Narrative:

Prior to takeoff; the first officer (flying pilot) and I reviewed the offshore five departure procedure out of sfo as part of our before takeoff check. This was the first time I had flown this particular departure. 28R would be the runway used. The instructions stated 'intercept and proceed via sfo R-281/D6 at or above 2;500 ft. Sfo VOR was not inoperative. The routing read 'turn left to a heading of 200 to intercept and proceed via pye R-151 to segul; then...' we also discussed crossing restrictions that would occur during the initial climb. Those included 16;000 or above at segul and FL220 or above at cyprs. I programmed the FMS (global GNS-xls) and noticed the first fix in the box was wammy. We backed up the departure with appropriate VOR frequencies and radials. Upon take off; we proceeded via the departure. At 2;500 ft; the first officer turned to a heading of 200 to intercept the depicted route. The norcal controller then stated that we should have maintained runway heading. I inquired; 'are you sure? We were following the offshore 5 departure.' she then replied that we should have waited until 6 DME off the sfo VOR prior to making the turn. She then gave us a heading to fly (240 degrees). Prior to handing us over to the next controller; she suggested that we review the departure procedures a little closer next time. I apologized for the inconvenience. No further action was taken. Upon review of the procedure; I discovered that the appropriate turn (at 6 DME) was depicted in the graphical section of the SID. We had focused more on the 'narrative' section and consequently inferred that the turn to 200 was to occur after reaching 2;500 ft. We reached 2;500 ft at about 3.5 - 4 DME of the sfo VOR and as a result; turned too early.first off; I am thankful that we did not create any traffic conflicts. I am also thankful the controller chose not to pursue action against us. This situation has emphasized to me that it is important to review the graphical and narrative portions of a SID and/or STAR to ensure that (either as pilot flying or in this case pilot monitoring) the procedure is flown correctly. If I could make some suggestions about this procedure; I would say the following: 1) make note of the turn (6 DME) in the narrative; 2) enlarge the chart to focus on that point 6 DME from the VOR. Looking at the plate now; that point is in the upper left corner of the diagram. I feel it can easily be overlooked. 3) find a way to incorporate senzy (the waypoint located at 6 DME) into future FMS loads. I realize this is not an RNAV departure; however; if I would have noticed the fix senzy prior to departing; I would have built it into the FMS as added situational awareness. These suggestions listed above are not meant to be excuses for the error this afternoon. I will certainly pay more attention to the various parts (narrative/text and graphical depictions) of the sids/stars that I fly. I write this report as if I was the pilot flying; I was the pilot monitoring in this situation. As PIC; however; I am responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. Even as the pilot monitoring; it is important that I assist the first officer during time of need and monitor his/her actions to ensure the safety of operations. In regards to human factors; this was leg 4 of 4 of a 12 hour duty day; however; at the time; I felt awake and alert. The first officer and I missed the depiction of the point at which we were to make the turn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE560 Captain departing SFO Runway 28R reports turning left to 200 degrees at 2;500 FT on the Offshore 5 departure instead of the 6 DME point as depicted. ATC points out the error.

Narrative: Prior to takeoff; the First Officer (flying pilot) and I reviewed the Offshore Five Departure procedure out of SFO as part of our before takeoff check. This was the first time I had flown this particular departure. 28R would be the runway used. The instructions stated 'intercept and proceed via SFO R-281/D6 at or above 2;500 FT. SFO VOR was not inoperative. The routing read 'turn left to a heading of 200 to intercept and proceed via PYE R-151 to SEGUL; then...' We also discussed crossing restrictions that would occur during the initial climb. Those included 16;000 or above at SEGUL and FL220 or above at CYPRS. I programmed the FMS (Global GNS-XLS) and noticed the first fix in the box was WAMMY. We backed up the departure with appropriate VOR frequencies and radials. Upon take off; we proceeded via the departure. At 2;500 FT; the First Officer turned to a heading of 200 to intercept the depicted route. The NORCAL Controller then stated that we should have maintained runway heading. I inquired; 'Are you sure? We were following the OffShore 5 Departure.' She then replied that we should have waited until 6 DME off the SFO VOR prior to making the turn. She then gave us a heading to fly (240 degrees). Prior to handing us over to the next Controller; she suggested that we review the departure procedures a little closer next time. I apologized for the inconvenience. No further action was taken. Upon review of the procedure; I discovered that the appropriate turn (at 6 DME) was depicted in the graphical section of the SID. We had focused more on the 'narrative' section and consequently inferred that the turn to 200 was to occur after reaching 2;500 FT. We reached 2;500 FT at about 3.5 - 4 DME of the SFO VOR and as a result; turned too early.First off; I am thankful that we did not create any traffic conflicts. I am also thankful the controller chose not to pursue action against us. This situation has emphasized to me that it is important to review the graphical and narrative portions of a SID and/or STAR to ensure that (either as pilot flying or in this case Pilot Monitoring) the procedure is flown correctly. If I could make some suggestions about this procedure; I would say the following: 1) Make note of the turn (6 DME) in the narrative; 2) Enlarge the chart to focus on that point 6 DME from the VOR. Looking at the plate now; that point is in the upper left corner of the diagram. I feel it can easily be overlooked. 3) Find a way to incorporate SENZY (the waypoint located at 6 DME) into future FMS loads. I realize this is not an RNAV departure; however; if I would have noticed the fix SENZY prior to departing; I would have built it into the FMS as added situational awareness. These suggestions listed above are not meant to be excuses for the error this afternoon. I will certainly pay more attention to the various parts (narrative/text and graphical depictions) of the SIDs/STARs that I fly. I write this report as if I was the pilot flying; I was the pilot monitoring in this situation. As PIC; however; I am responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. Even as the pilot monitoring; it is important that I assist the First Officer during time of need and monitor his/her actions to ensure the safety of operations. In regards to human factors; this was Leg 4 of 4 of a 12 hour duty day; however; at the time; I felt awake and alert. The first officer and I missed the depiction of the point at which we were to make the turn.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.