Narrative:

After release and delivery to the gate of a B737-800 aircraft from a c-check; discussions took place as to whether the drain holes were installed in the repair doubler on the right-hand (right/H) horizontal stabilizer. It was determined that the holes needed to be there and the aircraft be routed back to the maintenance base and inspected for drain holes. Upon arrival at the gate; the inspection of the doubler revealed that the drain holes were not there. The drain holes were located; drilled and treated at the gate. The paperwork was signed-off (deferred item) and the aircraft was returned to service. There was an engineering authorization (ea) issued that provided deviations from the structural repair manual (srm) with the aircraft manufacturer's approval. However; the ea did not address the drain holes; creating some confusion among those performing the task. Once engineering was asked about the holes; clarification was made. Recommend following the paperwork more closely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Maintenance Inspector; Maintenance Supervisor; company Engineer and a Mechanic report drain holes were not drilled at a repair doubler on the lower surface of the Right-Hand Horizontal Stabilizer of a B737-800 aircraft prior to departure.

Narrative: After release and delivery to the gate of a B737-800 aircraft from a C-Check; discussions took place as to whether the drain holes were installed in the Repair Doubler on the Right-Hand (R/H) Horizontal Stabilizer. It was determined that the holes needed to be there and the aircraft be routed back to the Maintenance Base and inspected for drain holes. Upon arrival at the gate; the inspection of the doubler revealed that the drain holes were not there. The drain holes were located; drilled and treated at the gate. The paperwork was signed-off (deferred item) and the aircraft was returned to service. There was an Engineering Authorization (EA) issued that provided deviations from the Structural Repair Manual (SRM) with the Aircraft Manufacturer's approval. However; the EA did not address the drain holes; creating some confusion among those performing the task. Once Engineering was asked about the holes; clarification was made. Recommend following the paperwork more closely.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.