Narrative:

After landing on 28R I was instructed to hold short of 28L. After slowing down and turning left on taxiway F; I thought this would be an opportunity to test my newly acquired software with approach and taxi charts on my ipad. As I looked at it; it still was showing an approach chart and not the taxi diagram. I looked up and I was still some distance from the first set of yellow lines (solid first and then intermittent; so still in the area of 28R runway). I returned to try to display the taxi diagram on the ipad. I couldn't do it in a few seconds - I estimate around 3- so I looked out again. Just then I realized the short distance between the runways when one taxis perpendicular to it. At this time I was already over the other set of pavement markings - solid first and then intermittent- indicating I was entering the upwind threshold of 28L. I realized that braking now would stop me in the runway itself. I thought it safer to definitely cross without braking until I was completely out of the runway; since there was a cessna on final to 28L and I would be out of the way by the time he touched down if I went through. By attempting to abruptly stop I would have stopped partially obstructing the runway itself. My essential mistake was complacency. I am familiar with [the airport] and I thought this would be an opportunity to test a GPS as an aid. But unfamiliarity with the device robbed my capacity for situational awareness and also to correctly interpret the significantly shorter time available for taxi on the less familiar perpendicular exit on F rather than on the diagonal parallel to runway 23. I should have devoted complete attention to the tasks at hand - taxiing and confirming outside references- rather than thinking that because I am familiar with the airport I can maintain situational awareness despite distractions like the new ipad.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: M20 pilot; distracted by trying to call up the airport diagram on his iPad; taxied onto an active runway without clearance.

Narrative: After landing on 28R I was instructed to hold short of 28L. After slowing down and turning left on Taxiway F; I thought this would be an opportunity to test my newly acquired software with approach and taxi charts on my iPad. As I looked at it; it still was showing an approach chart and not the taxi diagram. I looked up and I was still some distance from the first set of yellow lines (solid first and then intermittent; so still in the area of 28R runway). I returned to try to display the taxi diagram on the iPad. I couldn't do it in a few seconds - I estimate around 3- so I looked out again. Just then I realized the short distance between the runways when one taxis perpendicular to it. At this time I was already over the other set of pavement markings - solid first and then intermittent- indicating I was entering the upwind threshold of 28L. I realized that braking now would stop me in the runway itself. I thought it safer to definitely cross without braking until I was completely out of the runway; since there was a Cessna on final to 28L and I would be out of the way by the time he touched down if I went through. By attempting to abruptly stop I would have stopped partially obstructing the runway itself. My essential mistake was complacency. I am familiar with [the airport] and I thought this would be an opportunity to test a GPS as an aid. But unfamiliarity with the device robbed my capacity for situational awareness and also to correctly interpret the significantly shorter time available for taxi on the less familiar perpendicular exit on F rather than on the diagonal parallel to Runway 23. I should have devoted complete attention to the tasks at hand - taxiing and confirming outside references- rather than thinking that because I am familiar with the airport I can maintain situational awareness despite distractions like the new iPad.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.