Narrative:

Enroute to our destination we had an ECAM ENG1 reverser fault followed by another ECAM anti ice first officer pitot. After completing the ECAM and referencing the flight manual; I contacted dispatch and maintenance control to discuss the situation. While talking to maintenance control he advised that he had downloaded more information from the aircraft and informed me that the lgciu 1 [landing gear control interface unit] was also inoperable and probably causing the reverser inoperative ECAM msg. While talking to maintenance control; I began scrolling through the mcdu menu to the cfds menu to view the leg report and the leg ECAM report status pages. I noticed there were no indications of lgciu 1 in-operation or failure on the ECAM or leg message pages; but maintenance control said the data link indicated so. I was not convinced of this (nothing to verify this fault on board); but we discussed the fact that lgciu 2 was available for gear extension; normal braking (anti-skid also available) and we still had reverser 2. The weather at our destination was VMC and no operation issues of concern; so dispatch; maintenance control; and the flight crew agreed to continue to our destination that was 2 hours away. With the time remaining to our destination; I discussed with my first officer what we could expect with any performance concerns; the engine 1 reverser issue and our landing; roll-out expectations and concerns. We also reviewed the flight manual about the gear operation; wheels page display for lgciu 1 inoperative and the non-normals for potential other gear issues/warnings that might develop with gear extension. We also discussed lowering the gear sooner in the approach to see if we would have anything else to deal with before landing. As pilot flying (conducting an first officer IOE); we began to configure about 15 miles from the airport. At about 12 miles from [runway] xxr; we lowered the gear and experienced an left/G ECAM. The first officer began doing the ECAM while I continued to slow and keep configuring the aircraft. As the first officer performed the 1st ECAM another ECAM started and over the next 6-8 seconds (as I recall) we received 3 maybe 4 rolling ecams and the screens were cycling between them. This was a bit unnerving as the master warning alarm was almost continuous as the screens were cycling and the first officer was trying to comply with the ECAM steps. As this was going on; I advised ATC we were having a gear extension issue and would get back to him. He replied 'roger; keep me advised.' in the rolling of the ecams; the first officer said that an ECAM (not sure which ECAM) directed to cycle the gear up. He continued with the ECAM procedure and about this time the first officer advised that one of the ECAM screens (we're not sure which one) called for the gravity gear extension procedure. At this point I advised him to crank the gear handle and he began the gravity gear extension. I also advised ATC that we were doing the alternate gear extension (my words) and the gear doors will remain open as this a result of the procedure. He advised that he already call the [emergency] trucks as part of his procedures. My attention was diverted back to the first officer who was managing the manual gear extension and we noticed that the 3 gear green lights on the center panel were green and the wheels page showed both lgcius confirmed the gear was down and locked. I made a quick call to the flight attendants to let them know the normal gear extension didn't work but the alternate method did and the gear was fine and the landing would be normal but might not have steering capabilities to exit the runway and to stay seated until we advise otherwise. The aircraft was fully configured and we both agreed to continue the landing and all checklists were completed. Knowing both lgcius were indicating; I mentioned that we would have both reversers (we did) and touch-down and braking and would try and clear the runway if possible. Asi recall; he did advise the tower we might be stopping on the runway. Touchdown and rollout were uneventful. I was able to clear runway xxr and exit on a taxiway and not block the runway. Crash fire rescue equipment vehicles met us and we advised the passengers to stay seated; secured the aircraft; and coordinated with crash fire rescue equipment and our company for a tow to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain experiences an ECAM ENG1 REVERSER FAULT followed by another ECAM ANTI ICE FO PITOT during cruise flight. Maintenance Control believes LGCIU 1 is causing the problem and the flight should continue to destination. During approach the landing gear does not extend normally and the ECAM screen begins cycling rapidly with audible warnings making it almost unusable. After gravity extension of the landing gear all is quiet and a normal landing ensues.

Narrative: Enroute to our destination we had an ECAM ENG1 REVERSER FAULT followed by another ECAM ANTI ICE FO PITOT. After completing the ECAM and referencing the Flight Manual; I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control to discuss the situation. While talking to Maintenance Control he advised that he had downloaded more information from the aircraft and informed me that the LGCIU 1 [Landing Gear Control Interface Unit] was also inoperable and probably causing the REVERSER INOP ECAM msg. While talking to Maintenance Control; I began scrolling through the MCDU menu to the CFDS menu to view the LEG REPORT and the LEG ECAM REPORT status pages. I noticed there were no indications of LGCIU 1 in-operation or failure on the ECAM or LEG message pages; but Maintenance Control said the DATA LINK indicated so. I was not convinced of this (nothing to verify this fault on board); but we discussed the fact that LGCIU 2 was available for Gear Extension; normal braking (Anti-skid also available) and we still had Reverser 2. The weather at our destination was VMC and no operation issues of concern; so Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the flight crew agreed to continue to our destination that was 2 hours away. With the time remaining to our destination; I discussed with my First Officer what we could expect with any performance concerns; the ENG 1 Reverser issue and our landing; roll-out expectations and concerns. We also reviewed the Flight Manual about the gear operation; WHEELS page display for LGCIU 1 INOP and the NON-NORMALS for potential other gear issues/warnings that might develop with Gear Extension. We also discussed lowering the gear sooner in the approach to see if we would have anything else to deal with before landing. As Pilot Flying (conducting an First Officer IOE); we began to configure about 15 miles from the airport. At about 12 miles from [Runway] XXR; we lowered the gear and experienced an L/G ECAM. The First Officer began doing the ECAM while I continued to slow and keep configuring the aircraft. As the First Officer performed the 1st ECAM another ECAM started and over the next 6-8 seconds (as I recall) we received 3 maybe 4 rolling ECAMs and the screens were cycling between them. This was a bit unnerving as the MASTER WARNING alarm was almost continuous as the screens were cycling and the First Officer was trying to comply with the ECAM steps. As this was going on; I advised ATC we were having a Gear Extension issue and would get back to him. He replied 'Roger; keep me advised.' In the rolling of the ECAMs; the First Officer said that an ECAM (not sure which ECAM) directed to cycle the gear up. He continued with the ECAM procedure and about this time the First Officer advised that one of the ECAM screens (we're not sure which one) called for the Gravity Gear Extension procedure. At this point I advised him to crank the gear handle and he began the Gravity Gear Extension. I also advised ATC that we were doing the Alternate Gear Extension (my words) and the Gear Doors will remain open as this a result of the procedure. He advised that he already call the [emergency] trucks as part of his procedures. My attention was diverted back to the First Officer who was managing the manual Gear Extension and we noticed that the 3 GEAR Green lights on the CENTER PANEL were green and the WHEELS page showed both LGCIUs confirmed the gear was down and locked. I made a quick call to the flight attendants to let them know the NORMAL Gear extension didn't work but the ALTERNATE method did and the gear was fine and the landing would be normal but might not have steering capabilities to exit the runway and to stay seated until we advise otherwise. The aircraft was fully configured and we both agreed to continue the landing and all checklists were completed. Knowing both LGCIUs were indicating; I mentioned that we would have both reversers (we did) and touch-down and braking and would try and clear the runway if possible. AsI recall; he did advise the Tower we might be stopping on the runway. Touchdown and rollout were uneventful. I was able to clear Runway XXR and exit on a taxiway and not block the runway. CFR vehicles met us and we advised the passengers to stay seated; secured the aircraft; and coordinated with CFR and our company for a tow to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.