Narrative:

Medium large transport was parked at the gate, utilizing external electrical power and air due to inoperative APU. Felt some degree of urgency due to the fact that the flight was already 20 mins late and we had a controled takeoff time to dtw of XL10 local. Complied with all checklists, including the external electrical and pneumatic source-start checklist. Instead of turning the ignition switch on, however, I mistakenly turned the emergency lights switch on. This switch is in close proximity to the ignition switch, and in many of our aircraft it is of an identical shape. Unable to get the #2 engine to light off, I glanced up at the start panel and realized my error. I aborted the start of #2 and decided to start #1 first, thereby allowing enough time for fuel to drain (30 seconds per aircraft pilot handbook). However, I did not return the #2 engine fuel control to off as I should have (although I thought I had). Thus, when properly starting #1 with ignition on, #2 got fuel and ignition proceeded to torch and smoke. Egt exceeded normal start limits (440 degrees was noted in aircraft log book), and passenger were deplaned and an inspection of the engine by our company mechanic was accomplished. Engine run was subsequently done and aircraft was returned to service. The flight then operated some 2 hours late. This incident occurred as a result of my own oversight, and contributing to the situation was the fact that I allowed myself to be rushed in trying to expedite our departure, and our mix of medium large transport aircraft has varying ignition switch designs. This was the third model of medium large transport of the day for me, in a day that started with an XA30 call from crew scheduling, and I obviously was not performing up to the level I should have. Strick adherence to aborted start procedure would have totally avoided the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TAILPIPE FIRE AT GATE, PASSENGERS DEPLANED.

Narrative: MLG WAS PARKED AT THE GATE, UTILIZING EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL PWR AND AIR DUE TO INOP APU. FELT SOME DEGREE OF URGENCY DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE FLT WAS ALREADY 20 MINS LATE AND WE HAD A CTLED TKOF TIME TO DTW OF XL10 LCL. COMPLIED WITH ALL CHKLISTS, INCLUDING THE EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL AND PNEUMATIC SOURCE-START CHKLIST. INSTEAD OF TURNING THE IGNITION SWITCH ON, HOWEVER, I MISTAKENLY TURNED THE EMER LIGHTS SWITCH ON. THIS SWITCH IS IN CLOSE PROX TO THE IGNITION SWITCH, AND IN MANY OF OUR ACFT IT IS OF AN IDENTICAL SHAPE. UNABLE TO GET THE #2 ENG TO LIGHT OFF, I GLANCED UP AT THE START PANEL AND REALIZED MY ERROR. I ABORTED THE START OF #2 AND DECIDED TO START #1 FIRST, THEREBY ALLOWING ENOUGH TIME FOR FUEL TO DRAIN (30 SECS PER ACFT PLT HANDBOOK). HOWEVER, I DID NOT RETURN THE #2 ENG FUEL CONTROL TO OFF AS I SHOULD HAVE (ALTHOUGH I THOUGHT I HAD). THUS, WHEN PROPERLY STARTING #1 WITH IGNITION ON, #2 GOT FUEL AND IGNITION PROCEEDED TO TORCH AND SMOKE. EGT EXCEEDED NORMAL START LIMITS (440 DEGS WAS NOTED IN ACFT LOG BOOK), AND PAX WERE DEPLANED AND AN INSPECTION OF THE ENG BY OUR COMPANY MECH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. ENG RUN WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DONE AND ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. THE FLT THEN OPERATED SOME 2 HRS LATE. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF MY OWN OVERSIGHT, AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE SITUATION WAS THE FACT THAT I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE RUSHED IN TRYING TO EXPEDITE OUR DEP, AND OUR MIX OF MLG ACFT HAS VARYING IGNITION SWITCH DESIGNS. THIS WAS THE THIRD MODEL OF MLG OF THE DAY FOR ME, IN A DAY THAT STARTED WITH AN XA30 CALL FROM CREW SCHEDULING, AND I OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT PERFORMING UP TO THE LEVEL I SHOULD HAVE. STRICK ADHERENCE TO ABORTED START PROC WOULD HAVE TOTALLY AVOIDED THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.