|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : den|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Heavy Transport, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
pilot : cfi
pilot : flight engineer
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 75|
flight time total : 10000
flight time type : 2000
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : instrument|
pilot : commercial
|Anomaly||non adherence : far|
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Consequence||faa : assigned or threatened penalties|
faa : investigated
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
Our company policy is to tanker fuel whenever it is cost effective. The proposed fuel load was 121200#. We planned to add enough fuel to complete our flight at pvr. At our proposed takeoff weight with log passenger and 121200# of fuel we would land at zih at our maximum landing weight. The fueler overfueled the aircraft to 127500# and we had an extra 12 passenger and baggage at the last minute. At this point it became obvious that we were approximately 8000 pounds above our proposed takeoff weight and would be above our maximum landing weight upon arrival at zih. We informed flight following of our situation. I was now thinking in terms of flow to deal with an operational problem, and I was so focused on this aspect that I did not consider that my decision to depart with extra fuel would be a violation of far 91.37 and 121.195. I hoped to fly at a lower altitude than flight planned and a higher airspeed, thus burning extra fuel. About half way through the flight it became obvious that we were not going to make up the difference. We obtained a phone patch through commercial radio to our company operations to discuss our options. An overweight landing was out of the question since we did not have the facs at zih to do an overweight landing inspection. Holding over zih and burning the extra fuel would create the same situation that I was trying to avoid by leaving to begin with: that is making an already long day longer and inconveniencing our passenger. (Defueling would have taken 2 hours at departure.) I elected to dump the excess fuel, approximately 10000#, down to our landing weight. I might add that there was an FAA inspector in the jump seat throughout the whole process. In this particular case when flight following/dispatch was informed of the problem before we departed, if they had been properly trained and knowledgeable they could have waved the red flag and nipped this situation in the bud. Even before we told them of the situation they could have avoided everything by properly planning the flight. They left no margin for error with the proposed fuel load.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SUPPLEMENTAL ACR HVT OVERFUELED CAUSING ACFT TO BE OVERWEIGHT FOR LNDG WITH PLANNED FUEL BURN OFF. FLT CREW MADE TKOF KNOWING THIS PROBLEM EXISTED AND DUMPED FUEL TO BE AT LNDG WEIGHT.
Narrative: OUR COMPANY POLICY IS TO TANKER FUEL WHENEVER IT IS COST EFFECTIVE. THE PROPOSED FUEL LOAD WAS 121200#. WE PLANNED TO ADD ENOUGH FUEL TO COMPLETE OUR FLT AT PVR. AT OUR PROPOSED TKOF WT WITH LOG PAX AND 121200# OF FUEL WE WOULD LAND AT ZIH AT OUR MAX LNDG WT. THE FUELER OVERFUELED THE ACFT TO 127500# AND WE HAD AN EXTRA 12 PAX AND BAGGAGE AT THE LAST MINUTE. AT THIS POINT IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE APPROX 8000 LBS ABOVE OUR PROPOSED TKOF WT AND WOULD BE ABOVE OUR MAX LNDG WT UPON ARR AT ZIH. WE INFORMED FLT FOLLOWING OF OUR SITUATION. I WAS NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF FLOW TO DEAL WITH AN OPERATIONAL PROB, AND I WAS SO FOCUSED ON THIS ASPECT THAT I DID NOT CONSIDER THAT MY DECISION TO DEPART WITH EXTRA FUEL WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF FAR 91.37 AND 121.195. I HOPED TO FLY AT A LOWER ALT THAN FLT PLANNED AND A HIGHER AIRSPD, THUS BURNING EXTRA FUEL. ABOUT HALF WAY THROUGH THE FLT IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE UP THE DIFFERENCE. WE OBTAINED A PHONE PATCH THROUGH COMMERCIAL RADIO TO OUR COMPANY OPS TO DISCUSS OUR OPTIONS. AN OVERWEIGHT LNDG WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION SINCE WE DID NOT HAVE THE FACS AT ZIH TO DO AN OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION. HOLDING OVER ZIH AND BURNING THE EXTRA FUEL WOULD CREATE THE SAME SITUATION THAT I WAS TRYING TO AVOID BY LEAVING TO BEGIN WITH: THAT IS MAKING AN ALREADY LONG DAY LONGER AND INCONVENIENCING OUR PAX. (DEFUELING WOULD HAVE TAKEN 2 HRS AT DEP.) I ELECTED TO DUMP THE EXCESS FUEL, APPROX 10000#, DOWN TO OUR LNDG WT. I MIGHT ADD THAT THERE WAS AN FAA INSPECTOR IN THE JUMP SEAT THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PROCESS. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE WHEN FLT FOLLOWING/DISPATCH WAS INFORMED OF THE PROB BEFORE WE DEPARTED, IF THEY HAD BEEN PROPERLY TRAINED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE THEY COULD HAVE WAVED THE RED FLAG AND NIPPED THIS SITUATION IN THE BUD. EVEN BEFORE WE TOLD THEM OF THE SITUATION THEY COULD HAVE AVOIDED EVERYTHING BY PROPERLY PLANNING THE FLT. THEY LEFT NO MARGIN FOR ERROR WITH THE PROPOSED FUEL LOAD.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.