Narrative:

Failure to effect a radar handoff from cle ARTCC sector 52 to ny ARTCC sector 27. Discovered that the radar handoff was not completed properly approximately 3 mins after having switched the aircraft to ZNY's sector 27 frequency. The aircraft was mdt, IFR from dtw to lns. I promptly advised the ZNY sector controller of the mistake. No loss of sep occurred, although the aircraft was approximately 15 mi inside of ZNY's airspace, on sector 27's frequency. Approximately 10 aircraft were being handled at this time. I feel the factor that most contributed to this situation was inadequate staffing at ZOB's sector 52. I was the only controller working the sector. Before this mistake occurred, a fellow controller had returned from a break to relieve who ever was next in the break rotation. I requested that the controller help me by performing the manual controller position duties at sector 52. The controller did so, albeit reluctantly, as he did not sign on or plug in to the position, but simply handled the flight strips. After a few mins, when the traffic decreased somewhat, the controller then left and relieved the controller at the sector 51 radar position. Shortly after this, complexity increased (wherein a considerable amount of verbal coordination with other sectors was required) and the radar handoff on mdt was inadvertently not accomplished. My recommendation as how to prevent a recurrence of such a situation is to increase the minimum staffing at all sector so a minimum of 2 controllers will always be present to handle the unpredictable traffic/complexity loads that a controller is faced with throughout his shift. Current staffing policy allows for 3 of 6 sectors within our area of specialization to be operated with only 1 controller, often at the discretion of the controllers assigned. Such a discretionary practice in staffing sectors does not adequately protect for those unpredictable events, where traffic and/or complexity suddenly peak for 5-10 min periods.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT PENETRATED ADJACENT FAC'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT A HANDOFF. OPERATIONAL DEVIATION.

Narrative: FAILURE TO EFFECT A RADAR HDOF FROM CLE ARTCC SECTOR 52 TO NY ARTCC SECTOR 27. DISCOVERED THAT THE RADAR HDOF WAS NOT COMPLETED PROPERLY APPROX 3 MINS AFTER HAVING SWITCHED THE ACFT TO ZNY'S SECTOR 27 FREQ. THE ACFT WAS MDT, IFR FROM DTW TO LNS. I PROMPTLY ADVISED THE ZNY SECTOR CTLR OF THE MISTAKE. NO LOSS OF SEP OCCURRED, ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WAS APPROX 15 MI INSIDE OF ZNY'S AIRSPACE, ON SECTOR 27'S FREQ. APPROX 10 ACFT WERE BEING HANDLED AT THIS TIME. I FEEL THE FACTOR THAT MOST CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SITUATION WAS INADEQUATE STAFFING AT ZOB'S SECTOR 52. I WAS THE ONLY CTLR WORKING THE SECTOR. BEFORE THIS MISTAKE OCCURRED, A FELLOW CTLR HAD RETURNED FROM A BREAK TO RELIEVE WHO EVER WAS NEXT IN THE BREAK ROTATION. I REQUESTED THAT THE CTLR HELP ME BY PERFORMING THE MANUAL CTLR POS DUTIES AT SECTOR 52. THE CTLR DID SO, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, AS HE DID NOT SIGN ON OR PLUG IN TO THE POS, BUT SIMPLY HANDLED THE FLT STRIPS. AFTER A FEW MINS, WHEN THE TFC DECREASED SOMEWHAT, THE CTLR THEN LEFT AND RELIEVED THE CTLR AT THE SECTOR 51 RADAR POS. SHORTLY AFTER THIS, COMPLEXITY INCREASED (WHEREIN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF VERBAL COORD WITH OTHER SECTORS WAS REQUIRED) AND THE RADAR HDOF ON MDT WAS INADVERTENTLY NOT ACCOMPLISHED. MY RECOMMENDATION AS HOW TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF SUCH A SITUATION IS TO INCREASE THE MINIMUM STAFFING AT ALL SECTOR SO A MINIMUM OF 2 CTLRS WILL ALWAYS BE PRESENT TO HANDLE THE UNPREDICTABLE TFC/COMPLEXITY LOADS THAT A CTLR IS FACED WITH THROUGHOUT HIS SHIFT. CURRENT STAFFING POLICY ALLOWS FOR 3 OF 6 SECTORS WITHIN OUR AREA OF SPECIALIZATION TO BE OPERATED WITH ONLY 1 CTLR, OFTEN AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CTLRS ASSIGNED. SUCH A DISCRETIONARY PRACTICE IN STAFFING SECTORS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT FOR THOSE UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS, WHERE TFC AND/OR COMPLEXITY SUDDENLY PEAK FOR 5-10 MIN PERIODS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.