Narrative:

On an IFR flight plan in solid IMC conditions and light to moderate rain (but basically smooth air) I was flying for 55V in fl to our home airport of 29J (rock hill, sc). We were over the save VOR. I just happened to be looking to the right front when a chinook army helicopter appeared in the front windshield and passed 100 or so yds off our right side. In the clouds, the helicopter was there and gone in just a few seconds. Needless to say, I was very startled. I picked up the microphone and told sav approach what had just happened. After a pause the controller just said, 'roger.' he then handed us off to another controller. When I reported in to this controller he acted as if nothing had happened. I then said very firmly to him that I had just experienced a 'near miss,' and with what. Another pause and another voice came over the speaker. This seemed like a supervisor. He asked several questions and asked me to call collect when I landed in rock hill. I was mostly wanting to make sure that sav approach knew the helicopter was there. I thought it was just the army flying around in the clouds west/O talking to anyone. I was mistaken! When I called sav approach the supervisor answered and began apologizing. It seems that a brand new radar controller had gotten overloaded and forgotten the army helicopter (also IFR at 7000') that he had been working for some time on a different frequency. The supervisor also said he did not know why the warning system did not alert them. He convinced me that the young 'new' controller was 'sick' over his mistake and I said just take care of this mistake on an informal basis. He thanked me over and over for understanding. I feel that anyone can and will make a mistake. However, this was a very serious mistake that possibly happened because of an inexperienced radar controller working too much traffic for the WX conditions. He also was possibly burdened by working traffic on separate frequencys. If I could have heard him working the helicopter, maybe I would have questioned the controller about another 7000' aircraft. Also, why did the alerting system inside approach not work. I vote for TCAS. I do not think the controller should be fired or get time off or fined. We need more controllers. They need to work only 1 frequency at a time. When a pilot or controller makes a mistake, instead of an FAA that has an intimidation stance, we need to work through the mistake and help everyone involved learn from it to make flying safer.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA CAME IN CLOSE PROX TO AN MLT AT SAME ALT IN IMC CONDITIONS.

Narrative: ON AN IFR FLT PLAN IN SOLID IMC CONDITIONS AND LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN (BUT BASICALLY SMOOTH AIR) I WAS FLYING FOR 55V IN FL TO OUR HOME ARPT OF 29J (ROCK HILL, SC). WE WERE OVER THE SAVE VOR. I JUST HAPPENED TO BE LOOKING TO THE RIGHT FRONT WHEN A CHINOOK ARMY HELI APPEARED IN THE FRONT WINDSHIELD AND PASSED 100 OR SO YDS OFF OUR RIGHT SIDE. IN THE CLOUDS, THE HELI WAS THERE AND GONE IN JUST A FEW SECS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WAS VERY STARTLED. I PICKED UP THE MIC AND TOLD SAV APCH WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. AFTER A PAUSE THE CTLR JUST SAID, 'ROGER.' HE THEN HANDED US OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR. WHEN I RPTED IN TO THIS CTLR HE ACTED AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. I THEN SAID VERY FIRMLY TO HIM THAT I HAD JUST EXPERIENCED A 'NEAR MISS,' AND WITH WHAT. ANOTHER PAUSE AND ANOTHER VOICE CAME OVER THE SPEAKER. THIS SEEMED LIKE A SUPVR. HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS AND ASKED ME TO CALL COLLECT WHEN I LANDED IN ROCK HILL. I WAS MOSTLY WANTING TO MAKE SURE THAT SAV APCH KNEW THE HELI WAS THERE. I THOUGHT IT WAS JUST THE ARMY FLYING AROUND IN THE CLOUDS W/O TALKING TO ANYONE. I WAS MISTAKEN! WHEN I CALLED SAV APCH THE SUPVR ANSWERED AND BEGAN APOLOGIZING. IT SEEMS THAT A BRAND NEW RADAR CTLR HAD GOTTEN OVERLOADED AND FORGOTTEN THE ARMY HELI (ALSO IFR AT 7000') THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING FOR SOME TIME ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. THE SUPVR ALSO SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THE WARNING SYS DID NOT ALERT THEM. HE CONVINCED ME THAT THE YOUNG 'NEW' CTLR WAS 'SICK' OVER HIS MISTAKE AND I SAID JUST TAKE CARE OF THIS MISTAKE ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. HE THANKED ME OVER AND OVER FOR UNDERSTANDING. I FEEL THAT ANYONE CAN AND WILL MAKE A MISTAKE. HOWEVER, THIS WAS A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE THAT POSSIBLY HAPPENED BECAUSE OF AN INEXPERIENCED RADAR CTLR WORKING TOO MUCH TFC FOR THE WX CONDITIONS. HE ALSO WAS POSSIBLY BURDENED BY WORKING TFC ON SEPARATE FREQS. IF I COULD HAVE HEARD HIM WORKING THE HELI, MAYBE I WOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE CTLR ABOUT ANOTHER 7000' ACFT. ALSO, WHY DID THE ALERTING SYS INSIDE APCH NOT WORK. I VOTE FOR TCAS. I DO NOT THINK THE CTLR SHOULD BE FIRED OR GET TIME OFF OR FINED. WE NEED MORE CTLRS. THEY NEED TO WORK ONLY 1 FREQ AT A TIME. WHEN A PLT OR CTLR MAKES A MISTAKE, INSTEAD OF AN FAA THAT HAS AN INTIMIDATION STANCE, WE NEED TO WORK THROUGH THE MISTAKE AND HELP EVERYONE INVOLVED LEARN FROM IT TO MAKE FLYING SAFER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.