. I was not directly involved with the servicing of the O2 that night; only walked by and looked at what was going on. He said maintenance control said this was fine to do but was not per the amm [aircraft maintenance manual.] on this evening I did the same thing but I closed the bottles valve because I did not want to lose pressure when I disconnected the service hose. I forgot to open the valve when I was done; causing the in-flight emergency. Most of the problems include very limited training (almost a year since training happened-no hands on because airline did not fly out of airport for almost a year. They started the first of this year.) no amm books or computer access only what we got from maintenance control. The weather was bad; very cold and snowing. Airport management not telling or showing us where parts were and where to service O2; or oil; tires; were located. All technicians involved with the daily checks were upset about the lack of help/info/resources from management. Norms was the major cause of this problem because word was passed down from mechanic to mechanic that this is how maintenance control wants it done.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A maintenance technician was told that it was acceptable to service a crew oxygen bottle while it is installed in the aircraft; even though it was not per the Aircraft Maintenance Manual. He performed the task; but neglected to reopen oxygen bottle valve after removing the service hose; which resulted in an in-flight emergency. The technician noted a lack of training; equipment; and documentation.

Narrative: I was tasked to do a daily check on an Airbus 319. The temperature was 15 degrees above 0 and was snowing. This was the first time I was doing the daily by myself. I have been involved briefly 2 other times and that was to help in parts of the check; i.e. inflate the tires or walk around the aircraft. On [the previous day] I saw a technician service the crew O2 while the bottle was still inside the aircraft while I serviced the tires. I was not directly involved with the servicing of the O2 that night; only walked by and looked at what was going on. He said Maintenance Control said this was fine to do but was not per the AMM [Aircraft Maintenance Manual.] On this evening I did the same thing but I closed the bottles valve because I did not want to lose pressure when I disconnected the service hose. I forgot to open the valve when I was done; causing the in-flight emergency. Most of the problems include very limited training (almost a year since training happened-no hands on because airline did not fly out of airport for almost a year. They started the first of this year.) No AMM books or computer access only what we got from Maintenance Control. The weather was bad; very cold and snowing. Airport Management not telling or showing us where parts were and where to service O2; or oil; tires; were located. All technicians involved with the daily checks were upset about the lack of help/info/resources from Management. Norms was the major cause of this problem because word was passed down from mechanic to mechanic that this is how Maintenance Control wants it done.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.