Narrative:

Departing engine # 1 thrust reverser inoperative and on MEL. Captain is flying pilot. On the takeoff roll; after making the 80 KTS call and looking back to the engine instruments I noticed the oil quantity was at 7 qts; I called the abnormal oil level out to the captain. Immediately after bringing this to the captain's attention the oil quantity was now showing 2.5 qts and pulsing. I said to the captain 'oil is now at 2.5 qts.' the captain then chose to reject the takeoff at approximately 125 KTS; V1 was 135 KTS. The aircraft came to a full stop; on the center line of runway 36. I made the call to the tower and notified them of the reject while the aircraft was coming to a stop. After the aircraft came to a full stop; the captain made his PA announcement to the cabin. We assessed the situation; turned on the brake fans and taxied clear of the runway and into the ramp. While waiting for our gate and communicating with maintenance and the company the oil level was now showing normal. We returned to the gate and wrote the malfunction up in the fdml. The brake temps rose to approximately 760 degrees C and then cooled with the brake fans on. Maintenance then informed us that this aircraft had a history of this oil quantity indicator problem and the flight was canceled. After seeing the oil quantity drop rapidly to 2.5 qts and pulsing; we believed that we had lost the oil from the number 1 engine and that an engine failure was imminent. We were below V1; so the decision was made to reject the take off. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the reasons to reject a take off above 80 KTS would have led to a different decision about rejecting at a high speed. The previous statement is a reference to myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320-200 Captain rejected a takeoff at 125 KTS after the oil quantity decreased to 2.5 QTS during the takeoff roll and after arrival at the gate the crew was told the aircraft history indicated a quantity indicating problem so the flight was canceled.

Narrative: Departing Engine # 1 thrust reverser inoperative and on MEL. Captain is flying pilot. On the takeoff roll; after making the 80 KTS call and looking back to the engine instruments I noticed the oil quantity was at 7 QTS; I called the abnormal oil level out to the Captain. Immediately after bringing this to the Captain's attention the oil quantity was now showing 2.5 QTS and pulsing. I said to the Captain 'oil is now at 2.5 QTS.' The Captain then chose to reject the takeoff at approximately 125 KTS; V1 was 135 KTS. The aircraft came to a full stop; on the center line of Runway 36. I made the call to the Tower and notified them of the reject while the aircraft was coming to a stop. After the aircraft came to a full stop; the Captain made his PA announcement to the cabin. We assessed the situation; turned on the brake fans and taxied clear of the runway and into the ramp. While waiting for our gate and communicating with maintenance and the company the oil level was now showing normal. We returned to the gate and wrote the malfunction up in the FDML. The brake temps rose to approximately 760 degrees C and then cooled with the brake fans on. Maintenance then informed us that this aircraft had a history of this oil quantity indicator problem and the flight was canceled. After seeing the oil quantity drop rapidly to 2.5 QTS and pulsing; we believed that we had lost the oil from the number 1 engine and that an engine failure was imminent. We were below V1; so the decision was made to reject the take off. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the reasons to reject a take off above 80 KTS would have led to a different decision about rejecting at a high speed. The previous statement is a reference to myself.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.