Narrative:

Working with ewr approach control frequency 128.55 we received vectors for the NDB B approach into ldj. We shot the approach and broke out of the overcast approximately 100' above MDA. We sighted the airport and attempted to land on runway 9. However, at approximately 300' AGL we rejected to landing due to altitude, speed, runway conditions and large bird flocks in the immediate runway area. We did not attempt a circle to runway 27, but instead declared a missed approach and requested vectors for another attempt. Everything proceeded normally until the FAF inbound. At this point the controller began insisting that we were 'north of course.' both pilot and copilot RMI's as well as backup RNAV/LORAN indication evidenced that we were exactly on the published final approach course. We double-checked the plate and frequencys to confirm that everything was set up properly. All cockpit indications were that we had arrived at the FAF on course and at the proper altitude. We had no reason whatever to disbelieve our instruments. We continued with the approach, and since we were very busy the first officer simply stated 'correcting' to ATC in hopes that the controller would cease his diatribe. However, at approximately 1700' MSL the controller pulled us off the approach (after previously clearing us for it) insisting that we were too far off course to continue. It cannot be overstated that all cockpit indications were that we had a perfectly good approach in progress after a terse and insulting reprimand for our faulty navigation, the controller requested that we land at ewr. We declined and requested another approach into ldj. Again, everything was normal until the last vector to the final approach course. We were assigned heading 070 degrees to join. Approximately 10 degrees north of the 046 degree inbound course the controller began insisting that we were 'turning in too early again,' and he began another discourse on how we were mismanaging the approach. The first officer clearly informed the controller that we had not deviated from the assigned heading, we were not in a turn, and had not yet intercepted the proper bearing for the approach. The controller then immediately did a turn about and informed us that we were 'on course' at the FAF. At that point in time, we were neither. I disregarded the controller's navigation, and completed the approach according to my own instruments, broke out above minimums on course and completed a normal landing, this time circling to runway 27. I am at a loss to explain the occurrence except that the controller in all probability was receiving poor information on his display. The obvious inconsistency of his plot was evident as the situation unfolded. ATC has made this mistake before, and their equipment is not infallible. A PIC cannot allow himself to be intimidated by a controller who is 'never wrong,' and neither can ATC afford to allow themselves this foolish and dangerous assumption. The final responsibility lies with the pilot, not the controller. Such occurrences could be avoided if controllers would double-check with the pilot before issuing absurd and contradictory (from the crew's standpoint) instructions. In addition, insulting reprimands and editorial comments are never welcome, and serve only to distract a crew from their more pressing responsibilities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT ON AN IFR APCH SHOWED OFF COURSE ON RADAR WHILE ACFT NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT INDICATED ON COURSE.

Narrative: WORKING WITH EWR APCH CTL FREQ 128.55 WE RECEIVED VECTORS FOR THE NDB B APCH INTO LDJ. WE SHOT THE APCH AND BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST APPROX 100' ABOVE MDA. WE SIGHTED THE ARPT AND ATTEMPTED TO LAND ON RWY 9. HOWEVER, AT APPROX 300' AGL WE REJECTED TO LNDG DUE TO ALT, SPD, RWY CONDITIONS AND LARGE BIRD FLOCKS IN THE IMMEDIATE RWY AREA. WE DID NOT ATTEMPT A CIRCLE TO RWY 27, BUT INSTEAD DECLARED A MISSED APCH AND REQUESTED VECTORS FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT. EVERYTHING PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL THE FAF INBND. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR BEGAN INSISTING THAT WE WERE 'N OF COURSE.' BOTH PLT AND COPLT RMI'S AS WELL AS BACKUP RNAV/LORAN INDICATION EVIDENCED THAT WE WERE EXACTLY ON THE PUBLISHED FINAL APCH COURSE. WE DOUBLE-CHKED THE PLATE AND FREQS TO CONFIRM THAT EVERYTHING WAS SET UP PROPERLY. ALL COCKPIT INDICATIONS WERE THAT WE HAD ARRIVED AT THE FAF ON COURSE AND AT THE PROPER ALT. WE HAD NO REASON WHATEVER TO DISBELIEVE OUR INSTRUMENTS. WE CONTINUED WITH THE APCH, AND SINCE WE WERE VERY BUSY THE F/O SIMPLY STATED 'CORRECTING' TO ATC IN HOPES THAT THE CTLR WOULD CEASE HIS DIATRIBE. HOWEVER, AT APPROX 1700' MSL THE CTLR PULLED US OFF THE APCH (AFTER PREVIOUSLY CLRING US FOR IT) INSISTING THAT WE WERE TOO FAR OFF COURSE TO CONTINUE. IT CANNOT BE OVERSTATED THAT ALL COCKPIT INDICATIONS WERE THAT WE HAD A PERFECTLY GOOD APCH IN PROGRESS AFTER A TERSE AND INSULTING REPRIMAND FOR OUR FAULTY NAV, THE CTLR REQUESTED THAT WE LAND AT EWR. WE DECLINED AND REQUESTED ANOTHER APCH INTO LDJ. AGAIN, EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UNTIL THE LAST VECTOR TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE. WE WERE ASSIGNED HDG 070 DEGS TO JOIN. APPROX 10 DEGS N OF THE 046 DEG INBND COURSE THE CTLR BEGAN INSISTING THAT WE WERE 'TURNING IN TOO EARLY AGAIN,' AND HE BEGAN ANOTHER DISCOURSE ON HOW WE WERE MISMANAGING THE APCH. THE F/O CLEARLY INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE HAD NOT DEVIATED FROM THE ASSIGNED HDG, WE WERE NOT IN A TURN, AND HAD NOT YET INTERCEPTED THE PROPER BEARING FOR THE APCH. THE CTLR THEN IMMEDIATELY DID A TURN ABOUT AND INFORMED US THAT WE WERE 'ON COURSE' AT THE FAF. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, WE WERE NEITHER. I DISREGARDED THE CTLR'S NAV, AND COMPLETED THE APCH ACCORDING TO MY OWN INSTRUMENTS, BROKE OUT ABOVE MINIMUMS ON COURSE AND COMPLETED A NORMAL LNDG, THIS TIME CIRCLING TO RWY 27. I AM AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN THE OCCURRENCE EXCEPT THAT THE CTLR IN ALL PROBABILITY WAS RECEIVING POOR INFO ON HIS DISPLAY. THE OBVIOUS INCONSISTENCY OF HIS PLOT WAS EVIDENT AS THE SITUATION UNFOLDED. ATC HAS MADE THIS MISTAKE BEFORE, AND THEIR EQUIP IS NOT INFALLIBLE. A PIC CANNOT ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE INTIMIDATED BY A CTLR WHO IS 'NEVER WRONG,' AND NEITHER CAN ATC AFFORD TO ALLOW THEMSELVES THIS FOOLISH AND DANGEROUS ASSUMPTION. THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE PLT, NOT THE CTLR. SUCH OCCURRENCES COULD BE AVOIDED IF CTLRS WOULD DOUBLE-CHK WITH THE PLT BEFORE ISSUING ABSURD AND CONTRADICTORY (FROM THE CREW'S STANDPOINT) INSTRUCTIONS. IN ADDITION, INSULTING REPRIMANDS AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS ARE NEVER WELCOME, AND SERVE ONLY TO DISTRACT A CREW FROM THEIR MORE PRESSING RESPONSIBILITIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.