Narrative:

The event I will describe started as a rather innocuous flight crew error that due to some poor decision making almost turned into a very public professional embarrassment. We were assigned arrival gate # [1]. The key to this whole event is that both the captain and I; although stating gate # [1] numerous times from commencement of the arrival tasks on; were actually thinking of gate # [2]. I can't speak for the captain; but I looked at my -7 page and still mentally pictured it as gate # [2] for some reason. We landed on 17L and after crossing 17R on taxiway F; we called ground control. We were instructed to taxi to the ramp via G and H1. Now keeping in mind we were thinking gate # [2] (incorrect); I queried the controller and said; 'we are going to gate # [1] in the alley.' she; the ground controller; replied; 'I know; but taxiway J is blocked.' at the time; we were confused as to why this mattered. We continued north on G. As we passed taxiway H3; and could see the alleyway to gate # [2]; we saw it was wide open with no airplanes in the alley or at the gates. I remarked to the captain that these instructions made no sense and I was going to ask ground control to again state the route she desired. At this point; the frequency became very busy and as we approached G1 at the limit of fom acceptable taxi speed for cornering; I suggested to the captain that maybe we should stop short of G1 until I talked to ground again. He stated 'no; she'll get over this;' and immediately initiated a turn onto the ramp at G1; contrary to our taxi clearance. I am not sure if I expected him to continue to go straight to H1 or to accept my suggestion to stop short (which I have done numerous times in similar circumstances); but I was not expecting him to turn into the ramp and; as such; had no time to formulate an appropriate intervention. Just like that; we were off the movement area and on the uncontrolled ramp. As soon as we got our nose into the alley; we realized our mistake; and all the confusing communication with ground control instantaneously became brutally clear. Luckily; there was enough room to execute a 180; and as soon as we turned; we saw another airplane coming our way. I got on the radio; got a hold of them; and they stopped and made room for us to go to our proper gate. Around this time; ground operations was all over us on the radio asking where we were going because the ramp was nervous we were going to mess everything up. We taxied to the gate on the non-movement area without further issue. A couple of more bad breaks and we could have ended up nose to nose with another airplane with nowhere to go. Aside from a little embarrassment; this could have been much worse. If the captain had stopped short of G1 and allowed me to ask the controller for clarification; as I had suggested; the error chain; in all likelihood; would have been broken immediately. Granted; after the fact the captain apologized to all the right people; myself included; and took full responsibility; but the question remains - why did it have to take such a visible error to make him realize my suggestion may have had some merit?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew received clearance to taxi to a certain gate; but had another gate in mind and proceeded to taxi to the wrong gate. The error was realized before a serious traffic conflict materialized. Reporting First Officer attributes part of the problem to lack of good CRM on the Captain's part.

Narrative: The event I will describe started as a rather innocuous flight crew error that due to some poor decision making almost turned into a very public professional embarrassment. We were assigned arrival Gate # [1]. The key to this whole event is that both the Captain and I; although stating Gate # [1] numerous times from commencement of the arrival tasks on; were actually thinking of Gate # [2]. I can't speak for the Captain; but I looked at my -7 page and still mentally pictured it as Gate # [2] for some reason. We landed on 17L and after crossing 17R on Taxiway F; we called Ground Control. We were instructed to taxi to the ramp via G and H1. Now keeping in mind we were thinking Gate # [2] (incorrect); I queried the Controller and said; 'We are going to Gate # [1] in the alley.' She; the Ground Controller; replied; 'I know; but Taxiway J is blocked.' At the time; we were confused as to why this mattered. We continued north on G. As we passed Taxiway H3; and could see the alleyway to Gate # [2]; we saw it was wide open with no airplanes in the alley or at the gates. I remarked to the Captain that these instructions made no sense and I was going to ask Ground Control to again state the route she desired. At this point; the frequency became very busy and as we approached G1 at the limit of FOM acceptable taxi speed for cornering; I suggested to the Captain that maybe we should stop short of G1 until I talked to Ground again. He stated 'No; she'll get over this;' and immediately initiated a turn onto the ramp at G1; contrary to our taxi clearance. I am not sure if I expected him to continue to go straight to H1 or to accept my suggestion to stop short (which I have done numerous times in similar circumstances); but I was not expecting him to turn into the ramp and; as such; had no time to formulate an appropriate intervention. Just like that; we were off the movement area and on the uncontrolled ramp. As soon as we got our nose into the alley; we realized our mistake; and all the confusing communication with Ground Control instantaneously became brutally clear. Luckily; there was enough room to execute a 180; and as soon as we turned; we saw another airplane coming our way. I got on the radio; got a hold of them; and they stopped and made room for us to go to our proper gate. Around this time; Ground Operations was all over us on the radio asking where we were going because the Ramp was nervous we were going to mess everything up. We taxied to the gate on the non-movement area without further issue. A couple of more bad breaks and we could have ended up nose to nose with another airplane with nowhere to go. Aside from a little embarrassment; this could have been much worse. If the Captain had stopped short of G1 and allowed me to ask the Controller for clarification; as I had suggested; the error chain; in all likelihood; would have been broken immediately. Granted; after the fact the Captain apologized to all the right people; myself included; and took full responsibility; but the question remains - why did it have to take such a visible error to make him realize my suggestion may have had some merit?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.