Narrative:

I was the pilot flying. We were cleared for takeoff. Weather was CAT 1 with 1 3/4 mile visibility in moderate rain. We were in an older model jet with no autospoilers/brakes. The captain briefed to remind him in the event of a rejected takeoff to remind him to deploy spoilers. On takeoff roll; after the engines spooled to 1.4 EPR I called for the autothrottle. The right engine was lagging prior to 1.4 EPR but came up. As we began takeoff roll; it felt like were not accelerating properly. The captain had failed to make a 'thrust set' or 80 knot call by the time I felt he should. I looked down and saw were almost 85 knots and looked up and the right EPR gauge was split and well below the chevron target. I said to the captain 'we need to do something' at that time; he took the controls and it felt as if he was rejecting the takeoff. I looked first at airspeed and saw we were just coming through 95 knots. The captain deployed the reversers and began braking but due to his arm position I could not see if the speed brakes had deployed. I notified tower of our rejected takeoff due to low visibility conditions. We exited the runway after I called out that we were below 60 knots. As we exited the runway we observed that the speedbrake had in fact not been deployed by either pilot. A critical miss on an 8;500 ft runway with heavy rain and wind. The fact that we never accelerated beyond 95 knots and the captains use of brakes and reversers played into our more than favorable outcome. The differences of flying the older planes very rarely cannot be over stressed. The differences of the autospoiler/brakes systems on our company's md-80 models makes us complacent; greater care needs to be placed on the rejected takeoff litany and actions on every flight. A clear call of the rejected takeoff might have helped remind me of the requirement during a rejected takeoff to confirm spoilers are deployed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD-83's right engine failed to maintain takeoff EPR; so the Captain rejected the takeoff but failed to extend the spoilers on an older model aircraft without autospoiler/autobrakes.

Narrative: I was the pilot flying. We were cleared for takeoff. Weather was CAT 1 with 1 3/4 mile visibility in moderate rain. We were in an older model jet with no autospoilers/brakes. The Captain briefed to remind him in the event of a rejected takeoff to remind him to deploy spoilers. On takeoff roll; after the engines spooled to 1.4 EPR I called for the autothrottle. The right engine was lagging prior to 1.4 EPR but came up. As we began takeoff roll; it felt like were not accelerating properly. The Captain had failed to make a 'thrust set' or 80 knot call by the time I felt he should. I looked down and saw were almost 85 knots and looked up and the right EPR gauge was split and well below the chevron target. I said to the Captain 'we need to do something' at that time; he took the controls and it felt as if he was rejecting the takeoff. I looked first at airspeed and saw we were just coming through 95 knots. The Captain deployed the reversers and began braking but due to his arm position I could not see if the speed brakes had deployed. I notified Tower of our rejected takeoff due to low visibility conditions. We exited the runway after I called out that we were below 60 knots. As we exited the runway we observed that the speedbrake had in fact not been deployed by either pilot. A critical miss on an 8;500 FT runway with heavy rain and wind. The fact that we never accelerated beyond 95 knots and the Captains use of brakes and reversers played into our more than favorable outcome. The differences of flying the older planes very rarely cannot be over stressed. The differences of the autospoiler/brakes systems on our company's MD-80 models makes us complacent; greater care needs to be placed on the rejected takeoff litany and actions on every flight. A clear call of the rejected takeoff might have helped remind me of the requirement during a rejected takeoff to confirm spoilers are deployed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.