Narrative:

On takeoff; maximum thrust at near maximum takeoff weight; we experienced loud bangs; shaking and vibrations right at gear retraction. Captain was the pilot not flying on this leg. There were no associated EICAS warning/caution alerts (audible or visible) at this time. There had been a previous issue with the nose strut from a recent prior logbook entry; thus we all thought that the nose gear had some problem. With the noise and vibrations that were happening at the time; I elected to cycle the gear back down to see if extending the nose gear would help the situation. By this time in the climb out; we went into the clouds and we then saw red flashes from the left side of the aircraft and associated bangs. It was also at this time; I saw a red flashing engine #1 N1 indication on the upper EICAS display. It read approximately 114.5 to best of my knowledge. We all saw the indication immediately and the relief pilot asked me to check the secondary engine instruments. We determined the engine was in distress and I got the B747-400 quick reference checklist and we secured the #1 engine using the severe damage checklist. The relief pilot took over talking to ATC. The first officer had continued the climb out complying with the STAR and then was given a vector off of the departure after we declared the emergency and had stabilized the situation. In this situation; the cleanup of the aircraft took place after the engine was secured; which is nonstandard to our training. This happened without any of us questioning why we were securing the engine prior to cleanup. We talked about this decision later and agreed that the bangs and shaking were violent enough that the engine needed to be secured right away before any other damage to the aircraft could occur from engine #1's condition at that time. With the engine secured; we asked for vectors to a fuel dumping area and asked for a climb to a higher altitude. Once we were given permission; we started dumping fuel. We dumped approximately 220;000 pounds of fuel to get to below maximum landing weight. We set up for an ILS and I took over as the flying pilot at that time and briefed for an ILS autoland. We coordinated for crash fire rescue equipment to meet the aircraft after landing to inspect the aircraft and engine for damage. The landing was uneventful. We taxied off the runway and once crash fire rescue equipment inspected the aircraft and we were cleared; we taxied back to the ramp and shutdown normally. We elected to leave the flaps extended so maintenance could inspect for any damage. Of note; this aircraft had an engineering order placed on the #1 engine the previous day; from a borescope inspection that showed damage to the 1st and 2nd stages of the engine blades. Because of this previous logbook write up; we had actually been concerned with the engine and I elected to do a 20 second 70% runup prior to brake release on takeoff to check engine vibration levels. They appeared normal at that time; so we proceeded with the takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747-400 flight crew describe the events surrounding an engine failure and in flight shutdown shortly after takeoff. The noise and vibration coming from the number one engine sufficiently unnerved the three pilot flight crew so the engine was shutdown before the aircraft was cleaned up. The engine was scheduled for replacement due to blade damage; but was deemed serviceable by Maintenance and the Manufacturer.

Narrative: On takeoff; maximum thrust at near maximum takeoff weight; we experienced loud bangs; shaking and vibrations right at gear retraction. Captain was the pilot not flying on this leg. There were no associated EICAS warning/caution alerts (audible or visible) at this time. There had been a previous issue with the nose strut from a recent prior logbook entry; thus we all thought that the nose gear had some problem. With the noise and vibrations that were happening at the time; I elected to cycle the gear back down to see if extending the nose gear would help the situation. By this time in the climb out; we went into the clouds and we then saw red flashes from the left side of the aircraft and associated bangs. It was also at this time; I saw a red flashing Engine #1 N1 indication on the upper EICAS display. It read approximately 114.5 to best of my knowledge. We all saw the indication immediately and the Relief Pilot asked me to check the secondary engine instruments. We determined the engine was in distress and I got the B747-400 Quick Reference Checklist and we secured the #1 Engine using the Severe Damage Checklist. The Relief Pilot took over talking to ATC. The First Officer had continued the climb out complying with the STAR and then was given a vector off of the departure after we declared the emergency and had stabilized the situation. In this situation; the cleanup of the aircraft took place after the engine was secured; which is nonstandard to our training. This happened without any of us questioning why we were securing the engine prior to cleanup. We talked about this decision later and agreed that the bangs and shaking were violent enough that the engine needed to be secured right away before any other damage to the aircraft could occur from Engine #1's condition at that time. With the engine secured; we asked for vectors to a fuel dumping area and asked for a climb to a higher altitude. Once we were given permission; we started dumping fuel. We dumped approximately 220;000 LBS of fuel to get to below maximum landing weight. We set up for an ILS and I took over as the flying pilot at that time and briefed for an ILS autoland. We coordinated for CFR to meet the aircraft after landing to inspect the aircraft and engine for damage. The landing was uneventful. We taxied off the runway and once CFR inspected the aircraft and we were cleared; we taxied back to the ramp and shutdown normally. We elected to leave the flaps extended so maintenance could inspect for any damage. Of Note; this aircraft had an Engineering Order placed on the #1 Engine the previous day; from a borescope inspection that showed damage to the 1st and 2nd stages of the engine blades. Because of this previous logbook write up; we had actually been concerned with the engine and I elected to do a 20 second 70% runup prior to brake release on takeoff to check engine vibration levels. They appeared normal at that time; so we proceeded with the takeoff.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.