Narrative:

During engine start; the number 2 engine did not ignite after the start lever was brought to start position. We ran the boxed item for aborted engine start and referred to the QRH. After blowing out the fuel and waiting the appropriate time and checking circuit breakers; we tried again on the same igniter (right). After another failed ignition; we accomplished the above procedure again and then decided [to] start the number 1 engine on the (right) igniter. We then attempted to start the number 2 engine on the (left) igniter. We did get ignition; but the flight attendant soon called and said we had a flame coming out the back of the engine. We terminated the engine start and verified the flame was out from the flight attendant as well as another carrier who was pushing behind us. We then ran the QRH for tailpipe fire; asked for fire coverage to come take a look at the engine; and returned to gate. Maintenance was called and the procedures were accomplished for the engine check and appropriate MEL. I was so impressed with our passengers' response to the situation. We asked everyone to keep their seats for a few minutes once we were in the gate. I explained to them the situation that they saw was the excess fuel from the first attempt. I further explained that; since there was ignition on the engine this time; there would be no more excess fuel and we were able to identify the problem of the igniters as the primary problem. After the flight was completed without any other occurrences; multiple passengers told me what a great job the flight attendants did during the whole situation and also indicated they appreciated the way the pilots kept them informed and explained things. After filing this report; the assistant chief called me and asked for some qualifying remarks due to a letter from a passenger. After consideration; the assistant chief pointed out that I may have deviated from the QRH by performing a start on the number 2 engine with the (left) igniter. He pointed out that the QRH said to refer to the MEL for dispatching. I would not have dispatched without contacting dispatch but my goal was to get my engines started to move off of the taxiway so I could MEL the igniter as required. Since the (right) igniter is not a MEL event without maintenance and by starting the engine on the number 2 engine; the chiefs thought this could be misconstrued as troubleshooting. Since there is no way of telling if the excess fuel would have been there after maintenance; to MEL a possible inducement to the tailpipe fire. Although it was not my intent to troubleshoot; but to get the engines started to clear the taxiway so I could contact dispatch; I can see where the QRH would have taken me directly back to the gate for maintenance and further instruction. The first officer and I were intent on complying with every aspect of the QRH and even reviewed it and debriefed it after we were airborne. I think I saw something referring to the MEL prior to dispatch was as my discretion as to 'when' (i.e. Cleared of the taxiway; prior to takeoff; and the book updated). In the future I will view this as an 'action' step to be accomplished in order. I think discussion and visibility of these comments might also help others do the same.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 flight crew was notified by a Flight Attendant and another aircraft that they had a tail pipe fire on a third start attempt after completing the QRH following a second no light off start. The aircraft was returned to the gate for maintenance with the Fire Department monitoring.

Narrative: During engine start; the Number 2 Engine did not ignite after the start lever was brought to start position. We ran the boxed item for Aborted Engine Start and referred to the QRH. After blowing out the fuel and waiting the appropriate time and checking circuit breakers; we tried again on the same igniter (right). After another failed ignition; we accomplished the above procedure again and then decided [to] start the Number 1 Engine on the (right) igniter. We then attempted to start the Number 2 Engine on the (left) igniter. We did get ignition; but the Flight Attendant soon called and said we had a flame coming out the back of the engine. We terminated the engine start and verified the flame was out from the Flight Attendant as well as another Carrier who was pushing behind us. We then ran the QRH for Tailpipe Fire; asked for Fire coverage to come take a look at the engine; and returned to gate. Maintenance was called and the procedures were accomplished for the engine check and appropriate MEL. I was so impressed with our passengers' response to the situation. We asked everyone to keep their seats for a few minutes once we were in the gate. I explained to them the situation that they saw was the excess fuel from the first attempt. I further explained that; since there was ignition on the engine this time; there would be no more excess fuel and we were able to identify the problem of the igniters as the primary problem. After the flight was completed without any other occurrences; multiple passengers told me what a great job the flight attendants did during the whole situation and also indicated they appreciated the way the pilots kept them informed and explained things. After filing this report; the Assistant Chief called me and asked for some qualifying remarks due to a letter from a passenger. After consideration; the Assistant Chief pointed out that I may have deviated from the QRH by performing a start on the Number 2 Engine with the (left) igniter. He pointed out that the QRH said to refer to the MEL for dispatching. I would not have dispatched without contacting Dispatch but my goal was to get my engines started to move off of the taxiway so I could MEL the igniter as required. Since the (right) igniter is not a MEL event without Maintenance and by starting the engine on the Number 2 Engine; the chiefs thought this could be misconstrued as troubleshooting. Since there is no way of telling if the excess fuel would have been there after maintenance; to MEL a possible inducement to the tailpipe fire. Although it was not my intent to troubleshoot; but to get the engines started to clear the taxiway so I could contact Dispatch; I can see where the QRH would have taken me directly back to the gate for maintenance and further instruction. The First Officer and I were intent on complying with every aspect of the QRH and even reviewed it and debriefed it after we were airborne. I think I saw something referring to the MEL prior to dispatch was as my discretion as to 'when' (i.e. cleared of the taxiway; prior to takeoff; and the book updated). In the future I will view this as an 'action' step to be accomplished in order. I think discussion and visibility of these comments might also help others do the same.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.