Narrative:

Thirty minutes after a vip tfr ended at a class-C airport; I was cleared to land while on an ILS approach in IMC. A few miles from the airport; I emerged into marginal VFR conditions. During my flight; I received no traffic advisories to advise of a helicopter operating near and above runways. Before my flight; in a telephone briefing from FSS; I was read a list of notams at my destination; and these did not include any that warned of helicopter operations. As I touched down on the runway; I heard the tower advise a cessna; which was number two for landing behind me; to go around. At the same time; my skywatch traffic surveillance avionics (similar to TCAS) called out 'traffic! Traffic!' I discovered the problem by looking over my left shoulder; where I was surprised to see a military helicopter flying parallel to me at approximately 100 AGL and 300 ft from the runway centerline. The helicopter was faster than me as I was landing at less than 80 KTS; and it overtook me as I slowed down on the runway. The helicopter continued circling the runway vicinity at low altitude for at least another fifteen minutes. Occasionally I heard tower or ground make calls to '[X] helicopter;' but I never heard any warnings given to traffic of the conflict that the helicopter posed. I believe the helicopter's operations endangered my safety by presenting a significant hazard to traffic.contributing factors include: a lack of a NOTAM; a lack of an ATC advisory to alert inbound pilots to the presence of the helicopter; and marginal VFR conditions that made it impossible to visually discover the helicopter until late in the approach. I do not believe that I was given adequate separation. If ATC is unable to keep adequate separation of general aviation traffic from a helicopter performing a mission after a vip tfr; then the FAA should at least issue a NOTAM to advise pilots of the hazard. This NOTAM should indicate the nature of the hazard and it should define how long the hazard will persist; so that pilots can plan their flights to avoid the hazard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot emerged from IMC on the CID ILS to see a military helicopter 300 FT from him on short final with no communication from ATC about the near miss traffic.

Narrative: Thirty minutes after a VIP TFR ended at a Class-C airport; I was cleared to land while on an ILS approach in IMC. A few miles from the airport; I emerged into marginal VFR conditions. During my flight; I received no traffic advisories to advise of a helicopter operating near and above runways. Before my flight; in a telephone briefing from FSS; I was read a list of NOTAMs at my destination; and these did not include any that warned of helicopter operations. As I touched down on the runway; I heard the Tower advise a Cessna; which was number two for landing behind me; to go around. At the same time; my Skywatch traffic surveillance avionics (similar to TCAS) called out 'traffic! traffic!' I discovered the problem by looking over my left shoulder; where I was surprised to see a military helicopter flying parallel to me at approximately 100 AGL and 300 FT from the runway centerline. The helicopter was faster than me as I was landing at less than 80 KTS; and it overtook me as I slowed down on the runway. The helicopter continued circling the runway vicinity at low altitude for at least another fifteen minutes. Occasionally I heard Tower or Ground make calls to '[X] Helicopter;' but I never heard any warnings given to traffic of the conflict that the helicopter posed. I believe the helicopter's operations endangered my safety by presenting a significant hazard to traffic.Contributing factors include: a lack of a NOTAM; a lack of an ATC advisory to alert inbound pilots to the presence of the helicopter; and marginal VFR conditions that made it impossible to visually discover the helicopter until late in the approach. I do not believe that I was given adequate separation. If ATC is unable to keep adequate separation of general aviation traffic from a helicopter performing a mission after a VIP TFR; then the FAA should at least issue a NOTAM to advise pilots of the hazard. This NOTAM should indicate the nature of the hazard and it should define how long the hazard will persist; so that pilots can plan their flights to avoid the hazard.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.