Narrative:

Flight was proceeding at FL380 when EICAS caution 'C hydraulic qty' came up. Status page indicated center hydraulic qty was 0.49. I was pm and fb was PF. The QRH was referenced for C hydraulic qty was for crew awareness. Observing the qty; it was slowly decreasing. The fb and I discussed the situation and I elected to secure the C elec pumps and the adp to attempt to save the fluid for landing. The qty stabilized at 0.46 and the first officer was recalled from his break. The 3 of us discussed the situation; a plan was developed to leave the pumps secured until established on downwind for the ILS. The pumps would then be turned on and the aircraft would be configured for landing. If at any point a problem occurred in extending the gear and flaps; I would declare an emergency and wave off the approach to complete the appropriate checklist. Dispatch was briefed on the situation and intentions. I asked dispatch to brief maintenance control and solicit any input. Maintenance control concurred with the plan. A normal descent was initiated. Checking in with approach control; I apprised them of the situation and the plan for the approach. Approach accommodated our request. While descending to the downwind leg; approach requested a confirmation that there was a hydraulic leak; which I confirmed. Approach then said that arff were being dispatched as a precaution and to standby for possible runway contamination by hydraulic fluid. It was then I decided to declare an emergency and cognizant information was provided. Immediately after that; we turned on the center hydraulic pumps; extended the gear and flaps normally for landing and commenced the approach. The first officer flew the approach to a normal landing. Thrust reverses were used for primary braking. I took control of the aircraft and exited the runway to a holding position on victor taxiway. As the emergency vehicles were approaching the aircraft I realized that I had never given the flight attendant's the test briefing. A PA was made to apprise the passengers of the situation. The fire commander checked over the aircraft and detected a possible leak in the vicinity of the right main landing gear. I taxied the aircraft to just short of the gate for tow in. I think several factors contributed to all three of us missing the test briefing. Fatigue; this was the end of a two leg all night flight. Workload; I declared the emergency and immediately the process of configuring the aircraft and commencing the approach. Complacency; once the aircraft configured with no problems and we were established on the approach; job was complete. Crew coordination in the cockpit was excellent; we focused on working through the problem and getting the aircraft safely on the ground. We simply forgot to communicate with the back of the airplane. We do practice in the simulators giving the test brief but usually we are lead to it by a checklist. Possibly some discussion in training about using the test briefing even in minor abnormal situations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 flight crew experiences an EICAS Caution for C HYD QTY at FL380 approaching destination after an all night two leg flight. It is decided to turn of the center hydraulic pumps to conserve the fluid for landing which is successful although an emergency is eventually declared but the flight attendants are not briefed.

Narrative: Flight was proceeding at FL380 when EICAS Caution 'C HYD QTY' came up. Status page indicated Center HYD QTY was 0.49. I was PM and FB was PF. The QRH was referenced for C HYD QTY was for crew awareness. Observing the QTY; it was slowly decreasing. The FB and I discussed the situation and I elected to secure the C ELEC pumps and the ADP to attempt to save the fluid for landing. The QTY stabilized at 0.46 and the FO was recalled from his break. The 3 of us discussed the situation; a plan was developed to leave the pumps secured until established on downwind for the ILS. The pumps would then be turned on and the aircraft would be configured for landing. If at any point a problem occurred in extending the gear and flaps; I would declare an emergency and wave off the approach to complete the appropriate checklist. Dispatch was briefed on the situation and intentions. I asked Dispatch to brief Maintenance Control and solicit any input. Maintenance Control concurred with the plan. A normal descent was initiated. Checking in with Approach Control; I apprised them of the situation and the plan for the approach. Approach accommodated our request. While descending to the downwind leg; Approach requested a confirmation that there was a hydraulic leak; which I confirmed. Approach then said that ARFF were being dispatched as a precaution and to standby for possible runway contamination by hydraulic fluid. It was then I decided to declare an emergency and cognizant information was provided. Immediately after that; we turned on the Center HYD pumps; extended the gear and flaps normally for landing and commenced the approach. The FO flew the approach to a normal landing. Thrust reverses were used for primary braking. I took control of the aircraft and exited the runway to a holding position on Victor taxiway. As the emergency vehicles were approaching the aircraft I realized that I had never given the flight attendant's the TEST briefing. A PA was made to apprise the passengers of the situation. The Fire Commander checked over the aircraft and detected a possible leak in the vicinity of the right main landing gear. I taxied the aircraft to just short of the gate for tow in. I think several factors contributed to all three of us missing the TEST briefing. Fatigue; this was the end of a two leg all night flight. Workload; I declared the emergency and immediately the process of configuring the aircraft and commencing the approach. Complacency; once the aircraft configured with no problems and we were established on the approach; job was complete. Crew coordination in the cockpit was excellent; we focused on working through the problem and getting the aircraft safely on the ground. We simply forgot to communicate with the back of the airplane. We do practice in the simulators giving the TEST brief but usually we are lead to it by a checklist. Possibly some discussion in training about using the TEST briefing even in minor abnormal situations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.