Narrative:

We were planning a flight and had been monitoring a line of weather from the midwest to the gulf of mexico. We found what looked to be the lowest spot but improving; and when it got to 1;500 ft ceilings; we launched. En route the ceilings were going lower; but we could still see light below them with good visibility. The pilot flying elected to press on. I was looking at the sectional; noticed that up ahead was a wind farm; and notified the pilot. He had gone off the planned track to vector around weather; so I wasn't exactly sure where we were. I thought the wind farm was about 5-10 miles ahead. About 30 seconds after I notified the pilot; he saw the supports of one turbine ahead; with the tops in the clouds. He added power and began to climb. We were immediately in IMC. The pilot flying is very experienced; but not recently on round dials. As he climbed; I attempted to call center for a pop-up. There were 4 frequencies nearby on the chart; but no one answered. Another non-flying pilot onboard noticed we were picking up ice and ran the carburetor heat and other engine controls for me as I dealt with radios. As we neared 9;500 ft; we broke out between layers. I was able to get approach for a pop-up; although we remained in VMC the rest of the way to our filed destination. Several contributing factors were involved in this event. One; we had departed late; and there was pressure to make it to base for a planned demo and static display. Two; there was a steep authority gradient in the cockpit. The pilot flying is also the owner of the airplane and we do things his way. I suggested returning to an en route airport for landing; but was dismissed. I did not feel I could speak up again. Three; the pilot flying had lots of bush experience in alaska and felt we could make it. We did right in climbing immediately; but I am not proud we flew into these conditions with passengers onboard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B-25 First Officer reported that at an 800 FT cruise altitude the aircraft deviated from the planned track for weather and then encountered a wind farm; which forced a climb into IMC with icing and an IFR clearance.

Narrative: We were planning a flight and had been monitoring a line of weather from the Midwest to the Gulf of Mexico. We found what looked to be the lowest spot but improving; and when it got to 1;500 FT ceilings; we launched. En route the ceilings were going lower; but we could still see light below them with good visibility. The pilot flying elected to press on. I was looking at the sectional; noticed that up ahead was a wind farm; and notified the pilot. He had gone off the planned track to vector around weather; so I wasn't exactly sure where we were. I thought the wind farm was about 5-10 miles ahead. About 30 seconds after I notified the pilot; he saw the supports of one turbine ahead; with the tops in the clouds. He added power and began to climb. We were immediately in IMC. The pilot flying is very experienced; but not recently on round dials. As he climbed; I attempted to call Center for a pop-up. There were 4 frequencies nearby on the chart; but no one answered. Another non-flying pilot onboard noticed we were picking up ice and ran the carburetor heat and other engine controls for me as I dealt with radios. As we neared 9;500 FT; we broke out between layers. I was able to get Approach for a pop-up; although we remained in VMC the rest of the way to our filed destination. Several contributing factors were involved in this event. One; we had departed late; and there was pressure to make it to base for a planned demo and static display. Two; there was a steep authority gradient in the cockpit. The pilot flying is also the owner of the airplane and we do things his way. I suggested returning to an en route airport for landing; but was dismissed. I did not feel I could speak up again. Three; the pilot flying had lots of bush experience in Alaska and felt we could make it. We did right in climbing immediately; but I am not proud we flew into these conditions with passengers onboard.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.